certain circumstances. The second chapter in this section is Todd Lekan’s “A Pragmatist Case for Animal Advocates on Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees.” In it Lekan argues for the inclusion of animal advocates on these types of committees. Using Dewey’s notion of democracy Lekan argues that nonhuman animals need and deserve to have their interests included as well. Matthew Pamental, argues in “Pragmatism and Pets: Best Friends Animal Sanctuary, Maddie’s Fund℠, and No More Homeless Pets in Utah,” for the effective use of Deweyan notions of social intelligence (and what on some account amounts to the same thing) social inquiry in address the problem of the overpopulation of nonhuman animals in America. “Dining on Fido: Death, Identity and the Aesthetic Dilemma of Eating Animals” is the final chapter of the book, in which Glenn Kuehn argues that we often overlook significant and important aesthetic dimensions of our own diets. Kuehn address some of the seeming contradictions which exist in our desires regarding the food we commonly eat. A thoroughgoing pragmatic orientation awakens our aesthetic sensibilities to a fuller understanding of ourselves and our eating habits. Taken together this last chapter represents the most practical of the three sections which constitute the main text of the book.

All in all, McKeena and Light have made a valuable contribution to pragmatism, animal ethics, and environmental philosophy. The volume does an excellent job at times of offering a radical and much needed contribution to the various fields it addresses, and even at times when the contributions are not strikingly novel the book serves as a good introduction to those interested in either pragmatism, or animal ethics, or both.

Jacoby Adeshei Carter Purdue University


Michel Weber, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Catholic University of Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium), editor of the series Chromatiques whiteheadiennes and co-editor of the Process Studies Series, sets forth in this book both a historical introduction to the thought of Alfred North
Whitehead and his own dialectical analysis of key features of Whitehead's vision. In this review I will briefly indicate the contents of the historical introduction and focus on his analysis of Whitehead's thought. The introduction is divided into three parts, in the first of which he gives an overall view of the structure of Process and Reality and reviews the debate between Lewis Ford and Jorge Nobo about the historical development of Whitehead's thought. In the second part he notes the intricate relation between religion and science in Whitehead's thought, and in the third part he analyses Whitehead's notion of speculative philosophy as set forth in Chapter One of Process and Reality.

The analysis of Whitehead's thought is likewise divided into three parts, in the first of which he claims that Whitehead and Henri Bergson are quite close in terms of their common reliance on immediate experience for insight into the nature of reality and their corresponding distrust of verbal abstractions. This is initially somewhat surprising, since Whitehead conceived reality in terms of a succession of actual occasions or discrete moments of experience while Bergson perceived physical reality as a continuous flow unconsciously broken up by human beings in the effort to understand and control their experience. Yet in Part Two of his analysis, Weber makes clear how both Bergson and Whitehead are one in their emphasis on reality as process. Whitehead emphasizes the discrete character of actual occasions only to indicate how originality is possible within a process-oriented approach to reality. Subjectivity and objectivity, originality and determinism, are intertwined in the notion of an actual occasion as a self-constituting subject of experience which "superjects" its form or pattern of self-constitution on its successors, above all, those in the same linear "society" or series of actual occasions. Likewise included in this part is a lengthy discussion of the function of God within Whitehead's metaphysics. In the end, Weber prefers Hartshorne's understanding of God as a society of divine actual occasions rather than Whitehead's own concept of God as a single, ever-concreting transcendent actual entity (p. 195). But he indicates how the interplay of the primordial, consequent and superjective natures of God proposed by Whitehead can be still incorporated into the concept of God.
Most importantly, however, Weber affirms with Whitehead that creativity rather than God is Ultimate. He speaks of mother-creativity (creativite-mere) operating on both divine and creaturely levels of existence and activity (215, 219). Thus both God and the world are involved in the emergence of novelty within the cosmic process: the world for the most part functioning deterministically through efficient causality and God exercising final causality through the provision of divine initial aims, new possibilities for concrescing actual occasions. Finally, in part three of his analysis Weber examines the notion of "contiguity" in Whitehead, arguing that the extensive continuum is a reality derivative from the actual and potential interrelation of actual occasions (160). Thus he differs from Nobo in attributing Ultimate Reality simply to creativity rather than to creativity and the extensive continuum in combination. Creativity in its transitional phase within each actual occasion rather than an underlying receptacle (as in Plato's Timaeus) thus accounts for contiguity between actual occasions (161).

Weber's work is important for contemporary Whiteheadian scholarship not only because it is carefully done with ample endnotes and bibliography (although surprisingly without an index of names and topics), but because it shows how Whitehead's philosophy is now being taken seriously by scholars in continental Europe as well as in England and North America. In this way Whitehead's approach to process philosophy can be fruitfully compared and contrasted with continental process-oriented thinkers like Bergson. I have my own reservations about Weber's (and Whitehead's) strong emphasis on creativity as Ultimate Reality, even surpassing the reality of God. Likewise, as I see it, more attention should be given to principles of continuity such as the category of "society" within Whitehead's philosophy. For, while I appreciate Weber's metaphor of actual occasions "percolating" at the ever-moving boundary of past and future (152, 162), what is always needed in any metaphysical vision but, above all, in a process-oriented context, is an appropriate balance between order and novelty, continuity and change.

Joseph A. Bracken
Xavier University