are extremely helpful for clarifications of his philosophical motivations and his theoretical maneuvers. There will likely be no better resource for understanding Levi’s work and the potential for the line of pragmatist thought that he represents. Pragmatists who would further extend the ideas of Peirce and Dewey should carefully read to this most useful volume.

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In The Dynamic Individualism of William James, James O. Pawelski accomplishes a sustained exploration of William James’s individualism, forwards his own interpretative key to James’s entire corpus, and applies his new interpretation to the realm of “epiphanic experiences” (xviii). Pawelski accomplishes the first of these three tasks by analyzing the definition and primacy of the individual in James’s writings registered sociologically, psychologically, and metaphysically. In the second section, Pawelski advances the thesis that in order to best understand James’s philosophy, we must retain a robust understanding of his psychology and the physiology that undergirds it. Fundamental to these, according to Pawelski, is James’s reflex action theory. In the closing section, Pawelski offers “structured wholeness” as a theory for applying James’s mature individualism to the phases of epiphanic experiences. Because our experience, according to James and Pawelski, is both mundane and epiphanic, the romantic rejection of the former and the stoic rejection of the latter are both pathological. Structured wholeness maintains that the integration of both forms of experience is necessary for the process of our personal growth.

Chapter one is a clear and convincing description of how James privileges the individual as ontologically prior to the group in various social institutions, including the scientific community, the government, the church, and the university. His examples are apt and the argument sound. Chapter two turns to the internal dimensions of the individual, highlighting the receptive, perceptive, conceptual, and volitional features of reflex arc model in
James's psychology. The exposition of James's Principles of Psychology is clear, but I lost track of the overall intention to reveal James's individualism, as this word only appears twice in between the first and last page of the chapter. Pawelski takes "self" in its nuanced forms as the psychological analogue to the individual; however, because this is the foundation for his overall thesis, I thought it would work better as the first chapter of the book. Chapter three covers the metaphysical dimensions of individualism, focusing on the Varieties of Religious Experience and The Pluralistic Universe. Here Pawelski does good analytical work, revealing tensions in James's understanding of the individual with critical expertise and clarity. These inconsistencies in James serve as the problematic to which Pawelski's novel interpretation, presented in part two, is the solution.

In chapter four Pawelski surveys the various schools which interpret the disconnectedness in James's philosophy as either an anti-systematic virtue or as a veneer covering over a more coherent unity. Pawelski spends the most space critically assessing Richard Gale's thesis in The Divided Self of William James, which Pawelski judges to be an inaccurate reading of James. His critique amounts to the claim that Gale's identification of two personas in James, "the Promethean pragmatist" and "the anti-Promethean mystic," is an intellectualization of the division in James's psyche, a trend in scholarship James himself disparaged (106). Pawelski's metaphor of "snipping the reflex arc" is especially effective in revealing how other scholars ignore the dynamism at work in what Pawelski figures to be a central and enduring feature of James's thought (108). In chapter five, Pawelski returns to the metaphysical, psychological, and sociological descriptions of James's individualism, although in a different order, to reveal an integration of the tensions within them that he discussed in chapter one. Pawelski maintains that James's radical empiricism mediates between the poles of moralism and religion, that James's understanding of the "spiritual self" mediates between the perceptual, conceptual, and volitional faculties of the reflex arc, and that James's remarks about the socially productive role of the university late in his career soften his anti-intellectualism and modify his anti-institutionalism. I found the psychological features of the integration thesis, which expresses the ways in which perception and conception can be secondary to volition most convincing and thorough,
while I felt that the integration thesis with respect to sociology, having not been properly problematized earlier, quite brief. Pawelski ends part two with a short, but enlightening comparison of James, Emerson, and Kierkegaard, in which he concludes that James’s individualism is the most radical and metaphysical of the three.

Chapter six puts the integration thesis to practice in the concept of “structured wholeness.” This is the longest and best of the chapters, which spells out the pragmatic upshot of the interpretive section, and whose insights truly edify. However, I will forego an overly detailed coverage of it in an honest attempt to tease the reader of this review into reading Pawelski’s book. In this section, Pawelski illustrates the features of both mundane experiences, “habitual” and “angular”1 and epiphanic experiences, atemporal, temporary, and illuminating (138). He explains various types of epiphanic experiences and several responses to them, including the romantic, the cynical, and the stoic. Pawelski suggests that each of these is pathological, failing to integrate the two types. Responding to these experiences in faith, by valuing each, is the proper response of “structured wholeness,” which lends itself to a healthy and dynamic evolution of the self. Throughout this chapter, Pawelski remains faithful to the reflex arc as the key to understanding his integration thesis and to putting into practice. But the beauty of this chapter is Pawelski’s use of not only James’s texts, but also personal experience, popular movies, and classical and Biblical literature in an illustration of the these philosophies of life.

Pawelski’s writing throughout is clear, well-organized, and straight-forward. He substitutes a workman-like, lunch pail deliberateness for James’s metaphorical flourishes. However, this allows his reader direct access to his position, which he forwards convincingly. I have recently noticed the over- and mis-use of the word “individual” in journalism, where “person” could and should suffice, and this, along with Pawelski’s work has spawned some reflection as to what predicates attach appropriately to individuals and to persons, and what are the appropriate synonyms for “individual.” My criticisms of Pawelski’s book concern this query and others and are quite picky, but because his thesis covers the span of James’s dynamic

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1 Pawelski cites Emerson’s “Experience” essay here, 135.
career, I feel free to include them. First, where I see James equivocating between phenomenological and naturalistic descriptions early in his career, and moving toward the former and away from the latter in his radical empiricism, Pawelski does not. Moreover, Pawelski vacillates between these two modes of description throughout the text without explicitly letting the reader in on the import of the distinction. Second, where I notice crucial equivocations between the personal and the individual throughout James’s writings, Pawelski does not. For example, is Pawelski’s description of James’s psychology a description of the self qua individual, and if not, does this contribute to a defense of his individualism? Navigating these equivocations means not only telling us what the individuating factor is (Pawelski does this, highlighting inconsistencies in James’s writings), but also telling us whether this can be identified in a phenomenological or in a naturalistic description. Last, Pawelski does not take on the question of whether James’s radical individualism and pluralism leads to nominalism. The way Pawelski reads James’s mature metaphysics, which stresses the continuity and reality of relations, suggests to me that his later writing would attenuate his earlier nominalism. However, by insisting that hermeneutic key to reading James’s later metaphysics is the earlier physiology and psychology, Pawelski potentially deters us from reading James that way. Despite these misgivings, (some of which are a function of my problems with James, not with Pawelski’s reading of him), I am thankful for such a clear and focused book on James’s individualism, I commend the pragmatic and edifying thrust of the final section, and I recommend it to those interested in the many tensions and flights of brilliance, which emerge when we read “that adorable genius,” William James.2

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The overarching aim of Flanagan’s fine volume is to provide a naturalistic account of meaning, or more