giant ice bag. It now becomes abundantly clear that the book in question is only a minor reworking of Scott’s 1985 dissertation, “C. S. Peirce’s System of Science and an Application to the Visual Arts”—a fact that may partially explain the complete absence of any reference to the Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition (Bloomington, 1982–), and a complete lack of references to work published after the mid–80s.

The third and final Part, entitled “Reasoning with Models in the System of Science,” contains two chapters, one on mathematical reasoning and another on diagrammatic reasoning. The chapter on mathematical reasoning is by far the longest chapter of the book. Here Scott aims to show, using in particular Peirce’s notion that mathematical reasoning involves experimenting upon diagrams, that there is one method unifying the activities of all the sciences, which she takes as evidence that “Peirce achieved the unity required by a System of Science” (p. 140). I don’t think her discussion supports this conclusion, and aside from that, this view should have been panned out further by contrasting it with Peirce’s rejection of the definition of science as systematized knowledge, and to his comments that science isn’t even defined by its method (or methods), but by the attitude with which it is engaged in (which brings us back to Scott’s opening chapter). In the concluding chapter the author applies the mathematical method to the interpretation of works of art, discusses Peirce’s theory of perception (ignoring once again excellent work that has been done in the last two decades), makes a few comments on abduction, and stops.

So where does this leave us? Frances Scott’s C. S. Peirce’s System of Science seems a belated and slightly revised publication of her 1985 dissertation. The title has been changed, and it no longer adequately represents the content. The subtitle, “Life as a Laboratory,” which is especially intriguing because of Peirce’s attitude to issues of vital importance, makes no appearance beyond the title. No effort is made to flesh it out, and in a book that is perhaps best described as a covert attempt to give philosophical grounding to art criticism it is out of place. Overall, Scott’s book scratches many surfaces, which frequently leads to interesting associations of ideas. But in the end it remains unclear what they are surfaces of, and the reader is left with his associations hanging in the air. In fact much of the book consists of digressions that betray the novice, as they seem inspired by the author’s misconception that what is new to her must also be new to the reader. All this is not necessarily a bad thing, as sometimes you learn more from an ill-composed book than from one well written. It forces you to work harder and make your own extrapolations; it forces you to think for yourself.

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Peden’s book is the first major study on the life and work of the pragmatist, humanist, and scholar of religion, Albert Eustace Haydon. As such, Peden is to be
commended for providing us with this important study. The book interlaces both biographical data, and details of Haydon’s works in a fairly chronological order. Details of Haydon’s works are taken from various sources, including his books, articles, reviews, lectures, and even his radio addresses. Peden has done an exceptional amount of research digging deep into the archives to provide us with an accurate account of Haydon’s life and work.

The overriding theme of the book is Haydon’s contention that human beings strive toward the good life, and that religion is the pursuit of this goal in its highest and noblest fashion. This theme is summed up in the title of his first book, THE QUEST OF THE AGES, and it is a theme that is reiterated in various forms throughout his works. The title for Peden’s book is taken from Haydon’s second book, MAN’S SEARCH FOR THE GOOD LIFE in which he links the theory of evolution with religion into a unified quest of “a good life in a world made good” (165). Similarly, his third book, BIOGRAPHY OF THE GODS, tells us that the gods serve as the guarantee of “the highest ideal of the perfect life for man” (189). Haydon remains constant in his critiques, as well. For instance, in his review of Davidson’s THE RELIGIONS OF MANKIND, Haydon finds a defect in that the religions are interpreted too much in traditional terms rather than in terms of social situations (72). Likewise, in a lecture to the Chicago Ethical Society (4-28-46), titled “Ethics and the Gods”, Haydon tells us that the gods fade away when they no longer serve a useful function (230). In his radio address “Man’s Modern Task” (1-14-50), Haydon encourages humans to employ all the social tools available to establish a method that will help create an atmosphere and society that will enhance the joy of living (268).

The academic references in the book form quite a repertoire of scholarship. Peden provides a synopsis of these various works, and some are the subject of entire chapters. The articles are broken down into the early and the later articles, as are the reviews. In addition, the various ethical society lectures and radio talks are summarized. As an example of the detailed scholarship provided by Peden on Haydon’s work, the chapter on his dissertation, THE CONCEPTION OF GOD IN THE PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY, provides an outline of the pragmatic theories of Dewey, Schiller, Pierce, Ames, and King, and details how their works are applicable to the study of religion. In addition, the importance of the scientific method in the study of religion is highlighted.

Through the biographical data we get a sense of Haydon the man as well as his academic work. We learn about his relationship and marriage to his wife, Edith, and we are given glimpses into his other interests, such as his athletic abilities, and his consistent work with youth groups. Professionally, Haydon is painted as a pioneer in thought. Even in his days as a Baptist, Haydon is consistently on the cutting edge, as he argues against a baptism of immersion as a requirement for church membership. The growing tension with the Baptist community escalates to the point where charges are brought against him. Peden draws out the ironic coincidences in this regard with those of others in his ken. For example, it is after the death of Foster, who also ran into theological problems with the Baptist church, that Haydon replaces him at the University of Chicago. Similarly, his predecessors in humanism, Dietrich and Reese, also ran into trouble with the Reformed
Church and Baptist Church, respectively, and both turned to the Unitarian Church, as did Haydon. These common interests in humanism carry Haydon to one of the highlights of his life, his leadership in the Chicago Ethical Society, as well as his leadership in shaping the Humanist Manifesto.

We also learn of Haydon’s controversial views on politics. For instance, Haydon delivered a lecture to the Chicago Ethical Society (11-24-46) entitled “Why Fear Russia” in which Haydon advocated the position of allowing the free spread of ideas and teachings without compromise (236). His patriotism was eventually called into question, especially as he was “in sympathy with Eaton’s effort to develop peaceful relations with Russia” (285). Haydon reports being blacklisted from lecture invitations at this time. Yet, this did not stop him from speaking out against the Un-American Activities Committee (285), or from speaking out on other political issues. Yet, despite some of his more radical views, Haydon was also able to keep political friendships and acquaintances, such as with Senator La Follette, after whose death. Peden was even invited by Congress to give a talk (66). Similarly, he also sat at table with Eleanor Roosevelt at a Youth Congress (221).

In sum, Peden paints Haydon as a pioneering man of both vision and conviction. Haydon lived not only until the ripe old age of 91, but he lived fully, remaining active well after his retirement, lecturing on the history of religion, and striving to enhance the cause to which he dedicated his life, the good life.

While the book is well worth reading from a historical and philosophical point of view, it does have some weaknesses. For example, the flow between biographical and academic details is not always even. Perhaps, the book should have been separated into two parts, the biographical and the works themselves. In addition, the details of the various works are somewhat repetitive and make for monotonous reading, as the same points are rehashed over and over. To be sure, this repetition is found in Haydon’s works themselves. However, there should be a more succinct way of summarizing the common themes and threads and allow more attention to the nuances, variances, and novelties in Haydon’s thoughts. In addition, very little time is spent on critiques of Haydon’s works. Except for some minor biographical notes of discord, and short critiques of his first book, QUEST OF THE AGES, Peden’s work is somewhat one-sided. Surely a figure as pioneering as Haydon would have generated more controversy in academic circles than is mentioned. As Peden has dug into the archives so diligently, including this more critical aspect would have rounded out the academic endeavor and added to the historical debate. Also, the book is heavier on the academic reading of Haydon’s works and could use some more biographical enhancement, as for instant in the book’s abrupt ending on the death of Haydon.

That said, the book is still worth reading and provides a wealth of information not only on the specific works of Haydon, but also regarding the spirit of the age in which he lived. As Haydon himself was a versatile thinker with a wide variety of interests, the book will appeal to a wide audience on a range of issues pertaining to such disciplines as:
history of philosophy, pragmatism, ethics, philosophy of religion, religious studies, history of religions, and social theory.

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In this clearly written and often witty book, Rosa Mayorga explores the relationship between “the extreme scholastic realism” of Charles Sanders Peirce and the “moderate” realism of John Duns Scotus. In so doing, she is deliberately following the path forged most famously by John Boler in the 1960s (cf. xii). Her project differs from his, however, both by being wider in scope and by differing somewhat in interpretation.

The enlargement of scope stems from Mayorga’s conviction that an adequate comprehension of Scotistic realism requires “going back” to Plato. Her first chapter, “The Problem of Universals: Back to the Past,” then, is a broad and straightforward introduction to the attempts of Plato, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Boethius, and Avicenna to address this problem, which Mayorga glosses in the following way: “There is a metaphysical, or ontological concern, as well as an epistemological one, for it seems that even though the things we encounter in the world are all particular roses, chairs, cats, etc., in order to make any knowledge claims about them, we have to think in general terms, that is, in terms of universals” (8). As a result, her presentation of these ancient thinkers considers their respective answers to three questions: “What are universals? In what sense are universals real (do they exist?) [and] How are universals related to particulars?” (9).

Mayorga begins her chapter on John Duns Scotus by emphasizing how the scholastics’ concern with the nature of individuality – a concern that, as she notes, was deeply informed by certain articles of Christian faith – transformed the problem of universals. In terms of the three questions explored in the first chapter, this means that the relation of particulars to universals is now understood as involving the processes of abstraction and individuation. On Mayorga’s interpretation, the central questions thus become: “How does the [common] nature become universalized through abstraction? And how does something become ‘individualized?’” (41). This, then, leads her to conceive Scotus’s chief objective as “trying to find a coherent view of universals which protected our claims to knowledge while at the same time preserving the integrity of the individual thing” (43). Her second chapter, therefore, explores the means Scotus employs to meet this objective, specifically, his conceptions of haecceity and the formal distinction. For our purposes, what is most noteworthy in Mayorga’s exploration is her appeal to potentiality in her attempt to uphold Scotus’s commitments to haecceity as a positive (if ultimately unknowable) force and to the formal distinction’s basis in the external thing: “If indeed the haecceity is the actualization of the [nature ‘in itself,’ neither universal nor singular] ... then it could be said that Scotus recognizes real possibility in the potentiality of unindividuated nature” (66).