

A KANTIAN THEODICY

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Since the publication of J. L. Mackie's "Evil and Omnipotence" in 1955 and especially since the publication of Alvin Plantinga's *God, Freedom, and Evil* in 1974, much discussion of the problem of evil has been focused on the Free Will Defense as a possible solution. Furthermore, the discussion has been oriented to what is sometimes called, 'the logical problem', namely, whether the statement that the omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God of theism exists is consistent with the statement that evil exists, and not so much to the 'evidential problem', namely, whether, even if Plantinga and others are right and these two are ultimately consistent, the extent of the evil in our world does not undermine the rational justifiability of belief in God.¹ And again the discussion has been devoted primarily to the significance of moral evil, as Plantinga uses the term, the evil which results from human choice, and not natural evil, the suffering which results from the powers of nature, such as devastation and death caused by tornadoes, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, etc. Within these perimeters, Plantinga has argued that on the assumptions that God exists and creates free individuals, then it is not possible for God to create a world in which there cannot be evil. It is always at least possible, if not necessary, that there will be evil, due simply to the fact that human beings have the capacity to choose to perform evil acts.²

In this paper, I want to approach the problem from a different perspective. I shall work not with the Free Will Defense but with the classical theodicies of Leibniz and Tennant, one based on the idea of the best possible world and the other based on the idea of the prerequisites for a moral order. I shall deal not with the logical but with the evidential problem. And the focus of concern will not be moral evil but natural evil. And further, by the term 'natural evil', I would like to stipulate all pain or suffering incurred by human beings except that which is self-inflicted. So understood, the pain or suffering experienced by any particular individual might be the result of natural forces or the result of the evil acts of other human beings. And still further, I would like to bring into play the idea of an afterlife, a notion that is often paramount in the lives of religious believers but seldom receives much philosophical attention, even in theodicies.

In explanation of my interests, it seems to me that even if the logical problem is solved, the experiential and human problem, the evidential problem, remains, and that it is this which has traditionally been the occasion both for the origin of faith



and for the loss of faith. And in addition, I doubt that preoccupation with moral evil even allows for discussion of the problem which actually motivated the writing of Job, the work of Hume, the great literary descriptions of suffering, and the classical theodicies. That question was, and is, recall, 'Why do the righteous suffer?' not 'Why are human beings immoral?' It spoke to the injustice of things which happen *to* a person in a world created by a just and loving God, not of things which a person does in such a world. I hope to recapture this original motivation in restructuring the issue.

There is a good reason to believe that Hume himself was thinking primarily of the evidential issue in his classic statement of the problem in the *Dialogues*. Philo's famous statement of the logical issue,

Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive.³

is couched in a lengthy discussion of classes and specific examples of the misery experienced by the human race. It was not the inconsistency of evil and God's existence which was the primary issue for Philo, but the impossibility of deriving anything like the traditional attributes of God as cause from empirical experience of the universe as effect, given the enormity of the misery therein. Philo makes this point clear in continuing,

I will allow, that pain or misery in man is *compatible* with infinite power and goodness in the Deity.... A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove these pure, unmixt, and uncontrollable attributes from these mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful under-taking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixt, yet being finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where they are also so jarring and discordant!⁴

These comments reflect a concern for the evidence, not the logic of the issue. Hume is worried about the nature of the actual suffering, its variety and extent. That also remains an appropriate interest for us.

Having clarified the nature of the problem as I wish to consider it, I want now to show that classical theodicians, regardless of the particulars of their work, generally provide a utilitarian justification of divine goodness in the light of human suffering. Theodicies, of course, are as numerous as historical philosophers. Two of the clearest and most convincing, however, are the theodicies of Leibniz and Tennant. Each in the strictures of his own cultural context and philosophical method illustrates well the point I wish to make.

Leibniz's theodicy says essentially that given the perfection of God, it follows

directly that he chose for creation the best of all possible worlds, i.e., this world, with all of its evil. The idea that a world of mixed values is the best world is itself grounded in his distinction between possibility and compossibility. Leibniz allowed that in some ideal sense a perfect world would contain no suffering, and even that the various ingredients in such a world are all individually possible, but he argued that such ingredients are not mutually possible, or compossible in any actual world. Given the inter-connectedness of everything that happens in the life of a monad, and the prearranged harmony which must be assumed to account for the perceived order and relationality in the universe, any change whatever in the actual constitution of the universe would cause changes throughout. It would be, then, impossible to remove some or all of the evil in the universe and preserve at the same time its specific goods, or more generally, its essence as this particular world.

A passage from his *Theodicy* is instructive in this regard:

Some adversary... will perchance answer the conclusion by a counterargument, saying that the world could have been without sin and without sufferings; but I deny that then it would have been *better*. For it must be known that all things are *connected* in each one of the possible worlds.... Thus, if the smallest evil that comes to pass in this world were missing in it, it would no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all allowance made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it.⁵

What the best possible world theory implies, however, regarding the natural evil which befalls individuals is that such is a necessary condition for the world as it is, the best, chosen by God. Leibniz makes this relation clear in the following comment: "The best plan is not always that which seeks to avoid evil, since it may happen that *the evil is accompanied by a greater good*."⁶ He then gives his famous example of the general who takes certain losses in order to win a great victory. In this illustration the evil that is experienced by the soldier is presumably justified as a means for the end of victory in battle. And extrapolating from the example, the suffering of any individual is a means for the end of the existence of this world, and is presumably justified as such.

In a very different setting, Tennant provides a theodicy which is equally utilitarian. In *Philosophical Theology*, he argues that natural evil is an implicate of the existence of a moral order. For there to be such an order, the argument goes, it is absolutely essential that there also be a physical order exhibiting lawlike regularity. And if there is a physical order, then individuals who are at the wrong place at the wrong time, so to speak, will suffer the consequences. It is conceivable that God might intervene on each and every occasion when humans are in danger as a result of the forces of nature, but Tennant argues that such divine over-riding of natural conditions would eventuate in a chaotic existence, and would undermine

the predictability that must characterize a universe with moral values.⁷

To be sure, Tennant criticizes certain utilitarian approaches, those theodicies, for instance, which attempt to show that particular evils are never greater than the particular goods they bring into existence. Given the "chaotic distribution of human ills," such a task, he says, is easily seen to be impossible. Furthermore, it is inappropriate, in his view, to think of particular instances of suffering as willed by God as means for other ends. To suppose, for example, that one person's suffering is willed as a means for the spiritual edification of another is to conceive of God as "immoral." Yet, there is a larger sense in which the means-end scheme is surely at work in this theodicy also. The evils of nature, Tennant allows, are "collateral effects of what, in itself or as a whole, is good (nature) because instrumental to the highest good (the moral order)."⁸ Or again,

They are rather inevitable, if incidental, accompaniments or by-products of the world-order which, as a whole, and by means of its uniformity, is a pre-requisite of the actualization of the highest good we can conceive the world as embodying.⁹

But what this really comes to, though Tennant does not put it in these words, is that particular instances of suffering are necessary conditions for the moral order, or, in other words, means to the end of the moral order.

In both the best possible world of Leibniz and the moral order of Tennant, then, the suffering of certain individuals is finally justified as a requirement for the larger system in which they exist. Both theodicies are able to show why suffering is necessary in a theistic world, abstractly considered. But both picture the divine governance of the world in a remarkably utilitarian fashion, and it is this feature which I now wish to call into question.

Recall again the motivation for the question of suffering. Everyone knows that suffering is necessary for life, that we could hardly mature as human beings without it. But what has puzzled philosophers and literary figures over the centuries is the question, 'Why do the righteous suffer?' It seems unjust that some would have to suffer so disproportionately. Though the utilitarian account brings to theoretical expression our intuitions about suffering in general, I do not believe that it can handle specific instances of suffering in the lives of certain individuals and groups.

Utilitarian moral thought has been the target of persistent criticism throughout the last two decades. The most forceful analyses have occurred in the discussion of punishment, an area which has interesting parallels with the issue of natural evil. Numerous moral theorists have pointed out that utilitarian justifications for the institution of punishment are problematic, particularly because they seem to allow both for punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty.¹⁰ Retributivists maintain that prior to any considerations of utility such as deterrent value, rehabilitative value, etc., the punishment must be just, i.e., in-

flicted only on the guilty and proportionate to the gravity of the crime.

The parallel between unjust punishment and unjust suffering should be obvious. The innocent who suffer are in a situation similar to that of the innocent who are punished. In both cases utilitarian justifications could be invoked. In an oppressive governmental setting, for instance, an individual who has done no wrong might be arrested, convicted, and punished with the belief that his or her punishment will serve as a deterrent to the crime of which he or she was accused. And in the world at large, a good person might meet an untimely and excruciatingly painful death because the best possible world or the moral order requires it. Surely in both cases the individual has a right to complain of injustice, regardless of the moral worth of the larger purposes served. And if a utilitarian rationale for punishment is defective because it allows for injustice, then a utilitarian rationale for evil is defective for the same reason.

Two selections from the literature of suffering will be helpful in illustrating this point. One of these is found in *The Brothers Karamazov*, and is stated by Dostoevsky's character Ivan, who complains that the well-being of the whole is not worth the suffering of children. And the other is the work of Richard Rubenstein, who complains that after Auschwitz no theodicy is possible, that any effort to justify the slaughter of an ethnic group is absurd.

In the poignant and powerful chapter entitled, "Rebellion," Dostoevsky's Ivan castigates the saintly Alyosha for tendering something like the justifications for evil developed above. Ivan describes the suffering of a little five-year-old girl who was hated and tortured by her parents:

Can you understand why a little creature, who can't even understand what's done to her, should beat her little aching heart with her tiny fist in that vile place, in the dark and the cold, and weep her sanguine meek, unresentful tears to dear, kind God to protect her? Do you understand that infamy, my friend and my brother, my pious and humble novice? Do you understand why this rigmorole must be and is permitted? Without it, I am told, man could not have existed on earth, for he could not have known good and evil. Why should he know that diabolical good and evil when it cost so much? Why, the whole world of knowledge is not worth that child's prayer to 'dear, Kind God'.¹¹

No one with any sensitivity to human anguish can be unmoved by Ivan's argument. There seems to be no answer, and all of our rational schemes appear trivial over against the pain of the child.

Rubenstein has made the holocaust an unavoidable reality for theological reflection in our time. He maintains correctly that anyone who affirms belief in God today must do so in the face of the millions of Jews who died in the concentration camps. It is especially acute as a problem for those in the Judeo-Christian tradition

with its belief in a personal God who is related to his chosen people by covenant, and it is most acute for Jews themselves.

I believe the greatest single challenge to modern Judaism arises out of the question of God and the death camps.... How can Jews believe in an omnipotent, beneficent God after Auschwitz? Traditional Jewish theology maintains that God is the ultimate, omnipotent actor in the historical drama. It has interpreted every major catastrophe in Jewish history as God's punishment of a sinful Israel. I fail to see how this position can be maintained without regarding Hitler and the SS as instruments of God's will.... To see any purpose in the death camps, the traditional believer is forced to regard the most demonic, anti-human explosion in all history as a meaningful expression of God's purpose. The idea is simply too obscene for me to accept.¹²

Again, discussions of the moral order, the best possible world, or any other larger framework in which to interpret suffering, lose their glow in the overwhelming presence of Rubenstein's chosen people at Auschwitz. Who can say that their suffering, or the pain of Dostoevsky's children, is justifiable as a means to a greater end?

In the light of the critique of utilitarian thought generally, and in the light of these forceful personal and ethnic analyses of suffering, it seems to me that the only theodicy which is feasible is one which requires that individual suffering be justified by reference not to a broader scheme but to an end for the individual himself or herself, thereby preventing the person from being treated, as Kant put it, as a mere means. And since suffering often culminates in death, the only way in which such a theodicy can be worked out is by putting the locus for an ultimate justification of God in the afterlife, a procedure followed already by many religious believers in the concrete experience of suffering. In this way, we can preserve the contribution of classical theodicies, that suffering is often a means to a greater end, and at the same time preserve individual worth by insisting that the individual never be sacrificed for the whole.

If there is no afterlife, surely the atheist is right. Given the evil in the world, no rational individual could believe in God. But if there is an afterlife, it is open to the theodicy to argue that whatever inexplicable suffering remains, after all the other accounts have been given, will be addressed by God at that time. Again in Kantian terms, the afterlife is a transcendental idea. How the scales will be balanced, the compensation be given, the rectification of the injustices in this life be established, is beyond human thought altogether. We have only the images of judgment and reward in the various concrete religious eschatologies.

The idea of an afterlife plays a sort of marginal role in many discussions of evil, including those invoked in this paper. Dostoevsky, for instance, has Ivan flirt with

the concept as he appeals for a retribution “here on earth,” one that he himself can see. He insists that the retribution include him, even if that implies his resurrection from the dead. It will be unfair if he is not present, he says, since he has suffered also. In his words, “Surely I haven’t suffered, simply that I, my crimes and my sufferings, may manure the soil of the future harmony for somebody else... I want to be there when everyone suddenly understands what it has all been for.”¹³ But then he recalls the suffering of the children once more, and despairs of any ultimate unveiling of meaning. Rubenstein mentions the afterlife also, only to reject it as a route of escape available to our ancestors, but not to the modern world.

We cannot accept such a solution and we would do well to recognize the disguised yet nonetheless strong criticism of God’s government of this world implied in their fantasy of another world in which he would ultimately do a better job.¹⁴

And on the other side Tennant also mentions the afterlife as a locus of ultimate restitution but then discounts it, insisting that a theodicy be able to detect already in this life the “world-purpose of God” as a “reign of love.”¹⁵

Though the afterlife is often an object of ridicule, it should be pointed out that in the actual human experiences of faith it has always been and continues to be of inestimable importance. The phenomenology of religion shows that in virtually all cultures the belief, whether it be described as immortality, resurrection, or reincarnation, has been central to faith, and furthermore it is often stated in such a way as to provide for a rectification of injustice in this life. The Resurrection of Christ, of course, is foundational for the Christian faith. Without it, as the Apostle Paul says, we have hoped in vain. It is for Paul and for Christians generally a model of our own ultimate futures. And the model depicts a “spiritual body,” no longer “perishable” but now “imperishable,” no longer living in “dishonor” but now in “glory” and no longer in “weakness” but now in “power” (I Cor. 15:42-43, RSV). The spiritual body rather obviously represents a reality no longer racked by the pain and suffering of this life, but existing in glorious triumph over such evils.

Further, it is interesting to note also that in practical Christian experience suffering, even death, is not so much the source of disbelief as it is the source of belief. The prayer of faith beside a hospital bed, the comfort of the gospel at a time of despair, the quiet tears of sorrow as the hymns of faith are sung at the funeral, and the widow’s final triumph over death and sorrow, “I know he is with the Lord now,” all attest to the role of faith right in the midst of suffering. The latter has been for some, indeed, the demise of faith, but it is for many others the origin of real faith.

I know that philosophical questions are not settled by *ad populum* appeals, and that the truth in fact may be altogether different from popular belief. At the same time, however, rational appreciation of the phenomenology of religion, and more particularly of the role of religion in giving expression to the ideas that have unified

both individual and cultural worlds, dictates that the religious experience of humanity be taken seriously. And as a phenomenon of religious experience, belief in the afterlife has been ubiquitous.

Granted, the afterlife is meaningful for faith at a time of suffering, and granted that a theodicy requires an afterlife to respond to the charge that human existence is simply unfair, we must still ask in what sense belief in the afterlife is a credible belief in the modern world.

I would like to bring two considerations to bear on this question. First, there is a longstanding tradition in the faith/reason controversy, a tradition that was articulated most persuasively by Maimonides and St. Thomas, in which reason is given not only a positive role but also a restrictive role in matters of faith. In accord with this view, reason can establish the basic truths of faith, including the existence of God, but at some particular point faith-claims are encountered which cannot be assessed by reason. In regard to these transcendent claims of faith, reason can perform only the task of showing that they are not impossible (both in terms of logical and real possibility). The best example from the medieval context is belief in creation. Both Maimonides and St. Thomas attempted to show that creation is not impossible, that there is nothing either in logic or in nature to preclude it, though it cannot be established by reason.¹⁶

This approach, I think, can be applied to our issue as well. Surely it cannot be established either on a logical or an empirical basis that there is an afterlife. But at the same time it cannot be established that there is not, or that an afterlife is impossible. An opponent might object that it flies in the face of all known evidence from the natural sciences. So far as we know empirically, the objection might continue, the human being simply dies, the body decomposes, and that is the end of it. No one could deny the point of such an objection. But it should be made clear that what is being considered a possibility is not that the natural world will yield an immortal soul or a resurrected body by itself, but that the natural world combined with the creative and redemptive activity of God would yield an afterlife existence. And it should also be made clear that the kind of reality which is depicted by an afterlife is such that evidence from nature as the latter is construed in modern science could not conceivably be determinative in answering the question whether or not it exists. On the basis of these reflections, I do not see, by any stretch of the imagination, how the afterlife could be denied as impossible. If there is no power transcendent to nature, and if nature is fully determined by modern science, then there is no afterlife. If there is such a power, and if the real world transcends even the models of science, then the afterlife is not impossible. And if it is not impossible, then it represents an open option for belief.

I suggest that the Christian belief in the Resurrection of Christ as the "first fruits" of the harvest to come might be assessed in a similar way. There is the traditional Christian evidence that Christ was raised, namely, the empty tomb and the re-

surge of faith among the disciples, not just a general faith in Christ but a concrete belief that he had been raised from the dead. Assessed on the basis of purely objective, critical-historical inquiry, the facts themselves would be seen as interesting but not persuasive, the latter because of the general assumptions of such inquiry that miracles do not happen and the dead are not raised. Indeed, those assumptions, as the contemporary theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg has pointed out, would in all likelihood eliminate the Resurrection as a possibility, regardless of the strength of the factual evidence on its behalf.¹⁷ However, if one were to approach the same data with the presuppositions that God exists and has the power to raise from the dead, then the Resurrection becomes a legitimate possibility for belief.

This argument leads to a second important consideration. An opponent might argue more specifically that the theist has no right to appeal to the afterlife in his or her response to the problem of evil, that it is illogical and violates the rules for argumentation because belief in the afterlife presupposes belief in God, which is just the issue. The opponent might accuse the theist at this point, in other words, of begging the question.

Such an objection misses the point of the argument. It would be lethal if the theist were attempting to establish as his or her conclusion *that God exists* and were to use belief in the afterlife, which actually depends on belief in the existence of God, as the evidence. This, however, is not at all the structure of the present argument. In our case, the skeptic has originally attacked the theist's claim that God exists by recounting all the lurid facts involved in the problem of evil. In response, the theist is not attempting to prove that God exists, though he or she, of course, believes that. Rather, it is being argued only that the problem of evil does not undermine the rational justifiability of belief in the existence of God. Since the afterlife is a part of the theistic position to begin with, then appeal to this aspect of the position as a way of handling objections to it is completely legitimate. In fact, this is what always occurs when a theory is defended. There is no circular argument, or begging the question, here.

Moreover, for the skeptic to ask a theist to defend the existence of God in the face of evil without the afterlife is fundamentally unfair. It would be like asking a boxer to fight with one arm tied behind him, or like asking a modern physicist to explain all the interactions of phenomena by appeal only to the force of gravity, ignoring the other forces of modern physical theory. And to say that the theist's appeal to an afterlife begs the question is like arguing that a physicist's appeal, say, to the electromagnetic force, in his or her explanation of the behavior of certain objects, begs the question whether the behavior can be explained scientifically because determination of what an electromagnetic force is presupposes an understanding of the bulk of modern physical theory. Since such a force is an aspect of the theory in question, appeal to it is altogether appropriate and in no way begs the question. The same goes for the theist's appeal to the afterlife.

I suggest, then, that belief in the afterlife is a credible belief on the assumption that God exists, and that appeal to the afterlife as a final locus of justification for God is an appropriate response to the challenge to faith in the problem of evil.

The ideas which have been developed in this paper are similar to some ideas developed by Kant in a more technical form in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and in conclusion I would like to spell out the parallel. As everyone knows, Kant argued that belief both in immortality and in God, though not defensible on a theoretical or dogmatic basis, is required for moral rationality. He held that the latter entails the recognition of the Highest Good as the ultimate result of moral action, that unless we believe that the Highest Good can be achieved, such action becomes absurd. The Highest Good itself, in turn, is conceived in two different but related ways, each of which generates a postulate of practical reason. On the one side, it implies the perfectibility of the human will, something which is obviously not accomplished in the finite world of sense and requires therefore a continuation of existence beyond death, or immortality of the soul. And on the other side, the Highest Good implies that there is ultimately justice in the universe, that virtue and happiness will finally correspond. Again, such correspondence is rarely seen in the miserable conditions of human life as we know it, so there is required for this reason also a continuation of existence beyond death, and in addition there is required the existence of a reality transcendent to nature who can effectively bring virtue into accord with happiness, or God. The Highest Good as a possibility, therefore, implies both the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.¹⁸

Though the ultimate purpose of Kant's argument is different from the point of the argument in this paper, his worry over the relation of happiness and virtue, and especially his conviction that this relation must itself be connected with an afterlife, are directly relevant to our interests. In fact, though it is not ordinarily described in this way, his postulates of practical reason can be construed as an effort to work out a theodicy of a strictly non-utilitarian fashion. The suffering of the innocent, or in his way of thinking about it, the disproportion of virtue and happiness in our finite experience, is never conceived by Kant as a means to some further end, unless it is an end for the individual himself or herself. Rather, it is always seen as an injustice in this life which must be remedied in the next. I agree that no utilitarian consideration can justify the evil in this world. It is immoral to think that the individual's pain might be a means for the end of a moral order or a best possible world. Only an afterlife, in which the scales are balanced, can satisfy the demand for justice. Given the presence of evil, then, either there is an afterlife or there is no God.

In summary of my argument, I have attempted to show first that the most troublesome aspect of the problem of evil is not the logical but the evidential concern, second that classical theodicies attempted to handle the evidential problem in a strictly utilitarian fashion, third that the theodices so generated are immoral and

fail to justify the suffering of the innocent, a point that becomes crystal clear when it is asked what end might justify the pain of Dostoevsky's children or Rubenstein's chosen people, and then last that a viable theodicy, one in which the locus of divine justification is in the afterlife, can be worked out since belief in the afterlife is a credible belief, given the assumption of God's existence. I have, in short, attempted to state a Kantian theodicy.¹⁹

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NOTES

1. I am following William Rowe's development of the problem in his work, *Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 79-95.
2. Plantinga's Free Will Defense is stated in a variety of places, most notably in *God, Freedom, and Evil* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). It is, needless to say, much more elaborate than I have made it in this summary statement.
3. David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, ed. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1947), p. 201.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Theodicy*, abridged edition, trans. E. M. Huggard (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 34.
6. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Leibniz: Selections*, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 510.
7. Frederick R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, 2 vols. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1928), 2:180-208.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
10. This issue has, of course, been the subject of numerous essays from a variety of perspectives. A good early example of the critique of utilitarian justifications for punishment is H. J. McCloskey's article, "A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment," *Inquiry* 8 (1965): 249-263; and even earlier, John Rawls' article, "Two Concepts of Rules," *The Philosophical Review* 64 (1955): 3-18, contains a similar critique. It goes without saying, the basic thrust of the widespread contemporary Kantian moral perspective has been against any kind of utilitarian justification for institutions and practices.
11. Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, trans. Constance Garnett, Revised Ralph Matlaw (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 223.
12. Richard L. Rubenstein, *After Auschwitz* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 153.
13. Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, p. 225.
14. Rubenstein, *After Auschwitz*, p. 87.
15. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, p. 205.
16. Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed*, bk. 2, ch. 16, and St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, vol. 1, pt. 1, q. 46, art. 2. More specifically, St. Thomas argues that creation can be proved but not the temporal origin of the universe. The latter is, nonetheless, not impossible and, therefore, is open for faith. In *Summa Contra Gentiles*, for instance, he attempts to refute the arguments for