downright wrong, something very much like it is needed to get beyond the morass of modern epistemological problems that bedevil behaviorist and recent cognitivist approaches to psychology (if the latter is conceived only in terms of the computational-representational theory of mind that has held sway since the 1980s, being hardly more than modern empiricist psychology with a computer metaphor in place of a steam-engine metaphor).

The fact, though, that ecological psychology is able to correct and improve certain problematic or poorly developed features of James's radical empiricism suggests that an answer to the second question may be only partly positive. With no room really to pursue this question, we are lead to a cryptic and unsatisfactory final observation that "an emerging conceptual foundation for an ecological approach in psychology," if it were to draw on pragmatist thought at all, may also do well to include the work of other classical pragmatists. In that case, the issue is no longer what did or did not influence Gibson but rather what may or may not inform present understanding and future developments of ecological psychology.

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Sharyn Clough has written a first rate neo-pragmatist critique of the implicit correspondence theory underlying epistemological writings by feminist critics of science. The arguments are sound, informed by a grasp of the literature, and presented with elegance and clarity. She undertakes her critique in a spirit of respect, not antagonism, expressing appreciation for the achievements of feminist science studies pioneers. I recommend this book not only to feminist science scholars, but also to a broad audience interested in epistemology, philosophy of science, pragmatism, and evolutionary theory. Clough relies on Davidson's account of knowledge and Rorty's neo-pragmatist interpretation of that account. This is not classical pragmatism, but the critique of "representationalist" ontology and resulting epistemology, and the adoption of Davidsonian fallibilism are consistent with the fallibilism of Dewey and Peirce.
Clough is a strong advocate of feminists criticizing science in its own terms — for sloppy methodology, careless inference, and especially value-laden biases both in choice of research programs and claims about their results. After "local" or "empirical" criticism of this sort was, unfortunately, ignored for many years by the science establishment, Clough observes, feminists felt they needed a much broader critique of the scientific enterprise. They began attacking scientific concepts of method and truth as gendered, as masculine, not objective. Clough feels this was unfortunate, first, because it distracted attention from their critiques of particular scientific theories and arguments. Second, much of this attack was based on essentialist notions of gender, which oversimplify complex social and psychological structures. Third, relying on mainstream epistemological approaches, in order to attack the objectivity of gendered science, inevitably raised the question whether there is any basis for objectivity at all! And this skepticism was the turned back on the feminist claims of bias.

Instead, Clough proposes a neo-pragmatist fallibilism, which obviates the skepticism problem. And this enables her to shift her focus back to the "local" critique of particular scientific claims. She illustrates local critique deftly with her discussions of particular evolutionary biology claims. In the process she develops her own neo-pragmatist analysis of functionalism in evolutionary thought.

It seems to me, however, that something is lost if we insist only on such local critique. A more general critique of patriarchal tendencies in science should be possible and desirable without falling into essentialist errors. Clough takes up, for example, the "object relations" theory that due to asymmetric parenting males and female children have very different developmental paths. Men's quest for autonomy, the theory asserts, is channeled into dominating others, and nature. Clough criticizes this as an essentialist theory, which ignores social class and ethnic differences, as well as individual life histories. If one takes the object relations theory literally as a determinist account, this criticism is warranted. On the other hand one can view the alleged dominating orientation as an ideal type. As an ideal type it does help us to recognize and criticize certain styles and tendencies in science. It alerts us to inclinations toward domination, imposition, and control, which, though not determined and universal, are prevalent enough to need our attention. Interpreted as an ideal-type theory, the object-relations approach no longer implies the unlikely
position that all males must have a dominating orientation, or that no females might have it.

Clough also considers the receptive orientation attributed to female cognition, and quotes Keller's study of the biologist, Barbara McClintock. The Keller/McClintock language includes letting the material speak to you, encountering the object in its fullness, having a feeling for the organism. Clough finds in this language "a fairly straightforward version of the representationalist point of view" (p. 73). To speak of the material, the organism, even the object, however, is not necessarily to adopt a correspondence theory. Keller and McClintock are certainly not advocating passive receptivity to a predetermined thing. The receptivity they urge is the much more active one of encounter. Keller and McClintock can be construed, then - or if necessary, reformulated - as urging openness to experience (in Dewey's sense) - experience of the scientist in interaction with nature, which produces a constructed object.

To criticize a dominating orientation and praise a receptive one, furthermore, does not entail the claim, which Clough rightly criticizes, that the latter is more objective than the former. One can adopt the pluralist view that the chances of scientific discovery and error correction are increased by the presence of both orientations - and others beside. Feminist protest at the prevalence of the dominating orientation and the pronounced inhospitality toward the receptive orientation is, then, still very much in order.

These limited disagreements can not take away from Clough's considerable achievement in injecting neo-pragmatist thought into feminist science discourse and developing a pragmatist reconceptualization of validity conditions for functionalist arguments in evolutionary biology.

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