conclusion leaves room for the reader to continue the discussion. On the other, given the recurrent philosophical objections to the pragmatic emphasis on what works, Dooley could have pressed the issue more fully to good effect. Are there, for instance, insights or qualifications in James (or Dewey) that might help address Frederic’s – or the reader’s – uncertainty? Might the examination of life experiences through literature, rather than through typical philosophical discourse, help us break new ground in addressing recurrent concerns about a pragmatic account of truth? I found myself wanting a more extensive dialogue to test and strengthen the community between philosophers and literary writers.

The brevity of the essays may be a limitation or a benefit. Supplemented with detailed endnotes that could guide further study, essay length may prove ideal for undergraduate courses on philosophy and literature. Students would likely be prompted by Dooley’s sometimes tentative conclusions to pursue their own interpretations and answers. But I also think Dooley could delve more fully into the rich material he has unearthed, and a final chapter explicitly reflecting on the merits of the journey which the volume facilitates would deepen the conversation between philosophers and literary writers. Even so, Dooley’s book merits our attention for bringing together typically distinct audiences, stimulating interest in an interdisciplinary methodology, and providing a prompt for further exploration.

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Richard Rorty’s New Pragmatism: Neither Liberal Nor Free.

Grippe’s subtitle tells you right away that his criticism of Rorty’s “New Pragmatism” will be severe, accusing Rorty of failing to accomplish those things that he considered most central to his philosophic enterprise. What is remarkable is how well Grippe makes those criticisms while sustaining constant respect for both Rorty’s work and his goals.
In fact, one of the best features of this book is its combination of seriousness and intellectual generosity. We are often serious in our criticisms of others and generous with those with whom we sympathize. Grippe’s writing is direct and serious, but his argument is also marked by a greater than Davidsonian charity. Grippe’s account of Rorty’s pragmatism is fair, sympathetic, and detailed.

The first chapter puts Rorty in historical perspective, a nod to Rorty in its acceptance of the importance of acknowledging the historical situatedness of someone’s philosophy. Then Grippe cuts quickly to the chase: Rorty argues for toleration in the name of freedom, but in order to do so, Rorty winds up being inflexibly intolerant in his assumptions concerning the importance of liberty in judgment. On the one hand judgment must permit multiple interpretations of objects; on the other hand, to gain our assent to this view Rorty appeals to a universal standard of judgment. This is a subtle move, in which apparent toleration at one level of discourse is grounded in intolerance at an even deeper level.

The subsequent chapters aim to show how Rorty’s views on science, philosophy, politics, and the self always appear as a multiplist or “Heraclitean account” that really is singularist or dependent on “an all too often unspoken and unnoticed God’s-eye, Parmenidean perspective.”

On Grippe’s argument, Rorty’s philosophy winds up being structurally similar to religious fundamentalism. Obviously Rorty does not assert that his views will be vindicated by a transcendent arbiter, but Grippe suggests that Rorty’s easy dismissal of rival views quickly becomes the kind of intolerance of rival views that calls them madness. From this stance it is too easy to regard one’s own views as unassailable; but this is dogmatism or fundamentalism.

Without saying it in quite these terms, Grippe also suggests that consequent to Rorty’s rejection of the “looking-glass” metaphors of Enlightenment philosophers—and with them the possibility of there being an “inner eye of the mind” or “God’s-eye point of view”—Rorty has cut off his philosophy from psychological maturation. Grippe writes, ‘I can see no way that Rorty’s thought, as a system of ‘persons,’ can reflect upon the aggregate (i.e., himself) as a whole to establish individual identity.”
Grippe puts this in Freudian terms: Rorty can never "reach a point where he can achieve enough distance to establish the ego-identity he has unjustifiably presupposed for himself." His position within the weave of his ideas cannot ever justifiably be called the center of the weave; each part of it is structurally like each other part and offers no unique vantage point on the rest. But apart from the development of the ego, one's understanding of others remains deficient; a consistent Rortian is a perpetual psychological infant.

The criticisms of Rorty pile up high by the final chapter, and they boil down to this: Rorty argues for freedom but winds up sacrificing freedom in order to get it. Remarkably, Grippe does not move from these criticisms to a dismissal of Rorty's project. Rorty's New Pragmatism is still worthy of consideration and may be salvageable, Grippe thinks. At least, Grippe says that despite these criticisms we should "guardedly" embrace Rortian pragmatism, along with Kant and Plato and others, "as signposts on the road to further inquiry." Grippe is attempting a Rortian retrieval of Rorty, one in which Rorty's arguments matter, but only when we accept them in a manner consonant with Rorty's more explicit notion that judgment, and justification, is relative to the person. Rorty cannot offer us a philosophy we can adopt; his philosophy will not admit of philosophic disciples. But his narrative, like the narratives of other philosophers, may be very helpful along the way.

Grippe's writing is easy to read without sacrificing profundity of argument. As with any book, there are things that could be improved. Religion runs throughout the book, rarely in a sustained way, but it's always present. Considering the important tension between religion and freedom in our world, perhaps a more focused discussion of Rorty's views on religious belief (perhaps including his late-life discussion with Vattimo) should have been included here. I'd have liked the book more if it had an introduction, one in which Grippe foreshadowed his intentions and logic better, but the book still reads well as it stands. I'd also like to have seen more reference to the historical background as well, placing Rorty more clearly among the classical pragmatists, whose criticisms could have been marshaled to support Grippe's own. Peirce and Dewey do make occasional appearances but Grippe's argument with Rorty is grounded more in our contemporaries
than in historical criticisms. The index is unusually well-detailed, though the entry for "Dewey" erroneously has his first name as "Thomas." But these are all small criticisms, and on the whole the book serves as a fluent, careful assessment of Rorty. Grippe is like the best of teachers: able to show fault in a way that does not deflate the effort of the student, eager to see his pupil succeed but unwilling to give an undeserved grade.

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There are two texts in this short work of Sullivan’s. The first is a philosophy of jurisprudence. The legal concepts of community, individual rights, and participatory democracy are clear as he wrestles with the value of philosophy, as it informs or does not inform today’s courts. As such, the book makes a great sequel to Louis Menand’s *The Metaphysical Club*, particularly Menand’s parts about Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr.

The second interwoven text is a timely and precise philosophical work on contemporary pragmatism. Just because philosophers claims to be pragmatists does not mean that they are or that they even fall within the tradition of pragmatism, and Sullivan takes them to task. His diagnosis is precise, showing the root of their malady, but then he shows with cogent arguments how pragmatic thought can inform the issue at hand.

Sullivan uses a Deweyan pragmatic perspective, but is not afraid to call forth Peirce or James to show accurately what and why pragmatism is what it is. He also uses the pragmatists’ texts to point the way to how pragmatism can still serve society today in a viable way, without the pitfalls that so many of the neo- (or pseudo-) pragmatist take. While these newcomers select parts of a pragmatic vision for their purpose, they soon discard the essence for personal flights into far less productive ground.

While these pseudo-pragmatists veer from cohesive and coherent philosophy, their errors have allowed pundits to