

has this really any meaning? Has it not been clear since 1897 that the problem of upright vision is not a visual problem at all?

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*Appreciations of Herbert Spencer.*

In *The Nation* of December 10, 1903, Professor William James gives an appreciation of Mr. Spencer that is admirable for its justice and breadth of view. His points are briefly these. 'Few are entitled to a higher mark than Mr. Spencer on the score of positive and systematic form,' for 'who, since he wrote, is not vividly able to conceive' of the world evolving from a primitive fire-mist, of life "as a set of ever-changing ways of meeting the 'environment,'" etc.? Again, Mr. Spencer was the prophet of evolution and possessed both the "profundity and the genuine 'spirit of prophecy.'" Further, though he had a "matchless knowledge of certain sets of facts, one may hear it plausibly argued that Spencer is not a 'widely informed' man in the vulgar acceptance of the term." In short, facts that helped his purpose were never forgotten, the others seemed unnoticed.

His 'attitude toward religion is slightly paradoxical.' 'To the ultimate mysteriousness of things,' 'few men have paid more sincere explicit respect.' But this is confined almost to one chapter, and 'then dismissed with an affectionate good-by while all the particular mysteries that later present themselves are quickly explained away.'

Another seeming incoherence is given. In Mr. Spencer's 'heroic defense of individualism against socialism' he seems 'to have started from two independent facts,' to have been 'faithful to two ideals'—'the old English ideal of individual liberty' and 'the theory of universal evolution,' where 'the fate of the individual fact (or unit) is swallowed up in that of the aggregate whole.' But ought we not to add to the statement of Professor James, that here in Spencer's social theory a deeper conflict of principles comes to the surface? It is the old story, the mechanical-atomic cosmology and its opponent, the dynamic. In the former, the unit is the sport of external forces; in the latter, the monad determines its own life uninfluenced from without. This is the problem whose solution must determine the fate of Spencer's theory of evolution. If atomism be true or be, at least, an essential part in truth's ultimate synthesis, then his theory may remain secure. If the dynamic cosmology be the whole truth, then his theory is impossible. But if the final synthesis reconciles, as we believe it will, the mechanical and the dynamic theories, then the contradiction found here in Spencer's social teaching as well as the profounder opposition offered to his doctrine of evolution may both be removed.

Finally Professor James tells us that the 'ethical and political part of Mr. Spencer's writings seems the most impressive and likely to endure,' and that the 'Principles of Biology, of Psychology, and of Sociology' (though the last 'has probably a longer lease of life') will not remain as well known to the reading world as the 'First Principles.' But all this

is as it should be, not 'his infallibility in details,' but 'the bravery of his attempt' to seek truth as a whole, 'the original Greek ideal of philosophy,' and his life devoted to the service of mankind and true to its ideal, these are the things by which Spencer can afford to be judged.

The appreciation of Mr. Spencer by Professor Franklin H. Giddings, in *The Independent* for December 17, 1903, is especially welcome, because it comes from one who owes so much himself to Spencer's work and to his power of inspiring. Professor Giddings tells us that 'when all destructive criticisms have been made, this astonishing fact remains, that it is impossible to-day for the specialist in physics, in biology, in psychology, in sociology, or in ethics to offer any new hypothesis or constructive doctrine without directly or indirectly defining its relation to the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. It is this fact that justifies the comparison of Spencer to Aristotle. For in the whole history of human thought, these two men alone have so presented and interpreted the knowledge of their time that all other thinkers must of necessity take a position of antagonism to these masters or of agreement with them.' But we should be disposed to amend this statement of Professor Giddings, at least in part. Is not Spencer's contribution to metaphysics too limited and has not his theory of evolution rigidly confined his other contributions within too narrow limits to bring him in contact with all the chief thoughts of his time? We believe that there are even broad doctrines, it is surely true in philosophy, in discussing which Spencer's name need not be mentioned.

Our critic proceeds justly to show how preeminently original Spencer was when judged by the advance his doctrines made over positions actually held at the time of their formulation. But so short is human memory and so marvelous was Mr. Spencer's constructive power and gift of intelligent exposition 'that since 1880 all men have imagined that mankind has always thought in terms of evolution, forgetting to whom they owe their enlightenment.'

The most unfair criticism of Mr. Spencer is the assertion that specialists regard him as a great contributor in every other science than their own. As for sociology, Professor Giddings, 'expressing his own individual opinion,' does not hesitate to say that 'Mr. Spencer should be regarded as the true founder of scientific sociology, and as its greatest constructive thinker.' Of the many reasons for this judgment our critic gives three: (1) Spencer saw that 'the evolutionary process in society, as in plant and animal life, takes the form of a continuing adaptation of organism to environment, and that in human history the essential phase of the adaptation is a molding of human character to the relatively permanent circumstances of collective life.' A second reason 'is found in the insight with which he detected the dominant causes of social character.' The third reason, often cited as an incoherence, is Spencer's extreme individualism. 'Throughout his system he distinguishes between simple and compound evolution.' 'In the latter evolution is hindered and is complicated by differentiation.' The highest types of individual life are not possible where all else is sacrificed to integration, but only where there is a sufficient integration 'to insure cooperation

leaving the utmost freedom' for individual personal development. But does Professor Giddings remove all the difficulty of the adverse critic? It may be that he does as far as sociology's problem of the individual is concerned, but not so when we come to the ethical and metaphysical problem, to which sooner or later we must come.

Mr. Hudson gives a brief, good and authoritative sketch of Mr. Spencer's life and character in the same issue of *The Independent*, almost all of which, of course, may be found more fully stated in his book 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer.'

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### JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. July-October, 1903. Vol. XIV., No. 3-4. Commemorative Number, dedicated to President G. Stanley Hall by colleagues and pupils on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his doctorate. *Contribution à la psychologie du rêve* (pp. 7-23): H. BEAUNIS. - Results of a life-long study of the author's own dreams: content and causation of his dreams; changes with age. *Deception and Reality* (pp. 24-41): A. KIRSCHMANN. - All data of consciousness are real; unreality results from interpretation and depends on a willingness to lie. *Binocular Vision and the Problem of Knowledge* (pp. 42-59): J. H. HYSLOP. - The perception of depth in binocular vision is native, and yet transcends the actual data of the retinal images. *A Critique of 'Fusion'* (pp. 60-72): I. M. BENTLEY. - Fusion depends partly on the purely sensory interrelationship of elements and partly on the unifying effect of attention. *The Genetic Function of Movement and Organic Sensations for Social Consciousness* (pp. 73-78): M. F. WASHBURN. - Social consciousness arises from social instincts, by the development of 'free ideas.' Ejected ideas are distinguished from memorial by the presence of different instinctive movements. *The Status of the Subconscious* (pp. 79-89): J. JASTROW. - There is abundant evidence of the existence of subconscious processes, but not of their organization into a separate personality, nor of any impassible barrier between them and consciousness. *An attempt at Analysis of the Neurotic Constitution* (pp. 90-103): A. MEYER. - A plea for more careful study of types of the mentally unstable, in place of simply calling them all 'degenerates.' Several types are described. *The Psychology of Football* (pp. 104-117): G. T. W. PATRICK. - The great interest in games of football can only be explained on anthropological grounds, viz., as an instance of the pleasure in returning to primitive conditions of life. *Retroactive Amnesia: Illustrative Cases and a Tentative Explanation* (pp. 118-132): W. H. BURNHAM. - A blow on the head may abolish memory of events just before the shock, perhaps because time is necessary to ingrain an experience in the brain, and this ingrainment process is checked by the shock. *The State of Death: an Instance of*