devoted the bulk of their attention (p. 159). The sixth and seventh chapters conclude the book with a wonderfully thick description of what such a second-strand democracy already has and also potentially could look like, the modes of direct citizen participation in self-governance that it might involve, the ideal sorts of environments (mostly urban) in which it might be expected to flourish. In developing this picture, Green draws not only on a vast range of intellectual resources, from the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey to the theoretical deliberations of the “New Urbanists,” but also on her personal experiences as a planning consultant for various community movements and neighborhood organizations (e.g., in Seattle).

Green’s reading of Dewey seems especially felicitous for the purposes of her discussion here. Although the range of her reading is vast, her knowledge of the classical pragmatists quite thorough, brief discussions such as the ones of Peirce’s “tychism”, or of James’s argument in “The Will to Believe”, or of Royce’s portrayal of the “beloved community”, all manifest themselves as mere interludes in a sustained and insightful meditation on Dewey and on the robust and highly personal form of lived democracy that he prescribed in numerous books and articles. (The same is true for brief comments devoted to the work and writings of Jane Addams, W.E.B. DuBois, and Alain Locke.) Her rebuttal of some of Rorty’s readings of Dewey—for example, on the relation between theory and practice—is also quite instructive.

Dewey’s “great community,” like Royce’s beloved one, was intended to be “global” in the sense that Green’s twenty first century perspective requires. But, as already indicated, her philosophical resources are so thoroughly American (even European thinkers like Habermas, who draws some of her attention, are indebted to the American pragmatists) and the story that she tells is to such a great extent one about American facts, figures and movements, that it is difficult to discern from Green’s analysis precisely how we might set about the task of “achieving our world”. Since this book does not supply a detailed map of the contents of those other texts that are eventually to form her “trilogy”, this remark about the limitations of the present study, in fact, may amount to nothing more than a reporting of what she had strategically planned to do at this stage.

One thing that Green does do in this book (see p. 105, for example) is to observe the tension between demands for rich diversity and for powerful communitas, nevertheless, the vital necessity of developing “world-embracing, cosmopolitan loyalties” that are also vibrantly local and “proudly provincial”. This insight, it seems to me, will remain crucial as her project unfolds, also will need to be greatly developed in future reflections, so that Josiah Royce could prove to play a role in Green’s articulation of democracy’s global character similar to the one that Dewey has already begun to play in her plumbing of its “depths”.

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Isaac Levi’s work deserves to be much more widely known and appreciated, and this volume is designed to help achieve that worthy aim. Levi wrote his dissertation on epistemology under the direction of Ernest Nagel at Columbia University, and then taught at Columbia from
1970 to 2003, holding the title of John Dewey Professor of Philosophy since 1992. Levi has defended a novel kind of Peircean/Deweyan pragmatism for several decades. His sophisticated epistemological system stands as one of the most highly elaborated and robust accounts of inquiry and knowledge ever produced from selected principles of pragmatism. This volume of twenty new essays about various aspects of his system is concluded by Levi’s own lengthy replies to each contributor. The contributors are respected philosophers in their own right and they lend the volume its international flavor, writing from many countries including America, Brazil, Canada, UK, Sweden, The Netherlands, Germany, and Australia.

Several contributors attempt to locate the mission and principles of Levi’s pragmatic epistemology within a wider pragmatist and naturalistic context. Cheryl Misak agrees that Peirce, like Levi, did regard one’s stable body of background beliefs, for which a person has no reason yet to doubt, as practically infallible. What makes us reasonable is therefore our capacity for adjusting of beliefs in light of future evidence. But appropriate receptivity to new contradictory evidence becomes problematic, when we maintain a practical stance of infallibility. Why would we ever exchange a practically true belief for what must initially appear as a false belief? Levi supposes that this problem is severe for Peirce’s ‘messianic’ realism and its vision of perfected truth. However, Peirce actually recommends suspending affirmation of a freshly contradicted belief, and letting subsequent inquiry decide the matter, which is not far from Levi’s recommended ‘secular’ realism process of belief revision. André Fuhrmann respects the pragmatic utility of the notion of ideal truth. While potentially harmful for a lone inquirer, it remains the case that a community of inquirers who are cooperatively answerable to each other can benefit from appeals to the aim of unique ultimate truth. Philip Kitcher emphasizes how knowledge production is typically cooperative and why knowledge is mostly sustained in communities. Collective epistemic responsibility and socialized epistemology are the next frontiers for a pragmatist, in Kitcher’s estimation. The naturalization of inquiry itself concerns both Wolfram Hinzen and Akeel Bilgrami; Hinzen urges locating our rationality commitments in our actual cognitive capacities, while Bilgrami instead places intentional commitments within the first-person perspective and resists identifying them with brain functions or dispositions. Johannes Persson ponders the implications of Levi’s stance towards the vindication of disposition predicates through inquiry.

Most of this volume’s contributors focus on particular issues raised by Levi’s pragmatic approach to rationality and rational inquiry. Bengt Hansson, Otávio Bueno, and Hans Rott analyze Levi’s distinction between infallibility and incorrigibility and explore Levi’s ways of handling the problem of inconsistency among beliefs. Nils-Eric Sahlin, Henry E. Kyburg, D. H. Mellor, Maurice Pagnucco, and Erik J. Olsson peruse the issues of updating one’s estimate of probabilities, applying abduction, making predictions, and Bayesian induction. Wolfgang Spohn questions the wisdom of treating belief as having degrees and the relationship between partial and full belief, and recommends his own application of ‘ranking functions’ in preference to any probabilistic treatment of belief. Horacio Arão Costa compares Levi’s decision theory with contemporary work in computer science. Mark Kaplan questions Levi’s stance upon the autonomy of theoretical reasoning from practical reasoning. Sven Ove Hansson distinguishes various idealizations in Levi’s theory, which supply criteria for modifying belief commitment and standards for judging inquiry performance. Wlodek Rabinowicz explores distinct pragmatic arguments for rationality constraints on beliefs and preferences.
This volume is not merely a fine survey and critique of a major pragmatist thinker, but an important contribution to pragmatism in general. Many of the topics covered in these chapters are highly significant for pragmatism’s continued relevance to epistemology and the theory of inquiry. Levi’s precise and penetrating replies are extremely helpful for clarifications of his philosophical motivations and his theoretical maneuvers. There will likely be no better resource for understanding Levi’s work and the potential for the line of pragmatist thought that he represents. Pragmatists who would further extend the ideas of Peirce and Dewey should carefully read to this most useful volume.

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In one of his early essays, “The Study of Ethics,” John Dewey remarked that “ideals are like stars; we steer by them, not towards them.” The point, of course, is that ideals are something that we use to help us get along in the world; they are instruments to help guide our actions and choices and goals, but they do not dictate, much less constitute, those actions and choices and goals. This is so for us collectively, as well as individually. But stars are not the only things we use to steer by. In the context of law, we use principles, among other things, to regulate our individual and collective behavior, to steer by, not towards. This simple and obvious point seems too-often lost for many legal theorists. This fine book by Michael Sullivan is intended to help us rediscover this point.

Sullivan’s book is pragmatist in both content and method. He not only spells out some basic pragmatist views and understandings of legal theory and legal philosophy, but also he practices what he preaches; he begins his task by looking at how and why the regulation of our behavior is couched today in the language of concerns over rights. By the end of the book, he proceeds through various conceptions of a pragmatist approach to law and legal philosophy, identifying and dismissing misconceptions over the first three chapters. Having noted a problem that needs to be addressed, and having cleared away some confusions and infelicities, in the second half of the book he moves on to offer his positive account and reconstruction of these issues.

Chapter One centers on the recent debate concerning “rights talk” and the claim by communitarians that liberalism (at least in the United States) has resulted in a harmful over-emphasis and mis-emphasis on individual rights. Sullivan counters these communitarian claims, but the focus for him is not so much on settling this particular issue, but on seeing it as the kind of genuine issue that calls out for a legal pragmatist response.

Chapter Two involves an analysis of criticisms made by Ronald Dworkin against a pragmatist approach to legal theory and legal practice. Taking a pragmatist view to be forward-looking and essentially one that attempts to solve the problem at hand, Dworkin claims that a pragmatist judge would be quite comfortable with ignoring legal precedent in coming to a decision. For Dworkin, if the point is to determine a given case on the basis of what would best foster the values and goals that are embraced, then past decisions would appear to be of minor