

forces. These demand a personal ideal and the law of service as the moral law of the universe.

The Interpretation of Aristotle, Met. Z. 4. 1029 b 23-1030 a 6: Professor W. ROMAINE NEWBOLD.

The passage deals with the question whether there can be a real definition of that which corresponds to the phrase 'white man.' The difficulties in interpretation are to be removed in part by emendation of the text. The passage recognizes two kinds of faulty definition, the second of which is applicable to the case in question. There can be no real definition of 'white man,' because the content to thought of the phrase is different from that of the object, and its use as the predicate of a proposed definition is an attaching to the thing itself of a predicate different from it.

Dr. Cloyd N. McAllister made a preliminary report to the association on Thursday morning, of investigations on movements of the eyes made at the Psychological Laboratory of Yale University.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE.

Experimental Psychology and its bearing upon Culture. GEORGE M. STRATTON. New York, The Macmillan Co. 1903. Pp. 338.

As the title implies, the author's purpose is to point out some of the principal results achieved by experimental psychology, and to determine their deeper implications. On this account the book is quite as interesting from the standpoint of philosophy as from that of pure psychology.

The subjects treated are these: The beginnings of experimental psychology; the character of the experiments and their distinction from those of physiology; the possibility of mental measurements; the unconscious; illusions and their significance; experiments on mental space, particularly the space of the blind; the harmonies and discords of space-perception and its place in experience (the relations between visual and tactual space, non-Euclidean perceptions); memory; imitation and suggestion; the elements of art; the connection of mind and body; spiritual implications of the work.

In a certain sense the book is popular; for the topics are such as are of interest to most educated people, the different chapters are practically independent of each other, and the language is not technical. Yet Professor Stratton digs well below the surface, and his discussions are so luminous and so sane, his illustrations and experiments so well-chosen, his sense of the topic so keen, that the expert will find much to profit by. The style is self-restrained and yet full of warmth and vividness. Best of all, perhaps, one can not help finding a certain moral fiber behind it

all, and modesty and absolute fairness and frankness; to say nothing of ingenuity and sense of proportion and the turn of humor that lightens things up every now and then.

As a text-book this work can be used successfully even with elementary students. The better ones amongst them appreciate it thoroughly, and though the others find it hard at first, they get a great deal out of it. Yet the instructor must be on his guard; for it reads so easily with him that he is likely to forget how much it sometimes takes for granted. The discussion of the relations of mind and body is not much use to a student who assumes throughout it all that mind and brain are the same.

Such criticisms as we have to offer are concerned with minor points.

In the first place the monist may fairly complain of some neglect, for while it is suggested (p. 290) that certain objections to parallelism might be removed by monism, the author gets into a discussion of idealism without first telling how this could be done. The discussion of the possibility of mental measurements is, perhaps, not so well thought out as some of the others. The claim that every mental phenomenon is one and indivisible (and that, therefore, mental measurements are impossible) can hardly be answered by saying, 'So is a tree' (p. 48); for though we can not break a large tree up 'into a smaller tree plus a certain increment' we certainly can break both trees up into cordwood or sawdust and get out of one something exactly similar to what we get out of the other plus the increment. In this sense a tree *is* a compound, and a sensation is not. Again, the objection to giving space relations as well as time relations to mental phenomena can hardly be met by the Anselmic argument that 'many space-objects [such as the distorted lines in Zöllner's figure] have their existence only in consciousness' (p. 52); for that simply means that they are fictitious, not that they are parts of the mind. As a matter of fact the psychologist does not measure the space relations of pure fictions; he measures the distortion produced in real objects by mental functions, and that does not imply that the functions themselves are phenomena in space (as they are in time). Thus we may admit that space-measurements are of value to psychology but still persist in 'denying space-attributes to the mind.' Finally, the possibility of hearing several musical tones at once may be sufficient to disprove the doctrine that in time 'experiences can come only in single file'; but it does not prove 'that time itself has more than one dimension' (p. 160); for what are the temporal relations in the dimension of simultaneity that correspond to nearness and distance in the dimension of succession? Are not the relations really the reverse of those assumed in this discussion? The very narrowness of a path in space along which things can come only in single file proves that it has breadth of some sort, while the lack of further temporal relations amongst simultaneous events proves that time has none!

Two errors of proof-reading are worth correcting. On p. 48, margin,

for *quality* read *quantity*; and in p. 303, l. 26, for *immorality* read *immortality*.

H. AUSTIN AIKINS.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS.

MIND. October, 1903. *The Refutation of Idealism*: G. E. MOORE. — Modern idealists all hold that '*Esse is percipi*.' This proposition is insignificant unless understood synthetically; yet if it were thus understood it would not be believed, for 'the idealist maintains that object and subject are necessarily connected mainly because he fails to see that they are *distinct*, that they are *two* at all.' 'The object when we are aware of it is precisely what it would be if we were not aware of it.' The existence of material things is as directly apprehended and, therefore, as certain as the existence of our experiences of them. *Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism*: C. M. WALSH. — Kant has two conceptions of 'empirical reality.' He describes it first, as simply the actual and possible experiences of finite individuals; second, 'through a lack of definition and a slurring over of distinctions,' he reaches a conception of the empirically real as the object of a *single* experience which is *outside* individual experiences though not *transcending* them. It is this second conception which he used in opposing Berkeley; and it is inconsistent with his first conception as well as with his general doctrines of Transcendental Idealism. *The Physiological Factors of the Attention-Process*, III.: W. MACDOUGAL. — The results of observations and experiments recently made by the author upon the *fading, reappearance and alternation* of visual images, are in accord with his general theory of attention (previously published in *Mind*), 'and justify the assumption that the apparent tract from the intrinsic muscles of either eye is specially connected with the tract leading from the retina of that eye, so that the excitation process initiated in it by contraction of the muscles discharges not only through the motor-circle but in part through the retino-cerebral tract, *augmenting* in the latter the excitement which is directly due to the visual stimulus . . . and also determining the *mode* of attention. . . . How exactly the two tracts are connected . . . we can not yet say.' *The Disjunctive Judgment*: G. R. T. ROSS. — The author maintains with Keynes and against Bradley and Bosanquet 'that it is the function of the disjunctive judgment, both in science and in practical reasoning, to be exhaustive and not necessarily exclusive.' The author's most striking argument is his proof that on the exclusive theory the proposition 'A is either B or C' would be equivalent to the proposition 'A is either not B or not C,' which would in many cases lead to absurdity. Dis-