

Situating Tocqueville Between Modern Political Philosophy and Pre-Modern Catholic Political Philosophy About What Constitutes Society

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Sixteenth-century neo-scholastic Catholic thought defended a Christian-Aristotelian view of society as constituted by intergenerational moral obligations derived, not from consent, but from the benefits later generations are given by earlier generations' progress in the arts and sciences (language, civilization, society, the regime itself). In contrast, self-consciously modern political philosophy substitutes "social contract" in which individuals' natural rights are primary as well as natural, and moral obligations are not derived from any natural relation by which human beings benefit one another but only from consent. So understood, society is constituted by the agreement and will of the present generation rather than by moral obligation derived from benefits freely given by the preceding generations. This paper considers whether Tocqueville's account of the origin and development of American democratic society is closer to the medieval Catholic understanding or to the modern account and inquires how strong his affinity for either might be.

I. MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The moral and political orientation of "modern political philosophy" originates in Machiavelli and is given structure by modern social contract philosophers, notably Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, with important inferences in Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson.

Machiavelli's modernity regards politics as about getting and keeping political power, to which end all means may be used. The classical and medieval attempts to restrain politics with high-minded notions of justice are futile. Worse, they will weaken the ruler who would try to rule by such notions and turn politics over to the most ruthless. Moral exhortations for rulers to follow established rules of law and justice are not a sound basis for getting or keeping power.¹

Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau follow Machiavelli's orientation although they refrain from explicitly Machiavellian statements like "it is necessary for a prince, if he wishes to maintain himself, to learn to be

able to be not good, and to use it and not use it according to the necessity.” (*Prince*, chap. 15) Instead they articulate *higher sounding* moral and political teachings (e.g., men have natural rights, it is the duty of governments to secure these rights, and lawful government rests on consent of the governed). Nevertheless these *higher sounding* teachings are “low” compared to a medieval Christian view since they recognize others’ natural rights only because others can make trouble for them if they do not. Others’ rights should be recognized, not as something good in themselves and not as moral obligations, but as a means to social peace.

This understanding is “low” because it is meant to be “politically effective” rather than high, just, or noble. It is a calculation of advantage in contrast to the medieval Catholic political teaching that we should love one another as brothers and sisters of the same heavenly father. So Christians can affirm that all men are created equal and have natural rights, but Christians mean something more by that than do the modern political philosophers. Christians mean that we have a *moral duty* to see to it that one another’s rights are secured precisely because of their need, not because they can make war on us if their needs are not met.² Moreover, Christians emphasize our moral duty equally with our rights. Duties are neither less binding than, nor derivative from, rights.³

What constitutes society for modern political philosophy? Society is radically non-natural. Men are radically individuals not designed by nature to live together. Proof: when they *are* together they commonly place their own interests above those of others. The resulting conflicts these philosophers call the “state of nature” or the “state of war.” Their remedy is that men create by consent an authority called government or civil society to restrain themselves by force from harming each other. Consent backed by force, not nature, is what constitutes society.⁴

II. PRE-MODERN⁵ CATHOLIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Sixteenth-century Catholic thinkers (notably Bellarmine, Vitoria and Suarez) defended a Christian-Aristotelian view of society as constituted by intergenerational moral obligations, a view that can be glimpsed through a brief look at Bellarmine’s *De Laicis*.⁶

In Chapter 5, para. 1, generally following Aristotle, Bellarmine affirms “the nature of man is such that he is a social animal” because he cannot be self-sufficient alone. He “is born without clothing, without a home, without food, lacking all necessities,” with only “his hands, and reason by which he can prepare all instruments” (*DL*, 20). And “even were each one sufficient to himself for the necessities of life, yet he would never, unaided, be able to protect himself from the attacks of wild beasts and robbers.”

This necessitates “men to assemble and to ward off attacks with their combined strength.” This society makes it possible “to exercise justice,” which is “the virtue determining equity among many” (*DL*, 21).

Bellarmino’s argument then (para. 2) takes a turn not found in Aristotle. The “instruments” and “the arts and sciences” that man is born capable of developing “were developed over a long time and by many men.” He here (para. 3), for the first time, cites Aristotle by name, affirming “that man is by nature a civil animal.” Why else “has the gift of speech and of hearing, that is of clearly perceiving words, been bestowed upon him?” In paragraph 4, he asserts that, in addition to social life, man’s nature further necessitates political rule. The arguments are both rational and scriptural. So Bellarmino makes an apparently non-Aristotelian distinction between “by nature social,” on the one hand, (signified by lack of individual self-sufficiency) and “by nature political,” on the other (signified by natural teleology of speech).

Length of time is important because it takes longer than a single individual’s life span to develop the arts and sciences which enable us to fulfill our nature’s needs. Hence, we need a “teacher” (*DL*, 20) who lives longer than any single man. That teacher is society. And since “rulers have been necessarily ordained, if society is to endure,” rulers are necessary to make possible the duration that enables society to fulfill its natural purpose.

Thus, our nature requires us both to “live in society” and “that one should aid the other” (*DL*, 21). These are both needs and duties. Rulers and forms of government are insufficient “if society is to endure.” Society is natural and not constructed. It comes first in time and then chooses the form of government and hence who should rule (*DL*, 24). “Civil society” is thus constructed by consent, but society as such is not.

Bellarmino defends society’s naturalness against the view “that there was formerly a time when men wandered about in the manner of beasts” and that only “through the eloquence of some wise orator, they were induced to assemble and to live together” (*DL*, 22).⁷ He does not call this pre-social condition a state of nature, as would Hobbes and Locke after him, because for Bellarmino such a condition would have been contrary to man’s nature. Instead, Bellarmino, citing Genesis, says “the first men immediately built cities.” This naturalness of cities seems in agreement with Aristotle.

Bellarmino leaves the reader to infer that, if men are born in neediness that can only be met by and in society, and if the arts and sciences necessary to fulfill that neediness take longer to develop than the life of one man, then the question is how to preserve society so it can achieve that purpose. Rulers are part of the solution. But if each of us benefits from what society

has given us to fulfill our natural needs, we thereby incur a *natural moral obligation* to repay society for those benefits. This obligation does not arise from our consent. Nor can we repay it to those who have given these benefits to us, for they are passing away. What we can do is preserve these benefits, perhaps improve them, and freely pass on to the next generation what was previously give to us. Thus, society is both constituted and held together over generations by natural moral obligations.

The contrast with self-consciously modern political philosophy is this. Modern philosophers substitute for society constituted by intergenerational, natural moral obligations, a “social contract” in which the natural rights of naturally unsocial individuals are primary and moral obligations are derived only from consent.

Modernity’s implications are drawn out by Paine and Jefferson. “The earth belongs to the living, not to the dead. . . . [E]ach generation [i]s a distinct nation, with a right, by the will of its majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding generation.”⁸ And “Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases as the ages and generations which preceded it. . . . I am contending for the rights of the living, and against their being willed away, and controlled and contracted for, by the . . . authority of the dead.”⁹ If society is a contract, every generation is the “me first” generation, as a matter not merely of power but of right.

III. WHERE DOES TOCQUEVILLE FIT IN THE FOREGOING DISAGREEMENT?

“How society is constituted” is a more theoretical question than Tocqueville is usually thought to address. It arises in the course of attempting to clarify to what extent he reflects medieval Catholic themes, interests, concerns, and sensibilities. This clarification is part of a broader attempt to understand precisely how, and to what extent, self-consciously “modern” political philosophy departs specifically from “pre-modern” Catholic political thought. Bellarmine, Suarez, Vitoria, and Las Casas speak some language similar to that which most political philosophy scholars have learned from Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau (natural rights, government by consent of the governed, and the right of the people to change both the form of government and who rules). Here I try to get at how the pre-modern Catholic understanding of these things might differ from the modern one¹⁰ by situating Tocqueville between them on the issue of how society is constituted.

Tocqueville’s account of the origin and development of American democracy initially reminds the reader of the medieval Catholic themes and concerns. Here are three such reminders.

First, he analyzes American democracy primarily as “the democratic social state,” that is, as *society*: from below, in contrast to the top down analysis of the modern state characteristic of modern political philosophy.¹¹ Tocqueville’s approach means that “the political constitution of the United States seems to me to be one of the forms that democracy can give to its government.”¹² His idea that “the democratic social state” gives the form *to* “its government” is foreign to the political science of Hobbes and Locke. They are philosophic founders after the manner of Plato’s *Republic*, where the *regime* gives form *to* the political society.

On the other hand, Tocqueville’s emphasis on society over government is not foreign to medieval Catholic thought. John Courtney Murray emphasizes that the medieval tradition stressed the distinction between “the order of culture” and “the order of politics” and that “the state is distinct from society and limited in its offices toward society.” This medieval emphasis “was cancelled out by the rise of the modern omni-competent society-state” until revived by “the American proposition.”¹³

Tocqueville’s focus on democratic society as architectonic de-emphasizes the Constitution. While *Democracy in America* devotes one chapter to its discussion, the Federal Constitution is far less important for understanding American democracy than one would expect.¹⁴

For Tocqueville, of first importance about the Constitution is that it did not constitute the American “democratic social state” because that democracy antedated it by almost two centuries.

Secondly, it did not concentrate all political power in the center but preserved “local liberties,” that is, the self-governing capacity of the states and local communities. This enabled the Americans to successfully resist the “individualism” which Tocqueville sees as the great threat to democracy and liberty.¹⁵ This advantage reflects the older aristocratic and Christian political culture of Europe in leaving those institutions alone.¹⁶ This medieval Catholic theme is restated in nineteenth-century Catholic thought by Orestes Brownson¹⁷ and in the subsidiarity principle of recent papal encyclicals.¹⁸

Tocqueville calls “administrative decentralization” America’s embodiment of this medieval theme. In contrast, philosophic modernity holds that the state is 1) the supreme political authority and the source of the lawful existence of all subordinate authorities (e.g., families, local governments, churches, private associations of all kinds, etc.); and 2) the final legal authority which these subordinate authorities are obligated to obey. In contrast, pre-modern Catholic political thought defended the independent (and sacred) origin, and hence legally distinct existence of, the Church, which possesses spiritual authority over certain aspects of human

life with which the political sovereign may not interfere.¹⁹ This distinction meant “the immunity of the Church, as the supra political sacredness (*res sacra*), from all manner of politicization, [either] through subordination to the state or enclosure within the state as *instrumentum regni*.” It also meant that “the Church stood . . . between the body politic and the public power, . . . limiting the reach of the power over the people.” Rejection of this arrangement “has been common to all the prophets of modernity” who view “the freedom of the Church . . . as a trespass upon, and a danger to . . . the integrity of the political order.”²⁰

Although modernity subordinated “the freedom of the Church” to political authority, it sought secular ways of preserving some limits on the state as the Church had formerly done. Tocqueville’s praise of the Americans’ “administrative decentralization” carries that idea forward into modernity.²¹ Murray agrees that decentralization is the Americans’ successful “effort to find and install in the world a secular substitute for all that the Christian tradition has meant by . . . the freedom of the Church.”²²

A third Tocquevillian theme reflecting medieval Catholic thought is that democracy’s compatibility with liberty depends on its remaining religious:

Despotism may govern without faith, but liberty cannot. Religion is much more necessary in the republic they advocate than in the monarchy which they attack; and in democratic republics most of all. How could society escape destruction if, when political ties are relaxed, moral ties are not tightened? And what can be done with a people master of itself if it is not submissive to God?²³

Accordingly, “When any religion has taken deep root in a democracy, be very careful not to shake it; but rather guard it as the most precious heritage of aristocratic times.”²⁴

He does not have in mind a union of church and state. Indeed, he explicitly attributes the impressive influence of religion in America to the lack of such a union.²⁵ His praise of America’s church/state separation might seem to resemble that of the modern political philosophers. However, these philosophers foster or even require a public secularism. They certainly think Christianity is a political problem rather a political asset.²⁶ Tocqueville, by contrast, thinks that “one of the great general causes responsible for the maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States” is that “religion . . . reigns supreme in the souls of the women, and it is women who shape the mores”²⁷ thereby preserving democratic society for this and the next generation. The idea that the older generation

preserves society by handing down what it has learned about living well could be lifted from chapter 5 of *De Laicis*.

On the other hand, there is the problem of the Americans' love of wealth. In general "the great severity of mores which one notices in the United States has its primary origin in [religious] beliefs."²⁸ However, "religion is often powerless to . . . moderate their eagerness to enrich themselves, which everything contributes to arouse."²⁹ Tocqueville manifests no medieval concern that this powerlessness might endanger American democracy. This places him closer to the moderns' praise of "acquisitiveness"³⁰ than to what medieval Christian thinkers might have called avarice—a "deadly" sin. Tocqueville's apparent acceptance of this vice puts him much closer to modern than to medieval political philosophy.

There is another notable difference between Tocqueville's praise of religion and the views of medieval Catholic thinkers. The latter cared about Christianity because they thought it was the true religion and it was good for the people because it was true. But it is not clear that Tocqueville thinks the truth of religion is important.

Though it is very important for man as an individual that his religion should be true, that is not the case for society. Society has nothing to fear or hope from another life; what is most important for it is not that all citizens should profess the true religion but that they should profess religion. Moreover, all the sects in the United States belong to the great unity of Christendom, and Christian morality is everywhere the same.³¹

This almost suggests Machiavelli's thought that the political utility of religion is independent of its truth.

And they [rulers] must favor and encourage all those things which arise in favor of religion, *even if they judge them to be false*; and the more they do this the more prudent and knowledgeable in worldly affairs they will be.³²

No medieval Catholic thinker suggested the irrelevance of the truth of the religion by which society is constituted. Tocqueville's implying that irrelevance puts him on the side of the modern philosophers for whom the truth of religion is beyond what they accept as knowledge.

Finally, the "religion" Tocqueville praises for its social benefits is Christianity in general, not Catholicism in particular; more precisely it is Christian morality.

There is an innumerable multitude of sects in the United States. They are all

different in the worship they offer to the Creator, but all agree concerning the duties of men to one another. Each sect worships God in its own fashion, but all preach the same morality in the name of God.³³

Notwithstanding his break with medieval Catholic thought respecting the truth of religion, Tocqueville goes out of his way to present an especially positive assessment of Catholicism's influence in both constituting and preserving American democratic society.

The Catholics are very loyal in the practice of their worship and full of zeal and ardor for their beliefs. Nevertheless, they form the most republican and democratic of all classes in the United States.³⁴

I am disposed to believe . . . that our grandchildren will tend more and more to be divided clearly between those who have completely abandoned Christianity and those who have returned to the Church of Rome.³⁵

The last statement in particular is strange in light of the origin of American democracy in Puritan Christianity, and his thesis that the beginning of a people is decisive for its future development.³⁶ "There is not an opinion, custom, or law, nor, . . . an event, which the point of departure will not easily explain."³⁷ But Catholicism had almost no role in the origin of American society. Not until "About fifty years ago [did] Ireland [begin] to pour a Catholic population into the United States."³⁸ So why does he anticipate that Catholicism will survive and Protestant Christianity wither away?³⁹

Tocqueville suggests that Catholicism contributed to constituting American democratic society not at its origin but because "among the various Christian doctrines, Catholicism seems one of those most favorable to equality of conditions" which is the "nodal point" and "creative element from which each particular fact derived."⁴⁰ In contrast, "Protestantism in general orients men much less toward equality than toward independence."⁴¹ Thus Catholicism seems even more compatible with the decisiveness of equality of conditions than is the Protestantism which gave rise to that society.

IV. SUMMARY AND ONE LAST CONSIDERATION

Tocqueville's view of what constitutes society is closer in several respects to medieval Catholic political philosophy: 1) The decisiveness of society rather than the structure of government; 2) the importance of shared mo-

res, rather than governmental form, for preserving “the democratic social state”; 3) democratic society as a natural growth out of Puritan Christianity rather than as willed consent forming a “social contract”; 4) the importance of “administrative decentralization” for preserving local institutions from central government control, thereby counteracting the social dissolving “individualism” born of equality; 5) the value of religion for restraining man’s desires sufficiently to hold society together by tightening “moral ties” “when political ties are relaxed” and 6) the particular value of Catholicism for preserving democratic society by fostering equality of conditions rather than independence.

On the other hand, Tocqueville’s view of what constitutes society is in some respects closer to the modern political philosophers: 1) His endorsement of “separation of church and state” reminds one of the moderns (though his view that this separation actually increases the influence of religion on society seems contrary to what the moderns expected); 2) He appears fully on board with the modern political philosophers’ emphasis on acquisitiveness and apparently sees it neither as a moral failing, endangering the religion of the New Testament, nor as a threat to the moral ties which hold democratic society together; 3) His explicit indifference to the truth of religion at first reminds one of Machiavelli, who praised religion’s political utility to such an extent that he regarded Numa, founder of the Roman religion, as a greater founder of Rome than Romulus, who only gave Rome her laws.⁴² So, Tocqueville’s praise of religions’ political utility, would seem to put him closer to Machiavellian modernity than to the neo-scholastics.

But whereas Machiavelli loses sight of, or rejects, religion’s directedness towards eternity, Tocqueville does not. “Every religion places the object of man’s desires outside and beyond worldly goods and naturally lifts the soul into regions far above the realm of the senses.”⁴³ “Most religions are only general, simple, and practical means of teaching men the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.”⁴⁴

Moreover, democracy poses special threats to man’s “sublimest faculties,” and hence a particular danger that he will “degrade himself.” Hence, “it is ever the duty of lawgivers and of all upright educated men to raise up the souls of their fellow citizens and turn their attention toward heaven.”⁴⁵ And they do that best by acting as if they believe that men are destined for eternity.

[T]he only effective means which governments can use to make the doctrine of the immortality of the soul respected is daily to act as if they believed it themselves. I think that it is only by

conforming scrupulously to religious morality in great affairs that they can flatter themselves that they are teaching the citizens to understand it and to live and respect it in little matters.⁴⁶

So while Tocqueville values religion's social utility, he also values Christianity's emphasis on eternity as remedying democracy's tendency to "degrade" man's "sublimest faculties." He *moves towards* Machiavelli's view of religion's political utility, but does not *reduce* it to that as Machiavelli does. Further separating him from Machiavelli is that the religion Tocqueville praises is Christianity, whereas Machiavelli thinks Christianity has harmed political life by causing Christians to care more about the next world than about this one. He praises Numa's Roman religion, which did not do that.

CONCLUSION

This study presents Tocqueville as closer in several important ways to the political thought of pre-modern Catholic thinkers than to modern social contract philosophers. To that extent, we may think of him as carrying into modernity certain medieval themes, which the moderns reject. Tocqueville's "new political science . . . for a world itself quite new"⁴⁷ looks partly like an adaptation of those themes, concerns, and foci to the unprecedented modern democratic social state. Aristocracy and monarchy may no longer be options in modern times, as they were from Aristotle through the neo-scholastics. But liberty, virtue, and eternity still are, and the social thought formed in pre-modern times may still be adaptable to those ends.

Still, Tocqueville's apparent siding with the moderns on both acquisitiveness and the truth of religion constitutes a break with medieval Catholic thought. Whether it is a decisive break, such that eventually either the Catholic themes or the acquisitiveness would have to give way as American democracy develops, we cannot learn from Tocqueville. But that question nicely states the contemporary relevance of the inquiry to which this study is directed.

Notes

1. "[M]y intent is to write something useful to whoever understands it. . . . [M]any have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in truth; [but] a man who wants to make a profession of good in all regards must come to ruin among so many who are not good." *The Prince*, chap. 15.

2. On the neo-scholastic versus modern meanings of these ideas, see my "Words that Sound Alike but Have Different Meanings: Christian 'Natural Rights' and Kantian Inspired 'Human Rights,'" *Catholic Social Science Review* 9 (2004), especially pp. 21–28. And "Natural Rights and Social Contract in Burke and Bel-

larmine,” in *Rethinking Rights: Historical, Political, and Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. Bruce Frohnen and Kenneth L. Grasso (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 58–79.

3. On the difference between the opposing understandings spelled out in this paragraph, see Herbert J. Storing, “Slavery and the Moral Foundations of the American Republic,” in *The Moral Foundations of the American Republic*, ed. Robert H. Horwitz (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1986), 313–32.

4. A nineteenth-century American Catholic political thinker thinks this means that a modern state “can sustain itself only by force since it recognizes no right but might.” Because modern principles “deprive . . . the state of her sacredness . . . [n]o modern government can sustain itself for a moment without an armed [police?] force sufficient to overawe or crush the party or parties in permanent conspiracies against it.” Orestes A. Brownson, *The American Republic* (Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2002), 80–81.

5. “Pre-modern” generally designates both classical and medieval political philosophy. This study’s pre-modern focus is sixteenth-century neo-scholasticism, especially Bellarmine.

6. The full title is *De Laicis sive Saecularibus*. The only English translation (incomplete) of *De Laicis* or *The Treatise on Civil Government* is Kathleen E. Murphy (New York: Fordham University Press, 1928), introduction by M. F. X. Millar. Murphy’s translation (completed by the addition of chapters 16 and 19–22, translated by James Goodwin, S.J.) is available online at <http://catholicism.org/de-laicis.html>. Bellarmine’s thought has a certain authoritativeness for medieval Catholic thought, owing to the official position he held in Rome as Chair of Controversial Theology (1576–1587). In that capacity, he was responsible for addressing “those theological disputes that divided the Christian Church.” <http://www.sjweb.info/jesuits/saintShow.cfm?SaintID=27>. *De Laicis* is one of the three volumes of these writings published as *De Controversiis Christianae Fidei* (1586–1596).

7. He cites *De Inventione*, an early rhetorical work of Cicero’s (of all people). See *De Inventione*, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 1.1–2.3.

8. Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes, June 24, 1813. *Thomas Jefferson: Writings*, The Library of America (New York: Viking, 1984), 1280–81.

9. Thomas Paine, “The Rights of Man,” in *Two Classics of the French Revolution* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 277–78.

10. See note 2 above.

11. See *Democracy in America*, ed. J. P. Mayer, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Doubleday, 1969), vol. 1, part 1, chap. 3, pp. 50–57. Cited as *DIA*.

12. *Ibid.*, part 2, chap. 6, p. 231.

13. John Courtney Murray, *We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 35.

14. See vol. 1, part 1, chap. 8, pp. 112–72.

15. *Ibid.* vol. 2, part 2, chap. 4, esp. 511, on the effects of “local liberties.” And vol. 2, part 4, chap. 2, p. 668–70.

16. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, part 1, chap. 5, esp. the last section, “Political Effects of Administrative Decentralization in the United States,” pp. 87–98.

17. See *The Works of Orestes A. Brownson*, ed. Henry F. Brownson, vol. 11 (Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, 1884), vi. The Editor’s Preface summarizes Brownson’s thought on this matter thusly: “All centralism in the state, he held, is despotism; to maintain liberty, power must be divided, and each division given a separate organization of its own, so that each may operate as a veto on the others.” Brownson himself says, “The glory of the British constitution is in the absence of this all-absorbing centralization.” *Works*, vol. 10, “Schools and Education,” p. 574.

18. “The teaching of the Church has elaborated the principle of subsidiarity, according to which ‘a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.’” *The Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2nd ed. part 3, sect. 1, chap. 2, art. 1, “The Person and Society: The Communal Character of the Human Vocation.” The *locus classicus* of subsidiarity is the 1931 Encyclical of Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*, para.79. It is restated in Pope John Paul II’s 1991 Encyclical, *Centesimus Annus*, para. 48.

19. Murray, *We Hold These Truths*, especially pp. 31–32, 35, 53, and 202–11. See Bellarmine, *De Laicis*, chap. 17 “Judgment Concerning Religion Does not Come Within the Province of a Magistrate”; and chap. 18, “The Defense of Religion Pertains to the Political Magistracy.”

20. Murray, *We Hold These Truths*, 203, 207.

21. See Murray on “Political Modernity,” pp. 205–11. Cf. the following contrary, but plainly mistaken, judgment: “No [medieval] theorist was concerned with ‘local communities’ as one of his central themes. . . . A distinct characteristic of late medieval theory is its failure . . . to insert local communities into the framework of the politia.” J. P. Genet, “Political Theory in Local Communities in Later Medieval France and England,” in *The Crown and Local Communities in England and France in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. J. R. L. Highfield and Robin Jeffs (Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1981), 20.

22. Murray, *We Hold These Truths*, 201.

23. *DIA*, vol. 1, part 2, chap. 9, p. 294. See also vol. 2, part 1, chap. 5, pp. 444–49.

24. *Ibid.* vol. 2, part 2, chap. 15, p. 544.

25. *Ibid.* vol. 1, part 2, chap. 9 “all [the American Catholic priests he talked with] thought that the main reason for the quiet sway of religion over their country was the complete separation of church and state,” p. 295.

26. On the extent to which modern political philosophy requires public secularism, see Gary D. Glenn, “Does Modern Political Philosophy Require a Secular Political Order? And, if so, What Kind?,” at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 27–31, 2008. See note 41.

27. Vol. 1, part 2, chap. 9, pp. 287 and 291.

28. *DIA*, p. 291.

29. Ibid. “I know no other country where love of money has such a grip on men’s hearts.” Vol. 1, part 1, chap. 3, p. 55.

30. C. B. MacPherson identifies the unleashing of acquisitiveness from moral restraint as the core of the project of what this study calls “philosophic modernity.” *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (1962, 2011).

31. *DIA*, vol. 1, part 2, chap. 9 pp. 290–91.

32. *Discourses*, chap. 12, para. 2. “How Much Importance Must be Granted to Religion, and How Italy, Without Religion, Thanks to the Roman Church, Has been Ruined.” Emphasis added.

33. *DIA*, p. 290.

34. Ibid. vol. 1, part 2, chap. 9, p. 288.

35. Ibid. vol. 2, part 1, chap. 6. p. 451.

36. Ibid. vol. 1, part 1, chap. 2, pp. 31–49.

37. Ibid. vol. 1, part 1, chap. 2, p. 32.

38. Ibid. vol. 1, part 2, chap. 9, p. 288

39. See my “Whither Democratic Religion: Tocqueville on Pantheism, Secularism, and Catholicism” at the annual meeting of the Society of Catholic Social Scientists, University of Mississippi Law School, October 29–31, 2009. See also note 26.

40. *DIA*, vol. 1. p. 9.

41. Ibid. vol. 1, part 2, chap. 9, p. 288.

42. See *Discourses*, chap. 11, the beginning.

43. *DIA*, vol. 2, part 1, chap. 5, p. 444.

44. Ibid., part 2, chap. 15, p. 544.

45. Ibid. p. 543.

46. Ibid. p. 546. But Machiavelli had said almost as much. “It is the duty of the rulers of a republic or of a kingdom to maintain the foundations of the religion that sustains them.” *Discourses*, chap. 12, para. 2.

47. Ibid. vol. 1, part 1, p. 12.