determinism. The first main section of the book summarizes both some of the key areas within quantum mechanics, and certain of the contemporary controversies within each of those areas. Here Epperson takes pains to establish ontological interpretations as preferable to their merely epistemic competitors, and to defend the decoherence family of interpretations in particular, according to which only the universe as a whole is a closed system, the only sort of system to which quantum mechanics applies in the first place. Every portion of the universe interacts with other portions, under this line of interpretation; these interactions play a crucial role in the elimination of interfering potentia, such as those relevant to Schrödinger's famous paradox of the cat. The second main section contains so much detailed comparison that little can be done in a short review to offer any helpful summary. Suffice it to say that the comparisons are more ambitious than others so far undertaken, and that whether or not they succeed, any student of either the interpretation of quantum mechanics or Whitehead's philosophy will want to consider them carefully, case by case. In this regard the book really does represent a decisive moment in the project announced by Shimony in the 1960's.

If either philosophical 'materialism' or deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics are false, then there will need to be realities that do not derive merely from actual, antecedent states, as Heisenberg suggested in his effort to eliminate the paradoxes of quantum mechanics. There will need to be "potentialities of definiteness," designated as 'potentia' by Epperson, which are, under his proposed 'synthesis,' either closely related to, or identical with, Whitehead's 'eternal objects.' Are the two closely related, or are they identical? Epperson doesn't really address the conceptual issue raised by that question, even when he insists that quantum mechanics is an 'exemplification' of Whitehead's scheme. He seems to think that quantum mechanical potentia can be exemplifications of Whitehead's potentia under some less rigorous standard than the standard in effect supplied by Leibniz's Law or its near-cousins, for instance; but in the final analysis he is silent about what that alternative standard might be.

Michael Brown
Creighton University


David Hansen has assembled a variety of unique voices that illuminate and deepen our appreciation of Dewey's classic text. Indeed, Hansen appears to model the volume on his observation that "Democracy and Education is many books in one" (184). While some chapters focus on ideas that can be put to work in modifying pedagogical practices others address the relation between Democracy and Education and Dewey's oeuvre. Happily, the parts hang together with the cohesion one would expect from a lively informed conversation. Indeed, as I read the volume I frequently felt like a participant in an ongoing dialogue about Dewey's book.
The critical engagement mentioned in the subtitle tends to come in three different forms. The first is the careful analysis of specific ideas in *Democracy and Education*. The second employs Dewey’s text to respond to criticisms and misinterpretations (on the part of friends and foes alike) as well as to analyze contemporary policies and practices. The third form of criticism is the critical reconstruction of Dewey’s ideas. As one might expect, most chapters utilize more than one form of critical engagement. Indeed, one of the volume’s strengths is that each chapter blends careful scholarship with a passion for improving the practice of education.

Several authors – Reba Page, Herbert Kliebard, Gary Fenstermacher, and Sharon Feiman-Nemser – emphasize practical challenges in education. Page and Kliebard discuss Dewey’s treatment of the curriculum, both explaining that Dewey recommends cultivating student interests with vital resources needed to meet new and diverse problems. Page argues in favor of treating the curriculum as a bridge between students and the heritage they inherit; otherwise, the knowledge acquired in school is divorced from its social purposes and becomes a “hiding curriculum” (51). Kliebard contends in a similar vein that we need to eradicate the division between work and play in schools. Focusing on Dewey’s appeals to active occupations like gardening or cooking, Kliebard underscores the continuity (rather than contest) Dewey establishes by establishing that “occupations provide the starting point” while “[t]he end point is mastery of the organized disciplines of knowledge” (125). Together, Page and Kliebard provide an apt reply to those who contend Dewey surrenders the curriculum to the present, less cultivated interests of students.

Fenstermacher emphasizes Dewey’s endeavor to undermine forces that separate students from learning. Fenstermacher coins the term “studenting” to represent a student’s performance that is determined not by interest in content but by “institutional dynamics of the setting” (102) such as grades and test scores. (The concept of “studenting” generated lively discussion among my colleagues and students for several weeks!) The key to overcoming the gap between students and learning is to attend to student purposes so that we treat students not as objects or recipients but as intentional agents in their own learning. Feiman-Nemser extends Dewey’s ideas to a theme he did not explicitly address: how to educate teachers. Drawing on his view that we educate indirectly, she criticizes teacher education as preparation or training and proposes we promote it as the reconstruction of experience. As such, teacher education should foster habits of inquiry so that new teachers learn to attentive observing students to discern their purposes and the movement of their learning.

A trio of chapters framing the book – chapters by Gert Biesta, Elizabeth Minnich, and Hansen – explore the connections between *Democracy and Education* and Dewey’s other works. Biesta focuses on Dewey’s treatment of communication in *Experience and Nature* and argues that Dewey takes a “communicative” turn in *Democracy and Education*. Biesta argues that this turn signals that *Democracy and Education* is less a synthesis of Dewey’s previous philosophy than a new development in his thinking. Minnich’s title, “Dewey’s Philosophy of Life,” underscores the connections between democracy, education, and life when each is understood as a continual process of
renewal. Minnich offers an apt overture to the value of the imagination and the need for
greater attention to the aesthetic in education understood as the art of living. Hansen’s
chapter underscores the dynamic vision of the self with which Dewey ends Democracy
and Education. Hansen argues that the self is a transactional being formed through
education, so that education is the art of forming a “generous” self and society. He
characterizes traits of open-mindedness, wholeheartedness, directness and responsibility
as those that “motor the expanding fusion of self, interest, and world” (183) and “fuel
democratic sociability” (170).

Some chapters provide pointed criticisms of misunderstandings of Democracy
and Education. Larry Hickman, for instance, shows that careful attention to Dewey’s
treatment of socialization, social efficiency, and social control belies the charge that his
educational proposals are at once too relativistic (and so populist) and aimed at
totalitarian social engineering (and so authoritarian). The former criticism suggests
Dewey celebrates natural impulse, while the latter implies he favors social engineering.
Both fall into the very trap against which Dewey was arguing: presupposing a dualism of
natural powers (presumed to be best left alone) and social engineering (understood as the
subordination of those powers). Dewey’s experimentalism provides his alternative to
such a dualism; Hickman notes that “social efficiency is an ideal that gives rise to social
control as a family of flexible educational methods and activities” (74-75). Hickman
charges that such flexibility is precisely what many current educational policies (most
notably No Child Left Behind) make impossible. Kliebard is similarly critical of those
who suggest Dewey’s philosophy of education has been tried and found wanting. He
argues that “Dewey’s actual impact on American schooling has been negligible” (114)
and that many of his ideas about curriculum run contrary to those practiced in
contemporary schools. If we were to genuinely apply ideas developed in Democracy and
Education, Kliebard contends, we would not attempt to directly modify students through
the “frontal assault” of standardized testing.

A final set of chapters offer critical reconstructions of Dewey’s ideas. Biesta
recommends a deconstructive pragmatism that offers an interpretation of communication
that is not naturalistic (as was Dewey’s). Naoko Saito proposes we reconstruct Dewey’s
concept of growth along lines that resist temptations he finds in authors like Hansen and
Nel Noddings to tether growth to settled features of experience, such as moral traits or
home. Saito argues that Emerson’s notion of moral perfection, with its celebration of
discontinuity and the singularity of the self, can complement Dewey’s emphasis on the
continuous, inclusive features of growth. In the classroom, this reconstruction entails
trusting discontinuities students introduce, even as teachers help make the tradition more
familiar to them. Saito’s reconstruction is perhaps the most radical in the book, offering
an intriguing alternative to Dewey’s treatment of the ideal of growth. Coupling Saito’s
insights with Hickman’s suggests to me that a good deal of the resistance to Democracy
and Education says less about problems with its actual proposals than about our
predilection to embrace traditional assumptions, e.g., about dualisms and the need for
fixed or stable ideals.
This stimulating volume should prove of interest to a wide audience. Specialists and first-time readers, whether of Dewey or *Democracy and Education*, will find careful textual exegesis coupled with helpful summaries, telling reminders, and new insights. Teachers and students will find stimulating ideas, insightful anecdotes, and perceptive perspectives on the art and practice of education. Highly recommended.

Patrick Shade

*Rhodes College*


This book is divided into three sections that I will discuss in turn. The first section, entitled “The Pragmatic Method in Bioethics” sets the foundation for the ensuing sections as it includes essays that discuss pragmatism and pragmatist ethics. Glenn McGee’s essay stands out among the essays in this section as it discusses how the Deweyan notion of critical intelligence can be readily applied to remedy social problems including those that develop in healthcare settings. D. Micah Hester’s “Habits of Healing” also stands out as it considers how physicians can develop their ability to treat patients by becoming aware of habits, whether they be those that govern their practice of medicine or those of the patient (as well as the customs that are characteristic of the broader community).

The second section includes essays that connect key ideas of American philosophers with current debates in bioethics. C. Griffin Trotter discusses what the Roycean notion of loyalty can reveal about the medical covenant between physician and patient while William J. Gavin develops insightful Jamesian reflections on the nature of death. Bruce Wilshire’s “William James, Black Elk, and the Healing Act” provides a refreshing take on medicine as it gives the reader insight into an alternative philosophy of medicine that is rooted in a more inclusive worldview.

Lastly, the third section focuses on how pragmatism can be applied to critical issues in the field. These include mental illness and competence, genetics, stem-cell research, the determination of death, and the tensions that exist between autonomy and managed care.

Indeed, this volume clearly meets its aim of successfully demonstrating that pragmatism can both provide insight into the nature of bioethical problems and can suggest how they may be resolved. My only criticism is that there is little or no discussion regarding how pragmatic bioethics is situated within the broader field of bioethics. In the first section it is argued that pragmatic bioethics avoids many of the conceptual shortcomings (such as the rather rigid distinctions between fact and value or mind and body) that characterize other perspectives however, little work is done to situate pragmatic bioethics among its competitors (virtue theory, utilitarianism, ethics of care, etc.). Regardless, the essays included in this volume are insightful and, as a whole, the volume is necessary for those who are interested in bioethics or pragmatist ethics.