for the slowdown of social progress and the unfinished religious emancipation in modern times" (156). However, Anton details out the similarities between Dewey and Aristotle, saying that much of Dewey's work is Aristotelian, in particular "his attack on dualisms, his advocacy of clarity and instrumental conception of logic and methodology, and above all his biological setting of human experience" (157).

Anton argues that Randall, on the other hand, actively attempted to revive and reconstruct "the inherited philosophies of experience" (168) and was able to distinguish between the ancient thinkers themselves and the various portrayals of their thought—something he claims that Dewey often failed to accomplish. Randall was thus able to more directly resurrect the processive aspects of Aristotelianism in an attempt to rework Naturalism for the contemporary milieu.

There is one note of concern for those who work within Classical American Pragmatism comes from Anton's statements regarding temporality. Early in the text, Anton claims that the American Naturalists’ "projected philosophies of change and new relativism were inescapably predicated of their own achievements, relegating them to the prospect of temporality," a fair enough claim (9). However, he ends the work by highlighting the passing of Naturalism's importance as of the 1950s and by stating that American Naturalism currently "has been transformed into a heritage and a tradition, available to anyone who cares to study it, revive it, and perchance use it when the waves of irrationalism threaten the calm of the seas" (301). Unfortunately—as Anton's text shows—a school of thought becomes a tradition at the risk of its own immediate relevance, and those who attempt to revive and use ideas often distort and abuse the original work in the process. Although Anton claims that Naturalism has "done its work," Pragmatists must show that if American Naturalism is a tradition, it is a living one, still vital and relevant to today's concerns.

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The ten essays in this anthology may be grouped variously. Richard Shusterman, the book's editor, informally divides them into three categories: (1) pragmatism's impact in the global context, (2) race and ethnicity, and (3) beyond the limits of philosophy.

The first category may be roughly divided in two halves: regional and topical. Two essays concern the interface between pragmatism and Chinese thought. As both editor and contributor, Shusterman sets the tone for the book. His essay, "Pragmatism and East-Asian Thought," distils more general ideas from his own research and experience. These ideas inform all the chapters that follow, and are filled out in various ways. Sor-hoon Tan's piece, for example, examines Dewey's influence on the humanist thinking of Hu Shih. The other two essays deal with more pressing issues, global citizenship and war. As the world becomes ever more tightly knit, tensions are bound to run higher in places,
forcing us to rethink how people of different cultures can get along. Larry A. Hickman looks at how the experimentalist theory of truth provides an apparatus for weighing the competing assertions from various groups, as well as how a communitarian conception of self applies to groups and individuals alike. John J. Stuhr’s essay examines the withering criticisms of Dewey at the time of the First World War, criticisms which contributed to the decline of interest in pragmatism.

Only two essays directly concern race and ethnicity. Paul C. Taylor asks to what extent W.E.B. Du Bois may be considered a pragmatist; because of the distinctive views under the pragmatist umbrella, this inquiry has the reciprocal effect of clarifying themes within pragmatism itself. José Medina’s treatment revolves around the communitarian concept of self – knowing oneself within a social context, which Medina understands in a broad sense. While both writers treat the American instances, their lessons certainly transfer to other contexts – to Europe, for example, where tensions have grown among native residents and a growing influx of immigrants.44 By definition any questions of race and ethnicity imply a more global context, suggesting that we regard the first two general headings as (1a) pragmatism’s actual impact on the global scene so far and (1b) pragmatism’s potential impact on the global scene to come.

The final four essays examine law, psychology, psychoanalysis, and history. These are so various that they cannot be reduced any further. Marianne Janack proposes an interpretation of James that brings together his psychological and philosophical views in a way that may appeal to psychologists and philosophers alike. Vincent Colapietro’s essay is something of a shock, in terms of style: it is a difficult piece centering on the issue of loss as handled by psychoanalysis and pragmatism. It is dense text – I say this not out of disrespect for the writing, but simply as a caveat for the reader. The difficulty arises from a combination of the complexity of the material and the third-order viewpoint adopted by the author: he considers his subject through Stanley Cavell’s reading of Dewey and Emerson, with a hint of jazz thrown in. Reading it is like tightrope walking in the dark. By comparison, James T. Kloppenberg’s essay is like counting mile markers along a straight highway at noon. It is a serial account of pragmatism’s influence on the practice of history, i.e. a history of historians in a pragmatist vein. Not only are names named, trends are identified and discussed as they appear; this makes for an intelligible line of development from the fathers of pragmatism to the most recent historians.

This writer finds a great deal of useful work in the volume; all the essays are well written and researched, all have several insights on their subject matter. Readers from many different backgrounds will find the book interesting, and not only in their field of choice. There is little to complain about what is between the covers.

44 The United States is younger and essentially built on immigration, and so its problems differ somewhat from the more established nations of Europe. Still, racial and ethnic identity remain persistent issues – which is the case whenever different groups of people confront each other.
That said, one anticipates a complaint about what is not included. And unfortunately she is right. The theme of this anthology is implied in its title: the definition of pragmatism and philosophy. One of the hallmarks of pragmatism is its inclusiveness; there is some irony, then, in discovering that the volume has somewhat limited itself. As much as I enjoyed reading Shusterman's essay, for example, it might better have been called "Jamesian/Deweyan Pragmatism and Confucian Thought" — a more accurate title, albeit less catchy. This is not an isolated case. Browsing the book's pages, one finds a treatment of C.S. Peirce conspicuously missing. There is only occasional mention of him, and extended treatment of his thought altogether absent. This lacuna has its reasons. For one thing, his thought is notoriously complex and technical, the product of a polymath raised in the milieu of science and mathematics. Because of the great stress on this aspect, others tend to get lost in the thicket of mathematico-logical signs: religious thought being one case, social philosophy another. Peirce, founder and black sheep of pragmatism, covered vast territories of inquiry, so it comes as no surprise that he should hold forth on social matters. Anyone expecting applied philosophy, however, will be disappointed. He was a very conservative thinker, and held a strict distinction between theory and practice. Philosophy does affect everyday thought, but it is part of a more general development which travels a circuitous route; the results are so buried as to be almost invisible. Peirce gives philosophical arguments for his position, so it cannot be dismissed as merely an outgrowth of temperament.

In other words, Peirce might well be opposed to the project of this volume. All the more reason, then, to include an essay tackling this point. The selections give the reader the impression that pragmatism is more unified than it really is; this would be like saying Protestantism has unanimity. Labels are fine as far as they go, to be sure, but the differences underneath should not be glossed over. Reading the essays, one imagines at times the pragmatist as a gregarious intellectual-turned-social reformer, a role that Peirce — a pragmatist if there ever was one — would definitely oppose. To provide a more even-handed view, an additional chapter could outline Peirce's stance on the application of philosophy to everyday life (hardly a straightforward route), which may be contrasted by James's and Dewey's own views; objections should be addressed, thereby initiating an important discussion within pragmatist circles. For such a robust tradition as this, the internal debate can only be more worthwhile.

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45 The most accessible statement may be found in the first of Peirce's 1898 Cambridge lectures, published as Reasoning and the Logic of Things, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner and Hilary Putnam. ("Philosophy and the Conduct of Life" is also printed in volume 2 of The Essential Peirce.)