result was no less than an improved version of Dewey’s 1938 *Logic*. It was improved in ways that incorporated the insights of Peirce’s logic and developed Dewey’s earlier work in a direction that the aging pragmatist expressly intended. Indeed, Dewey writes, “You [Bentley] shouldn’t lean too heavily on the [1938] *Logic*; it wasn’t a bad job at the time, but I could do better now [with Knowing and the Known]; largely through association with you and getting the courage to see my thing [logical theory] through without compromise” (Cor. 595, see also 184, 420, 481, 483-4).

Nevertheless, Hickman’s book represents a significant contribution to the literature on classical pragmatism as well as an overture (whether intended or not) to philosophers interested in contributing to several fertile new areas for Dewey scholarship. They provide an excellent example, following Randall’s remark, of a preeminent Dewey scholar “honoring Dewey” by “work[ing] on Dewey’s problems . . . [and] reconstruct[ing] his insights, to see, if need be, farther than Dewey saw.”

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This book was extremely hard to read. The project of analytical pragmatism was something of a blur and a puzzling irritation. Brandom writes like an eco-tourism director who knows how things look and how things *could* look if certain other conditions were different than they are. But he describes them both in more or less the same voice, thus making the reader’s task quite challenging. He liberally sprinkles acronyms throughout the text, and I spent a good deal of time flipping around looking for definitions of PP-sufficient, VP-sufficient and XL and trying to figure out what pragmatic bootstrapping is. And here is what I make of Brandom’s project: in the six lectures in this book he develops an idea that a person who can do things with a language has all the tools necessary to make the move to a semantic meta-vocabulary of that language. So, using a language provides a complete set of tools for engaging in linguistic analysis of that language. Similarly, having a grasp of normative moves inside a language provides a basis for modal claims made in that language. These normative claims come out as commitments to material claims and rejections of other material claims. Once the move to modal semantics has been made, Brandom shifts his analysis of language to an ontological point of view concerning determinate negation (Hegel). Overall, his point is that in saying what we are doing, we (ordinary language users) have the inferential ground for describing the remotest regions of language and unpacking the moves we can make within that language. He describes his project this way: “I wanted to exploit the relations between what is expressed by deontic normative vocabulary (paradigmatically ‘committed’ and ‘entitled’) and alethic modal vocabulary (‘necessary’ and ‘possible’) that were revealed by putting together the Kant-Sellars theses with the way a semantics for modal vocabulary could be elaborated from what is expressed by a normative vocabulary. In those terms I thought I could say something new and interesting about the nexus between knowing and acting subjects, who are obligated to reject and or resolve incompatible commitments and objects, which are individuated in part by the impossibility of their exhibiting incompatible properties.” (xv) See what I mean?
The six chapters track the following sequence: (1) Extending the Project of Analysis [into use, beyond semantic unpacking] (2) Elaborating Abilities: The Expressive Role of Logic [unpacking the pragmatic structure that turns out to be implicit in the semantic project all along] (3) Artificial Intelligence and Analytic Pragmatism [updating or changing beliefs is a practice that cannot be “algorithmically decomposed” i.e., done by a symbol manipulating device, hence it is the product of “autonomous discursive practice”] (4) Modality and Normativity: From Hume and Quine to Kant and Sellars [see 3 above], (5) Incompatibility, Modal Semantics, and Intrinsic Logic [from the presence of incompatible normative claims comes the whole fabric of semantic moves that reveal the logic of language] (6) Intentionality as a Pragmatically Mediated Semantic Relation [analysis is shifted from a critical into a constructive instrument. Analytic pragmatism is saying what someone must do in order to count thereby as saying or representing something.]

Apart from the difficulties associated with picking up on Brandom’s style and idiosyncratic thought pattern, there were other difficulties with this book. For one, his argument precedes on the basis of unpacking rich vocabularies and abilities of speakers to work with norms as the basis for the rest of his argument. While I have a high regard for the meaning of ordinary language in the practices of ordinary speakers, it seems that this claim requires at least some qualification or other kind of backing. His backing is the demonstration that nothing else is required beyond the practical use of norm speech to explain the adoption or refinement of norms for that same language. This provides a formal assessment of the richness of vocabulary while remaining silent on that actual content of those norms and practices. But his next step in the argument is to turn content agreements and disagreements based on these norms into the stepping stones of a larger building of inference without ever looking back at the origin of normativity itself. This left me formally amazed but content-wise unconvinced. The other global criticism is that he implies that this analysis reveals a holistic and non-compositional system, therefore “the semantic value of a compound is not computable from the semantic values of its components. But this holism within each level of constructional complexity is entirely compatible with recursiveness between levels.” (135) As best I can make out this means that content norms in language can be pragmatically articulated and developed and the rules of practical language usage expanded to include all levels of that language. Rather than open a door or a window into philosophical inquiry, it appears that language can support only a recursive strengthening and repetition of its basis in norms already present. This leaves too much opaque in my opinion. And it seems to block the road of inquiry toward the possibility of any other alternative conception of the meaning of norms in language. In short, it seems to be back on the semantic analysis drawing board that he wanted to escape from.

There is the strong possibility that I have missed something quite elemental in Brandom’s argument. I was almost intoxicated by the project a time or two, but when I attempted to formulate the goal in other terms, I was stymied. I can’t shake the feeling that this book, and perhaps Brandom’s larger project, is an effort to leave the narrowness of analytic philosophy but without the intention of moving far enough toward a content richness of experience sufficient to incorporate the effort of those other philosophers who take on the mantle of pragmatism.

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