

which, according to the author, succeeded the illumination. But in England nationalization certainly began with Hobbes, however little Locke may have derived directly from him and from Bacon and however much he may have been influenced by Descartes.

Philosophy since Kant is treated very briefly and with Professor Turner's customary clearness.

In addition to the men and schools usually included in histories of philosophy there is an interesting chapter on the Traditional School in France, including De Bonald and Lamennais, and a summary of Catholic philosophy in the nineteenth century.

There are no very important omissions. Easmus Darwin's blundering attempts at an evolutionary theory might have procured him mention among the early contributors to the modern development of that theory; Thomas Hooker should have a place among British moralists, and Herschel among those who contributed to the development of scientific method. One anachronism should be noted. On page 637, Hickok is spoken of as a Spencerian. He was in sympathy with evolution, but most of his works were published before Spencer had worked out his theory.

Professor Turner's work as a whole belongs to the class of those which trace the history of systems rather than the development of concepts. He recognizes the fact that the history of thought is an organic growth and not a dialectical process. He appreciates the influence of political and social conditions, but the details of this influence, the concrete application of the principle might be very much more complete. He would, doubtless, admit that the history of thought is a phase of the history of civilization, but its relation to the other phases of this development is merely suggested. A closer articulation of the development of thought with the development of other forms of human activity is much to be desired. Professor Turner, in his paragraphs on the historical position of every important thinker or school, shows the relation of system to system so clearly that we can only regret that he did not give us also the relation of systems to the thought of the theologians and that of unsystematic thinkers, the Humanist, the early scientist and the unphilosophical public, and their relation to the development of art and of industry. But an elementary history of philosophy is practically limited to one volume and Professor Turner does not attempt to include everything. His book will be a very useful text or book of reference, particularly for the period which he has treated most thoroughly.

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*Philosophisches Lesebuch.* Herausgegeben von MAX DESSOIR und PAUL MENZER. Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke, 1903.

This is a book of 258 rather large and closely printed pages, containing selections from seventeen different philosophers and comments upon them. About two thirds of the pages are devoted to the extracts, one third to the comments; but the latter are printed in somewhat smaller type.

The selections chosen are as follows.—Plato: the doctrine of ideas; the idea of the good and the doctrine of knowledge.—Aristotle: on syllogism; on knowledge; on the thought of thought.—Plotinus: on the One.—Thomas Aquinas: on universals.—Meister Eckhart: on love; how will compasses all things.—Francis Bacon: on induction; on idols.—Descartes: where one may doubt; on the nature of the human spirit.—Spinoza: God is the cause of all things; there are no ends in nature; the godly life.—Locke: there are no innate ideas.—Berkeley: on abstract ideas.—Hume: the origin of our ideas; the idea of necessary connection.—Kant: the characteristic of all metaphysical knowledge; is metaphysics possible? how is knowledge from pure reason possible? how is pure mathematics possible? transition from popular moral conceptions to philosophical.—Fichte: first introduction to the doctrine of knowledge.—Hegel: on the notion of the history of philosophy; what is reasonable is real.—Herbart: change as the object of a trilemma.—Schopenhauer: all living is suffering.

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*The Distribution of Attention.* J. P. HYLAN. *Psychological Review*, July and September, 1903, pp. 373-403 and 498-534.

Dr. Hylan's investigation covers two problems which have usually been treated separately, but are closely enough related to justify him in bringing them together under a single head. These are, first, how many things can we do at once and secondly, how many objects can be perceived in a single act of consciousness?

After a review of the literature of the first problem the writer concludes that we can not consider experiments in which any of the actions to be performed can become automatic with practice. After all results of that character are excluded there is found no evidence in the literature for the assumption that it is possible to distribute the attention. The writer's method of investigation was to ask his observers to count series of lines as they passed behind one, two, three, four or five openings in a screen. The results indicated that a slightly greater number of lines could be counted through two or three openings than through one. When four or five were observed at once there was always a decided loss. Since no attempt was made to exclude rhythm, it was concluded that the saving when present, was due to the ease with which the lines could be grouped. This interpretation is rendered the more plausible by the fact that in a similar experiment with series of tones of different pitch, when the rhythmic grouping was rigidly excluded, there was always a loss of time in counting the series simultaneously. There is, then, no evidence that it is possible to distribute the attention between groups of perceptions or actions.

The second part of the investigation is devoted to a solution of the old controversy as to the interpretation of the results of experiments on the extent of consciousness. Do we, as Wundt and many of his followers claim, actually receive four or five visual impression in a single act of the attention, or is the perception merely a successive interpreta-