comment on their significant, though underappreciated, contribution to logical theory: *Knowing and the Known* (1945). A common bias among Dewey scholars is that this work, instead of developing Dewey’s 1938 *Logic*, departs from its spirit, reflects the overbearing influence of Bentley on Dewey (who was at the time an octogenarian) and, therefore, merits little scholarly attention. However, Dewey and Bentley engaged in an extended correspondence, collected in *John Dewey and Arthur Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951* (1964) and the result was no less than an improved version of Dewey’s 1938 *Logic*. It was improved in ways that incorporated the insights of Peirce’s logic and developed Dewey’s earlier work in a direction that the aging pragmatist expressly intended. Indeed, Dewey writes, “You [Bentley] shouldn’t lean too heavily on the [1938] *Logic*; it wasn’t a bad job at the time, but I could do better now [with *Knowing and the Known*]; largely through association with you and getting the courage to see my thing [logical theory] through without compromise” (Cor. 595, see also 184, 420, 461, 483-4).

Nevertheless, Hickman’s book represents a significant contribution to the literature on classical pragmatism as well as an overture (whether intended or not) to philosophers interested in contributing to several fertile new areas for Dewey scholarship. They provide an excellent example, following Randall’s remark, of a preeminent Dewey scholar “honoring Dewey” by “work[ing] on Dewey’s problems . . . [and] reconstruct[ing] his insights, to see, if need be, farther than Dewey saw.”

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The collection of John McDermott’s essays created by Douglas Anderson is a magnificent opening into the depth and breadth of the life and work, indeed, of the drama of possibility that McDermott lives. The essays address the dimensions of experience recurring in McDermott’s work: the exploration of the development and significance of American culture, the pivotal role of Emerson, James, Dewey and Royce as guides in exploring the stream of experience
natural to us as humans, the challenges we face in the restricting pull of our tendency to see objects and traditions as fundamental to reality instead of being derivations of our engagement as experiencing beings. The energy and sensitivity with which these issues are entered into makes evident the role McDermott has had as a teacher and as one who calls American culture and its philosophers to give an account of how their energies are being shaped and directed.

These essays draw deeply from the four men mentioned above, with special mention of James and Dewey. Their understanding of experience as a complex process in which each person is engaged in a wide variety of tasks is accepted as fundamental because this approach is one that is fruitfully open to the relations that constitute the primary, given dimensions of experience. Each person thus becomes a unique center of experiential activity that has to work things out with other such centers of activity as each of them and all of them together are creating and responding to their space, to their time and to each other. To manage under these very complex circumstances, humans take certain dimensions of their experience and create objects, giving them a name and placing them in an order. They also create norms of behavior and institutions. The inclination, of course, is to accept the objects and their order, the behavioral norms and the institutions as the founding reality, resulting in a shut down of the experiential processes that are the hallmark of our humanity. To approach human beings in the way in which James, Dewey and McDermott do is a risky endeavor. It places total responsibility for human life on the current crop of humans. This would not be particularly frightening were it not apparent that humans are just as likely to choose for their undoing as they are to choose for their benefit. Dewey addresses this matter and affirms that in the process of the flow of our experience we create or discover norms that tend to the good making progress or at least an amelioration possible. McDermott is not quite so sure, given the mounting evidence of human violence and the propensity to make choices without proper regard for their consequences. Rather than this natural propensity for the good, McDermott would grant that we are able to assess the consequences of our choices, even if we do not always take action appropriate for avoiding down turns and catastrophes. We have the capacity for the better choice,
gained through experience and rational capacity, even if it is not always exercised well.

For McDermott, there is an additional dimension of experience that is a buoyant factor. This is the element of novelty and surprise, which emerges as we seek to create a world that is our own as we build, relate and reflect on our relations.

Much more should be said to provide a worthy account of the challenge and the fullness of the cultural and philosophical issues that McDermott brings to the table. Given the nature of space and time, however, that opportunity will be set aside with encouragement to those who read this review to take up The Dream of Possibility and walk into that challenge and fullness.

In keeping with McDermott's invitation throughout his work to enter into conversation with him and to raise questions, the following issues are put forward.

On several occasions in this collection of essays, which includes about half of those published in Streams of Experience, McDermott underscores the importance of Royce's notion of community and how vital a role creating community has as we struggle with vital dimensions of our experience as well as the boredom, the meanness and the unraveling depression that can creep into our activity. Dewey also had much to say about the importance of strong, democratic processes in developing community. However, in McDermott's essays, community, which is a creation of the stream of experience, does not receive the attention it deserves, in spite of the fact that without vital communities, even the educational process tends to languish, at least in our current cultural context. It would seem that a community that would provide encouragement for exploring traditions and foster creative engagement with the environment would have an essential role. This is one of the first relations of the newborn and certainly an elemental relation for the rest of one's life. Although communities can be inhibiting, they can also serve as mainstays of a creative response to our inchoate experiential streams.

Linked to a sense of community is a sense for narrative. Without the narratives that emerge in our experience it becomes difficult if not impossible to come by meaning or to place in context. McDermott provides a
fine historical narrative of the cultural background out of which American culture emerged, but he does not go on to grant it much of a role in the everyday working with our own stream of experience. He does grant that each of us needs to be concerned about our “tale” but does not go on to develop the manner or role such a story has in the molding and meaning of life. For McDermott this is an important issue since our story provides a singularly important dimension of the context for linking or associating the elements in our stream of experience. Without our story that stream is little more than a scattering of sparkling elements, glorious as it may be. What ever our story is or our stories are, without them there is no way to respond to the inevitable moral question “What should I do?” This question McDermott accepts as one of the pivotal questions a person must address. Further, without a narrative of some sort, the sense of personal continuity is seriously curtailed. The nature and role of narrative needs additional development.

There is also a dimension of pluralism that needs further attention. An elemental dimension of pluralism grants the uniqueness of each center of conscious activity and the requirement for each such center to grant an equitable reality to all other centers of conscious activity or persons. What I grant, in this case, is that a reality I have access to only indirectly and through various interpretive routes is granted a status at least equal to my own. The point is I am granting reality to an “other” that I do not know except indirectly. McDermott is quite comfortable with this exercise. The question comes up, however, with respect to experiences that Dewey refers to as “consummatory,” that is experiences creating a profound enrichment. Dewey and McDermott alike recognize the importance of consummatory experiences but put limitations on them out of fear that they will congeal into something that will end up curtailing the creativity and novelty of the centers of conscious activity. But what if this “other” glimpsed through consummatory experience enhances the creativity and novelty of the centers of conscious activity and does not seem to be quite like the other centers that I run across daily? Is the “other” still to be rejected and if so, on what grounds? Because some have abused the experience?

Reading McDermott is always a salutary experience, even, to use his word, a salvific experience. This
collection of his essays, in particular, has a depth and breadth that is consummatory. It also leads to an ongoing conversation that expands the horizons of most every aspect of personal identity and of the culture we create.

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For the last several decades, African American philosophy has seemingly revolved around a single DuBoisian axis. The introduction of his thought to the American philosophical canon has traditionally and almost exclusively focused on his study under white philosophical figures like William James, Josiah Royce and his emulation of Hegelian dialectics. Though DuBois categorically rejects these associations and the training that many of the works "traditional" American philosophers insist make him a "philosopher," the most notable contemporary reflections on DuBois and his theoretical contributions are rooted in his ties to European and American thinkers. While DuBois is adamant in his later works (1930–1963) that it is his African heritage, his cultural nationalism, and his anti-colonial disposition that he wishes to be remembered for, he continues to be valorized for his admittedly immature thought which emerged from his academic training at Harvard and Berlin. Here enters *W.E.B DuBois on Asia: Crossing the World Color Line*, a recent collection of essays edited by Bill V. Mullen and Cathryn Watson. As a much needed intervention into the dominant trends that currently define DuBois scholarship, Mullen and Watson’s edited collection opens up many different avenues of future research that better situates DuBois as a theorist, activist and race thinker beyond the narrow confines of American philosophy.

In an introduction and four parts respectively entitled: "The Color Line Belts the World," "Darkwater Rising: Japan and the Color of Imperialism," World War II and the Anti-Colonial Turn," and "The East is Red: Revolutions and Resolutions," Mullen and Watson present the works of DuBois from the early 1900’s to his death in 1963. Following the introduction, every part in the book is prefaced by an introductory essay that outlines the themes