manner permitting their rediscovery. Pedagogically then, in classroom environments increasingly micro-managed to suit externally imposed ideas of student's interests and sensibilities, and to deliver them into standardized categories, volumes such as the ES afford the opportunity to fruitfully agitate readers; to potentially engage the non-initiated without forcing upon them anything but self-initiation.

Coleman and those he consulted in gathering the essays for this collection have done a wonderful job of including these crucial pieces, which bring forth vividly the breadth of Santayana's interests, philosophic, literary, moral, and scientific. Until the Santayana Edition is able to achieve its ultimate aim of releasing critical editions of all of Santayana's major works, scholars and instructors can be satisfied that many of his most important insights are captured in this single, affordable, ready-for-classroom-use collection.

Matthew Caleb Flamm
Rockford College


In this volume of essays, each chapter flows together so seamlessly that the whole could easily be mistaken for a single monograph. Authored by Larry Hickman, the Director of the John Dewey Center, these essays coalesce around two major themes: (i) John Dewey's pragmatism is, to borrow Richard Rorty's turn-of-phrase, "waiting at the end of the road" that postmodernists have been trekking and (ii) Dewey's ideas have far-reaching implications for several areas of contemporary philosophic interest, such as global citizenship, technology, logic, religion and the environment. In memoriam to Dewey, John Herman Randall, Jr., remarked: "The best way of honoring Dewey is to work on Dewey's problems—to reconstruct his insights, to see, if need be, farther than Dewey saw" (cited by James Gouinlock in the "Introduction" to The Moral Writings of John Dewey, liv).

Part I of the book addresses the first of the two themes. In the initial essay, Hickman demonstrates that Dewey's philosophy anticipates the postmodern project of eschewing philosophical pretensions to apodictic certainty, and surpasses it by putting "to work what the postmodernists had simply dismissed" (p. 20). Whereas Dewey joins with postmodernists in rejecting traditional metaphysics, he departs from postmodernists (particularly Rorty) by providing a naturalistic alternative: a metaphysics of experience. The second essay concerns the topic of global citizenship and whether Deweyan democracy can accommodate the plural differences of peoples and groups around the world. Hickman's answer is that "what various cultures hold as good is much too rich and varied to be understood or judged [by the Deweyan democrat] in terms of one principle or set of principles" (p. 43). Still, "the Pragmatic hotel cannot accommodate the democrat and the dictator" (p. 47). Thus, the chapter offers a cogent response to Robert Talisse's objection that Deweyan pragmatists cannot be political pluralists (see his A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, 2008; for my own response, see "In Defense of Democracy as a Way of Life" forthcoming in Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society). The final essay brings the ideas of contemporary scholars of classical pragmatism into dialogue with those of several postmodernists and neo-pragmatists.
Part II of *Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism* speaks to Dewey’s influence on what Hickman calls the ‘technosciences.’ While Dewey is widely appreciated (even outside of the discipline of Philosophy) as a philosopher of education and democracy, he is rarely, if ever, heralded for his contributions to the philosophy of technology—an omission that Hickman (among others) hopes to remedy. The first essay criticizes Jürgen Habermas’s dualistic treatment of strategic and communicative action, as well as his insistence (shared with other critical theorists) that the human sciences and technological sciences “proceed on the basis of a wholly different method . . . [such] that the two methods are at bottom irreconcilable” (p. 71). Critical theorists fear that by enshrining instrumental rationality philosophers such as Dewey subordinate human ends (or values) to the means or technologies of science. While some features are shared by Dewey’s theory of inquiry and Habermas’s model of communicative action, Dewey believed that the scientific method, including its instrumentalism, can serve to advance social (scientific) inquiry and enrich human life. The middle two essays articulate Deweyan responses to two contemporary philosophers of technology. In the final essay of this section, titled “Doing and Making in a Democracy,” Hickman connects Dewey’s philosophy of technology with his democratic theory.

Part III contains two essays pertaining to another philosophical area in which Deweyan pragmatism, while having gained some traction in recent years, still lacks a solid foothold: philosophy of the environment. In the first essay, Hickman argues that the naturalism and instrumentalism of Dewey’s pragmatism harmonize with Aldo Leopold’s environmental philosophy. Leopold’s notion of environmental management resembles a species of what Dewey calls ‘inquiry.’ According to Hickman, “Dewey’s Pragmatic Instrumentalism is an encouragement to ‘management,’ in just the Leopoldian sense, that is, as an intelligent reworking of what is unsatisfactory in order to render it more satisfactory” (p. 143). Rather than conceive nature as distinct from or in competition with human communities, both Leopold and Dewey see “human beings themselves . . . as one of many forces within the larger domain of nature”—a view Hickman refers to as ‘nature-as-culture’ (p. 144). In the second essay, “Green Pragmatism,” Hickman shows how Dewey’s writings, particularly his essay “Is Nature Good?” are relevant to more recent academic exchanges about the value of the natural environment.

In part IV, “Classical Pragmatism,” the essays fit more loosely together than those in the previous sections of book. Hickman explores the points of contact between Dewey’s works on aesthetics, ethics, logic, religion and evolutionary theory and the works of other notable scholars, including Michael Eldridge, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Max Scheler and Charles Sanders Peirce.

If there is one flaw in this volume, it is the relative neglect of Dewey’s collaboration with Arthur F. Bentley (except for a brief mention of their correspondence on p. 27). Hickman’s essays on Dewey’s theory of inquiry and Peirce’s logic would have been excellent occasions to comment on their significant, though underappreciated, contribution to logical theory: *Knowing and the Known* (1945). A common bias among Dewey scholars is that this work, instead of developing Dewey’s 1938 Logic, departs from its spirit, reflects the overbearing influence of Bentley on Dewey (who was at the time an octogenarian) and, therefore, merits little scholarly attention. However, Dewey and Bentley engaged in an extended correspondence, collected in *John Dewey and Arthur Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951* (1964) and the
result was no less than an improved version of Dewey’s 1938 *Logic*. It was improved in ways that incorporated the insights of Peirce’s logic and developed Dewey’s earlier work in a direction that the aging pragmatist expressly intended. Indeed, Dewey writes, “You [Bentley] shouldn’t lean too heavily on the [1938] *Logic*; it wasn’t a bad job at the time, but I could do better now [with Knowing and the Known]; largely through association with you and getting the courage to see my thing [logical theory] through without compromise” (Cor. 595, see also 184, 420, 481, 483-4).

Nevertheless, Hickman’s book represents a significant contribution to the literature on classical pragmatism as well as an overture (whether intended or not) to philosophers interested in contributing to several fertile new areas for Dewey scholarship. They provide an excellent example, following Randall’s remark, of a preeminent Dewey scholar “honoring Dewey” by “work[ing] on Dewey’s problems . . . [and] reconstruct[ing] his insights, to see, if need be, farther than Dewey saw.”

Shane Ralston

Penn State University and University of Maine


This book was extremely hard to read. The project of analytical pragmatism was something of a blur and a puzzling irritation. Brandom writes like an eco-tourism director who knows how things look and how things *could* look if certain other conditions were different than they are. But he describes them both in more or less the same voice, thus making the reader’s task quite challenging. He liberally sprinkles acronyms throughout the text, and I spent a good deal of time flipping around looking for definitions of PP-sufficient, VP-sufficient and XL and trying to figure out what pragmatic bootstrapping is. And here is what I make of Brandom’s project: in the six lectures in this book he develops an idea that a person who can do things with a language has all the tools necessary to make the move to a semantic meta-vocabulary of that language. So, using a language provides a complete set of tools for engaging in linguistic analysis of that language. Similarly, having a grasp of *normative* moves inside a language provides a basis for modal claims made in that language. These *normative* claims come out as commitments to material claims and rejections of other material claims. Once the move to modal semantics has been made, Brandom shifts his analysis of language to an ontological point of view concerning determinate negation (Hegel). Overall, his point is that in saying what we are doing, we (ordinary language users) have the inferential ground for describing the remotest regions of language and unpacking the moves we can make within that language. He describes his project this way: “I wanted to exploit the relations between what is expressed by deontic normative vocabulary (paradigmatically ‘committed’ and ‘entitled’) and alethic modal vocabulary (‘necessary’ and ‘possible’) that were revealed by putting together the Kant-Sellars theses with the way a semantics for modal vocabulary could be elaborated from what is expressed by a normative vocabulary. In those terms I thought I could say something new and interesting about the nexus between knowing and acting *subjects*, who are obligated to reject and or resolve incompatible *commitments* and *objects*, which are individuated in part by the impossibility of their exhibiting incompatible *properties.*” (xv) See what I mean?