to endorse hedonistic happiness. There is a wealth of emerging research indicating that individuals who regularly engage in meaningful activities such as volunteering have measurably better health outcomes than those who do not. It would be interesting to see what kind of assessments regarding the scientific image of health Flanagan would make in light of these data. The closest we get is a related discussion of research on meditating monks. The final chapter investigates the possibilities for a naturalized spirituality. Scientific explanations for the God-impulse are offered here, but with the discussion of positive illusions from the previous chapter lingering in the background, these come off in a more courteous and frank manner than Dawkins’ God-delusion arguments. The complaints here are standard and uninteresting – theistic religions tend toward dogmatism and dogmatism tends toward violence; assertions regarding creation, miracles, and afterlife are epistemically immature. Creation stories (or attempts to answer the question Why is there something rather than nothing?) are the least problematic, because the question is by its nature unanswerable, hence any story we give is just that - a story. The problem comes when creation stories are presumed to assert rather than express, when they are taken to be more than myth. Rather than representing literal accounts, theisms should be taken as expressive of "meaning and moral glue." In other words, we should move away from theism toward spiritualism. The most compelling stretch of the final chapter is the few pages Flanagan devotes to his own spiritual autobiography. Having built a sound case in the preceding chapters for meaningful and enchanted lives in which the scientific image of humans is taken seriously, this is an anticlimactic dénouement. Still, in all, this is a book very much worth the reading.

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Elizabeth Cooke has written a very helpful and illuminating book on Peirce’s theory of inquiry with special attention to his fallibilism. Fallibilism is a consistent feature of Peirce’s sometimes changing description of inquiry, and Cooke demonstrates the
centrality and peculiarity of this feature. Is it a guiding principle, is it pragmatically justified, is it content dependent? These questions circulate Peirce’s practice of fallibilism, as well as the telic conception of inquiry. Peirce’s Realism comes in for special consideration at this point.

The first two chapters present a careful reading of Peirce in terms of fallibilism and its theoretical and practical implications for inquiry. Cooke focuses on Peirce’s critique of foundationalism and the growth of knowledge that guides his critique. Consistent with his later formulation of pragmatism Cooke notes that the scientific method of fixing belief emerges because “the other three methods of inquiry have nothing to which they can appeal in order to settle disputes.” In addition, she notes that for Peirce “the existence of a real world remains a hypothesis (and not a proof or an assertion).”(25)

In the next chapters Cooke counters the received tradition that Peirce is non-systematic in his account of inquiry. This challenge amounts to an argument that the direction of inquiry finally comes down to experience. Central in this claim is the self-referential incoherence of Peirce’s fallibilistic theory - that at some point any notion of truth must connect to absolutes of one sort or another. But Peirce consistently holds that inquirers are “never in a position to say we have reached the final word.”(47) Thus the issue becomes progress in terms of the stability of beliefs.

This part of the book is the most helpful. Cooke shows that rather than simply opposing the possibility of discovering true beliefs, Peirce’s method of fallibilism -- that any belief may be in error -- is the centering force of inquiry. It does not privilege absolutes or expect absolutes. Of course this raises difficulties in relation to mathematics, an aspect of knowledge with a curious relation to fallibilism. Peirce tends to raise the specter of mistaken results rather than fallibilistic inference here. Also curious is the notion that practice presumes a kind of certainty. The point is that practice itself is a kind of inquiry, stable in execution but not absolute in terms of conclusions. Cooke confronts the issue of the goal of inquiry as correspondence with an external world or coherence among beliefs. She describes a two-fold analysis
of internal and external fallibilism. The internal seeks coherence within a hypothetical system and the external fits beliefs for correspondence with a dynamic (ever evolving) existing world. (61)

The penultimate section opens up an analysis of Peirce's metaphysics of inquiry and the ontological hypothesis warranting inquiry. Cooke adopts Wiggins's question whether Peirce aims for fixation of belief or truth. Wiggins says truth, which is countered by Margolis' claim that any truth as a final end of inquiry reduces Peirce's fallibilism to incoherence. Cooke responds to Margolis noting that one makes assumptions in inquiry whether they are explicit or not (114). Hookway, and Quine criticize Peirce's notion of inquiry in the long run as a form of idealism that is problematic for fallibilism. Hausman provides a nuanced notion of the long run seeking a "dynamical object" which preserves the long run, not as an ideal but as a hope. (118) The final movement in this book is an examination of what that hope entails, whether it is an actual concrete state to be expected, or more like Rorty's move simply to keep the conversation going, but without any concrete hope of arriving. Cooke notes Apel's argument that conditions of inquiry are logically prior to claims (123) but she finds that Apel is stuck in the context of fallibilism as treating beliefs as falsifiable rather than as revisable.

In the last section Cooke expands on the role of hope in Peirce's inquiry. What she finds necessary for inquiry is a kind of hope that is not only ideal but practically motivating individual inquirers, and so affective. A very key thought is that Peirce is dependent on a kind of transformation of the inquirer to a position of hope without concrete or indubitable grounds. Hope, then, is a transcendental condition of inquiry, although "hope, unlike sentiment, is conceived as subject to self-control." (139) Given this conception of hope as a feature of self-controlled inquiry "truth remains the goal, and is, in principle, achievable," (144) and "hope also implies a kind of lack. But in pragmatic inquiry it is the lack (of a solution, an answer, a belief of vital importance) which gives inquiry its purpose." (143)

Cooke maintains that "fallibilism is constitutive of meaning itself" (127) for Peirce. The emphasis on hope as a component for explaining the functioning of inquiry in a
fallibilistic system makes good sense. Questions that remain are 1) how such hope can be constituted in individuals and the community of inquirers simultaneously or at least sufficiently to be a common good, and 2) how hope can be sufficiently rendered under self-control of the inquirer. In both cases, the origin of the hope of inquiry and its continuing success and expansion remain opaque. I think the signal advance of Cooke’s argument is the focus on the affective state of the individual inquirer, an aspect of Peirce’s philosophy and his own story that always gave him difficulty.

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David Hildebrand’s book, Dewey: A Beginner’s Guide, is a well-conceived introduction to John Dewey’s way of thinking about many aspects of human life. The book’s own brief introduction consists of some biographical details about Dewey, a preview of two significant features of Dewey’s thought, namely, his “practical starting point” (4) and his “[m]elioristic [m]otive” (5), and a description of the content of the book’s chapters and its conclusion. Each of the book’s seven chapters presents in as much detail as space permits an overview of Dewey’s mature theories of experience (chapter 1), inquiry (chapter 2), morality (chapter 3), politics (chapter 4), education (chapter 5), aesthetics (chapter 6), and religion (chapter 7) (xi). The chapters range from twenty-two to thirty-seven pages in length, with the fewest number of pages having been given to the chapter on education and the greatest number of pages having been given to the chapter on aesthetics. Each chapter is meant to be readable independently of the others (7). As the book points out, however, the first chapter is fundamental for understanding the remaining chapters (9). Moreover, if the chapters are read sequentially, the reader gets a sense of how Dewey’s theory of experience informs his theory of inquiry, how both of these theories inform his theory of morality, and how all three of these theories inform his theories of politics, education, aesthetics, and religion. The book’s conclusion consists of “three brief sketches of how Dewey’s ideas are making a difference in the areas of medicine,