subjectivist. The arguments of the "new pragmatists" mostly take aim at Rorty. While Rorty used Dewey's work, his interpretation of Dewey, is not a substitute for the real thing and the two should not be confused.

Misak's chapter deals with the Peircean notion of truth as the aim of inquiry. Tackling various deflationist accounts of truth, she finds these wanting. Extending her interpretation of Peirce, Misak gives us reasons to prefer pragmatism's naturalistic take on truth to that of the deflationists. Similarly, Price and Macarthur defend a pragmatic account of truth, against Crispin Wright and Simon Blackburn. Together the "new pragmatists" wish to reanimate the idea that (pragmatic) truth must obtain equally in all areas of human inquiry. There can be no sharp dichotomies between the practices of science and those of ethics, as these are all areas of human inquiry, pursued through embedded social practices and all equally dictated by communal norms.

Bakhurst's "Pragmatism and Ethical Particularism" is the centerpiece of the collection. There, Bakhurst does more than rehearse themes from the older pragmatists. Instead, he connects "new pragmatism," to the vibrant contemporary program of ethical particularism. Emphasizing the similarities and differences between the two approaches, Bakhurst manages to show that both pragmatism and particularism have something to teach each other. Bakhurst examines the moral point of view, the role of moral generalities, and the analogy between the moral and aesthetic, seeing these areas as important points of convergence for both particularism and pragmatism alike. An exciting essay and collection. Highly recommended.

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The fourth and sadly, due to his passing in June of this year, final volume of Richard Rorty's *Philosophical Papers* is a continuation and not a culmination of Rortyian philosophy. The book showcases Rorty at his provocative best, attempting to find the practical value of philosophical ideas. It is comprised of thirteen essays culled from the last ten years of Rorty's life and is divided into three sections: Religion and Morality from a Pragmatist Point of View, Philosophy's Place in Culture, and Current Issues Within Analytic Philosophy.

While the second section deals most explicitly with philosophy's place in culture, this is a theme that recurs throughout essays in all sections of the book. The question of philosophy's place or role was an ongoing issue for Rorty. He continually and consistently argued against the idea of philosophy as a field of study that has a privileged access to the Truth or Reality, but the questions of how exactly philosophy should be understood or what was to become of it were not easily answered. In *Philosophy and Social Hope* he admitted that when he was asked about the future of philosophy he got
“tongue-tied.” In the ninth essay of *Philosophy as Cultural Politics*, “A pragmatist view of contemporary analytic philosophy,” he seems resolved to the fact that “philosophy is not something that anybody can ever walk away from; it is an amorphous blob that will englobe anyone attempting such an excursion” (145). One can almost hear Rorty, who held the title of Professor of Humanities at Virginia and Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford, saying, “Take my word for it, I tried.”

Rorty’s consistent position regarding the future of philosophy was that it should contribute to the ongoing conversation of humankind. The importance of understanding philosophy as a conversation is expressed throughout the volume, and Rorty even suggests that “we drop the term continental and instead contrast analytic philosophy with conversational philosophy” (124). According to Rorty, conversational philosophers see what they are doing as engaging in a conversation while analytic philosophers see themselves as engaging in a “quasi-scientific discipline” (126). In earlier books Rorty had described the ongoing conversation as ‘kibitzing’ or literature. Rorty gives a more detailed explanation in the sixth essay of this volume, “Philosophy as a transitional genre,” making the argument that philosophy should be understood as a transition from religion to literature. He claims allegiance with those who “think that inquiry is just another name for problem-solving, and we can not imagine inquiry into how human beings should live, into what we should make of ourselves, coming to an end” (89). The role of philosophy therefore is not to bring an end to inquiry but to continue to improve inquiry. His argument is that historically philosophy replaced religion as the way to gain redemptive truth, and philosophy in turn should be replaced with literature. Then, “from within a literary culture, religion and philosophy appear as literary genres” (91). As genres, according to Rorty’s pragmatic understanding, they are options that can be chosen by individuals depending on what better fits their needs. At the end of the essay Rorty argues in favor of giving up the search for redemption, but not for giving up the search ‘for a single utopian form of political life – the Good Global Society” (104).

This search can be aided by philosophers if they abandon the quest for absolute truth and embrace the idea that what they should do is tell stories about how to get along better in the world. According to Rorty, the idea of getting along better in the world falls within the realm of cultural politics, so philosophy should become understood as cultural politics. In the Preface, Rorty, echoing a pragmatic, Deweyan sentiment, argues that debates between contemporary philosophers should be evaluated “in light of our hopes for cultural change” (x). Understanding philosophy as cultural politics is conducive to the type of utilitarian ethics of belief, inherited from James and Mill, which Rorty endorses, because it allows one to decide the right thing to do based on what will make people happy, and it does not aspire to attain ethical certainty in such matters. Rorty does not think that philosophers have any special insight into ethics thusly construed, but they could be of use in contributing to ethical discussions that take place in this pragmatic-utilitarian framework.

In the third essay of the volume, “Justice as larger loyalty,” Rorty argues against Rawls and Habermas, for a more ethnocentric and less universalist understanding of justice. Rorty agrees with Annette Baier that, we should “cease to think of reason as a
source of authority, and think of it simply, as the process of reaching agreement by persuasion" (53). This point is more fully developed in the last essay of the book, “Kant vs. Dewey: The current situation of moral philosophy.” In that essay Rorty again sides with Baier and endorses her view that “the Kantian notion of unconditional obligation is borrowed from an authoritarian, patriarchal, religious tradition that should have been abandoned rather than reconstructed” (187). In Rorty’s eyes Kant remains the culprit responsible for much of what is wrong with traditional philosophy. Dewey, on the other hand, is still Rorty’s hero and he looks to his ideas for guidance in steering philosophy towards a better future. Rorty’s analysis of Kant, Dewey, and other philosophers throughout the book, as well as in previous books, is selective. He takes what he wants and jettisons the rest. While some may object to this practice, it is done to be provocative. Rorty hopes to elucidate what is important in terms of contributing to an understanding of philosophy as a conversation about cultural politics.

Throughout the book, Rorty argues for dissolving dichotomies, which he thinks have hindered philosophy. These include: reason and feeling, reason and imagination, literal and symbolic, philosophy and poetry, science and common sense, and morality and prudence. However Rorty still clings to the public/private distinction on which his liberal ironist rests, when he suggests that “private hopes for authenticity and autonomy should be left at home when the citizens of a democratic society foregather to deliberate about what is to be done” (102). Rorty’s philosophy would perhaps be better served if he had done away with this dichotomy as well, but this debate can still be had in the ongoing conversation he is urging us to continue. These essays should not be taken as Rorty’s last word on philosophy, but rather as an invitation to the reader to join in the ongoing conversation he talked so much about.

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John P. Anton's book, *American Naturalism and Greek Philosophy*, examines some of the ways that American Naturalists used Greek philosophy to strengthen their own positions and to undercut both religious and European influences on their thought. In so doing, these thinkers broke "through the blinding impasse" of the Greek focus upon Being and the modern emphasis upon Experience by finding "a place for Being in the metaphysics of Experience" (10). This approach placed the idea of permanence within the change that stands as the "fundamental quality of all being and all experience" (15) so that metaphysics "became a theory of the pervasive traits of experience, not of being" (16). Throughout the book, Anton places his emphasis upon the metaphysical aspects of American Naturalism rather than the ethical or epistemological, with a specific focus upon the ways that American thinkers took up portions of Aristotle's thought.

Anton's first chapter, "The American Way of Renaissance and the Humanistic Tradition of Greece," details the ways that portions of Greek philosophy benefited