here sex gets a word in edgewise. It is surely original of Arthur Efron to call Tess (a farm girl) an interesting critical thinker. But do professors who write for a professional audience really say about a master novelist that his work "seems dumb"? Do we really have to invoke Dewey to describe a mind/body duality problem in Tess? Isn't that overkill? Surely Dewey didn't coin the terms Mind and Body. What does Efron intend when he responds to Hardy "as a person who is the author" such that it "feels all right"? Is Hardy not the author? Why belabor the obvious--so that things feel all right? And do philosophical critics really speak that way, about "feeling all right" in the context of their critical work?

To look past all this forced use of Dewey and unsubtle informality one has to simply assume that much of Efron's material comes directly from classroom lectures. In the give-and-take of the undergraduate lecture, much of his language is excusable, even appropriate. Yes, it is best in this case to be forgiving and call in the protection of pedagogy, by which the end justifies the means.

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Philip Cafaro presents an integrated picture of Henry David Thoreau's moral thought in *Thoreau's Living Ethics: Walden and the Pursuit of Nature*. The first substantive chapter documents Thoreau's engagement with the question of "how to live," while the second argues that his answer was framed within a rich matrix of aspirational virtues. The next chapter is an extended analysis of Thoreau's account of economy in which Cafaro argues that Thoreau's concern is neither asceticism nor autarky so much as achieving the discipline needed for contemplation. Unlike Aristotle, Thoreau argues that realization of human potential is possible in the absence of wealth. Cafaro follows this with a discussion of specific virtues associated respectively with solitude and society, including an extended meditation on Thoreau's relationship with Emerson under the aegis of "friendship." The chapter titled "Nature" probes Thoreau for an ethic on the use of nature, finding a strong
argument for setting aside wild tracts and limiting appropriations of nature on the ground that the reciprocity between self and nature is the ultimate source of meaning and essential to moral fulfillment. Here, Cafaro finds Thoreau to be the source of environmental values later expressed by John Muir and Aldo Leopold.

Next, Cafaro examines Thoreau’s political views, noting but not highlighting the celebrated work on civil disobedience. Instead, Cafaro emphasizes speeches Thoreau gave on the trial of John Brown, bringing the cause for which Thoreau spent his night in jail (opposition to slavery) to the forefront, rather than his tactical concerns. This chapter both notes the political limitations of an ethic framed almost wholly in terms of personal virtue, and also examines how Thoreau recognizes an implicit commitment to the overridingness of human rights. He believed Brown’s violent raid at Harper's Ferry justified in light of the practical necessity of ending slavery. The succeeding chapter on “Foundations,” builds from this, and portrays Thoreau as adopting a meta-theory grounded in uncertainty, contingency, experimentation and gradual improvement. Cafaro concludes with a brief discussion of Thoreau’s death, noting especially Thoreau’s reconciliation to his own death as consistent with his naturalism. The overall effect of Cafaro’s treatment is quite satisfying, and Thoreau’s Living Ethics will certainly enrich the profession’s appreciation of Thoreau’s thought.

Getting Thoreau a wider appreciation seems to have been a key aim. Cafaro operates from the premise that moral philosophy is the central topic of Walden, but he believes that Thoreau’s philosophical achievement has gone unnoticed by philosophers—especially environmental philosophers—largely because the approach was grounded in the theory of virtue. This premise is itself nested within a set of assumptions about the current state of academic philosophy. One is that the tradition of virtue ethics has been recently, but also only partially, recovered by philosophers such as Alisdair MacIntyre and Richard Taylor (who are mentioned only in the endnotes). Another is that environmental philosophy is properly concerned with establishing a non-anthropocentric approach to value in the natural world. As a result, Thoreau’s Living Ethics: Walden and the Pursuit of Nature is pitched (if only subliminally) to a reader whose ethical universe is populated mainly with
consequentialist and neo-Kantian moral theories, and who sees environmental ethics as needing an account of valuation that can ground environmental duties well beyond any conceivable benefit to or rights of other human beings.

The result is a treatment that is somewhat insensitive to Thoreau's historical and philosophical context. Cafaro, for example, correctly argues that Thoreau sees the pursuit of virtue more comprehensively than simply the cultivation of moral excellence defined as competence in the execution of moral judgments and performance of attendant behaviors. Yet it is doubtful that any 19th century author conceived of virtues (or consequences and duties, for that matter) in the quite the reductionist manner characteristic of the late 20th century. John Stuart Mill, for example, was arguably inclined to view a good and fulfilling life as requiring the cultivation of personal qualities every bit as diverse as those Cafaro associates with the text of Walden. The decisionism and the preoccupation with assigning value to outcomes that contemporary philosophers associate with utilitarianism come later, as does the view that virtue consists in acquiring a predisposition to act as either utilitarian optimization or the categorical imperative dictates. The presumption that consequences, duty and virtue represent three contrary domains in moral theory is an artifact of our time, not that of Mill and Thoreau, who are more like one another than a late 20th century ethical theorist of any analytic school.

More seriously, Ralph Waldo Emerson's transcendentalism is portrayed much like a contemporary neo-Kantian's pursuit of a precise and internally consistent specification of moral duty. This permits Cafaro to contrast Thoreau as a thinker more comfortable with an approach that simultaneously accepts the possibility of contingency and genuine inconsistency within our moral aspirations, while remaining committed to a conception of morality that permits one to condemn injustice and to insist upon amelioration of problematic situations and continuing growth in one's moral sensitivities. In this respect, Thoreau's thought is indeed shown to foreshadow that of William James (mentioned once) and John Dewey (not mentioned), but Cafaro's treatment is hardly fair to the man who wrote not only Self Reliance, but also Circles, not to mention "I am always insincere, for I know that there will always be other moods."
To be sure, Emerson's essay on Thoreau comes across as stuffy and does not display deep appreciation of his friend's thought. Yet Emerson and Thoreau jointly transformed an 18th century philosophical tradition focused on the way that nature (mediated by the material production of human subsistence) shapes not only political institutions, but also the very terms in which human societies conceptualize and articulate the moral domain. The philosophes from Montesquieu and Buffon to Condorcet and Diderot had stressed the way that natural endowments from soil and climate are reflected in the moral character and attitudes of a people. The Scottish Enlightenment emphasized the relationship between modes of production (hunting, herding, settled agriculture, manufacture and trade) and the evolution of norms stressing kinship or regional loyalties, on the one hand, or limited rights and duties, on the other. Hegel, too, made much of geography and climate in his philosophy of history. Only as humanity's dependence on natural endowments is obscured does environment's intimate role in fixing the terms of morality recede into the background of implicit norms. The idea that industrialization and urbanization might conceal this role was already old and established by the time that Emerson and Thoreau were active.

But certainly no one in the 18th century interpreted these agrarian themes in light of post-Hegelian ontology. This Emerson and Thoreau most certainly did, and it is hard for me to think of one without the other in this connection. In dissociating experience from the cogito (understood as a Cartesian substance), Emerson gradually breaks away from the tradition that sees experience as a mental phenomenon "had" by an independently existing subject and begins to understand it as a field in which occasions are manifest and from which meaning can be extracted. But it is Thoreau who stresses how uncertainty and inherent risk are the pervasive qualities of experience, making it inherently a domain of wildness that recedes when subjected to industrial disciplines of power and control or drowned out by urban chatter. "Experience" gradually came to play a role in the American philosophical tradition that "the actually existing individual" did for Kierkegaard or that "Being" did for Nietzsche and Heidegger. This theme was, perhaps, not fully realized in the American tradition until James, but certainly Emerson and Thoreau are where it starts.
Furthermore, we must move backwards from James to recover the environmental dimension in the American tradition. This potential resides in the way that Emerson and Thoreau resituated 18th century views on nature's role in the formation of moral character with respect to their post-Hegelian (postmodern?) understanding of experience. Emerson at first celebrates poetry as the most promising venue for the emergence of Geist within experience, but contrary to Cafaro's reading, Emerson's mature thought praises farmers, fishermen and those who work "in the presence of nature" for the authenticity of their creative activity. Such work, so deeply and pervasively informed by nature, attends to experience, and this is what makes a farmer the most likely candidate for genuine virtue (just as Thomas Jefferson thought). Thoreau, in contrast, was skeptical of farmers, possibly because he knew them better. He believed that nature cannot be tamed and must be allowed its own free play in the cultivation of virtue, lest the authentic experience that is the true ground of virtue be covered with clutter, one's receptivity to experience stunted and the individual's moral character shunted toward artificial and ultimately unsatisfying pursuits. Cafaro is thus right to notice Thoreau's unique appreciation of the wild, and to see this as the deep source of his understanding of humanity's dependence on (and duty to preserve) the natural world.

As I read it, this Thoreauvian orientation to environmental ethics is almost wholly orthogonal to the terms in which contemporary environmental philosophers debate the anthropocentrism of "traditional" ethical theory; the two approaches just fail to intersect one another. The scare quotes here indicate that this tradition does not, in fact, have very deep roots at all, but is instead a fairly recent creation of philosophers who see value exclusively in the mind's consciousness of various states of affairs. For mainstream consequentialists, value is associated solely with mental states themselves, while neo-Kantian's see our ability to conceptualize the mutuality that characterizes intersubjectivity giving rise to moral duty. The exceeding narrowness of these foundational piers has spawned limitless paroxysms among those who feel (as Thoreau did) some appreciation for and duty to wild nature itself, being contemplated by a subject, transcendental or not. Cafaro's aim here is largely to backdate the dawning of environmental consciousness a few decades earlier than the writings of Muir. He does not, to my satisfaction,
sufficiently articulate Thoreau’s contribution to the ontology of American pragmatism nor does he explore the way in Thoreau, Emerson, Peirce, James, Dewey, Santayana and Whitehead (among others, certainly) constitute a school offering an alternative way to think about philosophy, generally, and environmental philosophy, in particular.

These complaints notwithstanding, there is a lot one can learn from Thoreau’s Living Ethics. Beyond Walden itself, Cafaro makes excellent use of selected passages from Thoreau’s other nature writings, as well as his journals. The discussion of Thoreau’s opposition to slavery and his sympathy for the activism of John Brown provides an especially insightful analysis of the way that Thoreau reconciles moral pluralism with the need to justify uncompromising standpoints on practical issues. The analysis of Thoreau’s view of friendship is also quite valuable, as is Cafaro’s argument to the effect that Thoreau’s thought is, in fact, far less individualistic (or perhaps we should say less insidiously individualistic) than is typically thought. I also appreciated the extended discussion of Thoreau’s vegetarianism, which will certainly inform my future thinking this topic.

Most importantly, I believe that even if Cafaro has not quite situated Thoreau in the most revealing context, he has subjected Thoreau’s own texts to a thorough and sensitive reading. This reading is, I am persuaded, largely correct, so much so that Cafaro himself seems to be led toward an approach to environmental philosophy that is broadly consistent with the themes of American pragmatism, despite any evidence that he was, by training or prior acquaintance, particularly inclined to go in that direction when he began to study Thoreau’s work. Perhaps I am mistaken on this point, but I believe that Cafaro was led in this direction by Thoreau himself. The care and attention that has, in the process, been lavished on Thoreau’s philosophical corpus is gratifying, and we can be extremely thankful that Cafaro has not allowed the axes he may have wanted to grind in writing this book to silence Thoreau himself. Few of us approach our subject matter with such respect, and seldom are interpretive works on the philosophy of others so honestly realized.

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The Philosophy of William James: An Introduction is Richard Gale’s “more popular version” of his own The Divided Self of William James (1999). The older book was a fresh, nuanced study, and scholars interested in James should welcome the availability of this material in a different format. From the earlier work, Gale omits both the most technical discussions and references to much of the secondary literature on James (p. ix). The availability of the book in $24 paperback is especially good news, as the Divided Self hit the shelves at a whopping $60 (if memory serves) and has only increased in price since.

Like The Divided Self, the Introduction argues for a fundamental cleavage in James’s philosophy. Since Perry, many scholars have read James as having twin impulses, one scientific and the other religious, which are meant both to be accommodated by his pragmatism. But for Gale the fundamental cleavage is between James’s promethean, pragmatist self, which seeks to control nature for human purposes, and his anti-promethean, mystical self, which seeks intimacy and union with others, God, and the universe.

The Introduction closely follows the structure of the Divided Self. Both books are divided into two parts, each dealing with one of James’s two advertised selves. The 11 chapters of the shorter work bear the same titles, save for a word or two, as the 11 chapters of the longer. The Introduction does not contain The Divided Self’s appendix, which was a reprint of Gale’s Cambridge Companion to James essay on Dewey’s naturalized reading of James. The Introduction’s index is noticeably shorter, which is mostly accounted for by the omission of references to secondary authors.

In terms of content, note that the Introduction is an abridgement, and not a rewriting of the earlier work. Most of the text in the Introduction is contained in The Divided Self, save mostly for new transitions to compensate for omitted material. There are a very few sentences and qualifications added to the original text, but none that I can find substantially revise the structure or content of the reading given in 1999. The “Introduction” and the final chapter have been shortened most, to avoid lengthy