It takes up the contemporary European search for a future that is neither totalitarian nor neoliberal. Each of these is, of course, worthwhile. Unfortunately, however engaging and widely-knowledgeable Bauman’s synthesis is, it suffers the weaknesses of the jeremiad. While a critical call to action, it is unclear what must be done, or whether anything is possible at all.

For example, Bauman faces the Levinasian problem of the Third. Emmanuel Levinas’ postmodern ethic explicitly undergirds Bauman’s project. Levinas’ fundamental insight is that the individual is constituted by its ethical obligation to the Other. However, the I-Thou relation with its infinite obligations faces the problem of the Third, the ‘other Other’ who also makes demands on us. As each obligation is absolute, we may not adjudicate between them, but we must. This problem is made explicit in Levinas’s *Otherwise than Being* and acknowledged by Bauman. The strength of this position is that we gain an ethical vantage point from which to critique the failures of the political. Its weakness is that politics becomes a realm of necessary sin. As he presents it, totalitarianism is the State’s essence, not simply its potential. Bauman does not argue for a politics of positive freedom and citizenship so much as an ethical and anarchic anti-politics.

Bauman hopes for a social world governed by the edict to “love thy neighbor” and makes occasional reference to the need for a more humane politics, but the rest of the text indicates that this is no longer possible. He is not a post-modernist so much as a betrayed modernist. The political and aesthetic ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity and beauty are openly held as ideals, but ones betrayed by the nation-state and the free market, those essentially modern inventions. There is certainly a need to develop a humane politics and this will require an engagement with the exclusions of the State, the distractions and false promises of the Market, the role of the artist and the place of hospitality in societies that would rather police their borders for the always threatening ‘Them’. Bauman’s desperate plea is both compelling and exhibits his deep insight and broad knowledge, but the reader is left wanting more.

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In Josiah Royce’s 1908 work *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, the teacher of W.E.B. Du Bois and colleague of William James offered a treatment of the principle of loyalty, which he saw as chief among virtues. Also published in 1908 was a collection of essays intended to show the role of the principle of loyalty as it might be applied to problems that are existent in American society, entitled *Race Questions, Provincialism, & Other American Problems*. In 2009, Scott L. Pratt and Shannon Sullivan have re-introduced and amended the latter work to include six additional essays that have not been available since their original publication more than 90 years ago. In so doing, the pair has added an invaluable collection to the pool of available works by early 20th century American philosophers. In this brief review, I offer comments on the introductions as well as a few remarks about the topic of the last of the newly introduced works by Royce.
Pratt’s introduction to *Race Questions* is focused on the virtue of loyalty. No other angle of approach seems more appropriate to lead off this collection, given that loyalty is at the center of Royce’s philosophy and a major theme in every essay of the volume. For the uninitiated, Pratt gives an explanation of loyalty according to Royce. He also identifies the role of the principle in Royce’s body of work. Finally, he introduces each of the essays in the volume, showing generally the role of the principle of loyalty in each essay.

Pratt explains that loyalty is not just one virtue among many. It is by loyalty that the other virtues are possible. The others are, in fact, subsidiary virtues. Pratt quotes from *Philosophy of Loyalty*: “all special virtues and duties [...] are special forms of loyalty.” Moreover, “[...] the whole moral law is implicitly bound up in the one precept: *Be loyal*” (4). Loyalty is expressed individually and according to what a person has to offer. The loyal person is one who gives whatever she is able whenever an opportunity arises to show “devotion to a cause.” Loyalty is purpose-giving and action-directing. It is not the cause to which one is devoted that provides direction, but rather what one has to offer in support of the cause. It is therefore not the case that loyalty provides a set of rules that all people can employ in all situations, but rather is a guiding principle that enables individuals to figure for themselves what they ought to do.

Individuals can and do get it wrong, of course. These failures in loyalty produce the kinds of problems Royce discusses in the essays included in the original volume of *Race Problems*. The newly published essays included in Pratt and Sullivan’s current volume expound further upon problems caused by failures in loyalty as well as in the solutions proper application of the principle can afford.

Shannon Sullivan’s introduction offers a context for Royce’s essays that may appeal more directly to the philosopher who is concerned with problems related to race and racism in America. The context she offers is to encourage the reader to see Royce’s first aim in “Race Questions and Prejudices” as being one of resetting the question of the problem of race for white readers. It is not the threat posed by blacks in white America and Europe that should concern philosophers, but rather the threat posed by white America and Europe to the rest of humanity. Sullivan explains, “Royce sees that white domination and imperialism might be the greatest threat to the flourishing of humankind in the twentieth century” (22).

Sullivan points to a central theme of concern for Royce. He asks readers how we are to deal with difference. He points to cultural differences in comparing Japanese to European and Americans, explaining that loyalty to one’s own people does not include a demand that, and in fact it should prohibit, “an unwillingness to learn from foreign cultures [...]” (24). He also points to Jamaica as an example of a land without race problems such as those that are apparent in the southern United States. He examines the manner in which European colonials have acted to keep control over the natives in that state. As Sullivan notes, the lessons Royce derives from the Jamaica case are problematic at best for modern anti-racists. But the historical value in his analysis is at the fore: violence towards blacks is not the answer to the problem of race in the first decade of the 20th century. Sullivan’s treatment of Royce’s focus on race is a useful contextualization for the modern philosopher interested in the history of American philosophy of race and racism.

Notably included in this new edition is a letter Professor Royce wrote after the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The context in which he wrote this letter is worth our attention: prior to this point.
in his career, Pratt explains, Royce had always held to a principle of neutrality in the classroom. Furthermore, he had hitherto extolled the role of loyalty as engendered in the state of Germany. The letter marks a modification to Royce’s approach and an abandonment of his principle of neutrality. In this letter, he quotes his own comments to a class of students wherein he condemned the act, saying to his German peers: “You may triumph in the visible world, but at the banquet where you celebrate your triumph there will be present the ghosts of my dead slain on the Lusitania” (265). He declares his new position: “I am no longer neutral, even in form” (268).

Pratt and Sullivan’s contextualization in their introductions to their new edition of Royce’s Race Questions are valuable tools to those of us who are only recently introduced to Royce’s work. Likewise, the essays provide valuable reintroductions for those of us who are new only to the expanded edition’s fresh material. The new material in the 2009 edition is worthwhile both to the student of the philosophy of loyalty as well as the student of the American philosophical tradition. Pratt and Sullivan’s edition of Race Questions is a noteworthy addition to the library of works of American philosophers.

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Religious naturalism is a philosophical perspective which states that only the world of nature is real, and that the divine is fully a part of nature. Religious Naturalism Today is distinctive and unprecedented as it combines a family-portrait of religious naturalists past and present and explores religious naturalism’s major contested issues. The book’s subtitle, “The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative,” alludes to the view that this philosophical movement is making a revival and represents a viable option in religious thinking. The purpose of the book is to “trace this story and to analyze some of the issues dividing these religious naturalists, issues which a religious naturalist must face” (xii.) Overall the book is a detailed map of and guide to religious naturalism and it may serve as a companion for someone who would like to consider nature and naturalism as subjects for religious reflection.

Religious Naturalism Today is divided into six chapters consisting of two parts, as well as an introduction and conclusion. Part One covers the movement’s “classic period” and discusses several of that period’s major representatives including George Santayana, Samuel Alexander, John Dewey, Bernard Meland, and William Bernhardt. Part Two discusses more recent religious naturalists including Bernard Loomer, Robert Neville, and Robert S. Corrington. An interlude briefly discusses religious naturalism in literature.

Stone’s introduction, in my judgment, is the most crucial part of the book because it provides substantial historical background and sets the scene for the book’s main theses and arguments. As the introduction sets out, Stone takes a synoptic view of religious naturalism’s history and grounds that history in two major philosophical schools: the naturalism of Columbia University in New York where Santayana was read and Dewey taught, and the Chicago and Iliff Schools of Theology where the philosophy of Meland, Bernhardt, and Loomer exerted