and "tribunal of the public sphere." By employing such a fine interpretive filter, both the author of the introduction and the translator might have underestimated the value of treating Dewey's work on its own terms (for a similar argument noting this tendency among interpreters, see also R. Westbrook "Doing Dewey: An Autobiographical Comment" in Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society v. 29, no. 4, fall 1993).

Notwithstanding the aforementioned criticisms, this translation of The Public and Its Problems is a noteworthy contribution, for it makes the primary source of Dewey's democratic theory accessible to a wider Spanish-speaking/reading audience in the U.S., on the European continent, in Central and in South America. Although Dewey's approval can only be conjectured at, I think it would be safe to say that this translation of The Public and Its Problems is infused with the spirit of his life and writings. Dewey was not only aware of U.S. Imperialism in the Western Hemisphere, but he was also a virulent critic of it throughout his life and in several of his works; see, for instance, his essays "Imperialism is Easy" (1927) and "A Critique of American Civilization" (1928). Consistent with Dewey's melioristic faith, this translation provides a glimmer of hope for U.S.-Latin American relations; hope that the deep wounds inflicted by the citizens of the United States on their southern neighbors over the past 150 years will slowly heal through the promotion of mutual understanding and discourse about their respective political philosophies.

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This book traces the influence of William James's radical empiricism, by way of E. B. Holt's neorealism, on James Gibson's ecological psychology. Gibson was Holt's student at Princeton, while Holt was James's student at Harvard. That entails nothing by itself; but Heft traces theoretical and philosophical connections that place radical empiricism at the core of "an emerging conceptual foundation for an ecological approach in psychology," arguing that radical-empiricist themes filtered
their way to Gibson's thought more or less intact by way of James's influence on Holt. The result is an excellent exposition of pragmatist foundations for ecological psychology---a must-read for anyone involved in debates concerning pragmatist approaches to epistemology or post-behaviorist, post-cognitivist psychology.

The book is organized into three main parts. The first part surveys James's radical empiricism, drawing as much on Principles of Psychology as on the later Essays in Radical Empiricism. This survey centers on James's dynamic, antidualist conception of "pure experience" with its focus on the evolving, unitary, systemic reciprocity of environments and perceiving, thinking, social organisms that inhabit them. Heft clearly explains what it is that makes James's empiricism radical, namely, the idea that relations (structure, order) are "just as much matters of direct particular experience" as are things that stand in such relations (rather than being imposed on experience by a separate cognitive faculty). Heft highlights the radical-empiricist principle that perception is direct (a key notion in ecological psychology) along with the idea of the coordinated coalescence (continuity) of perceptual and conceptual experience. Holt's neorealism is also summarized in this first part of the book, particularly in terms of the various aspects of James's views that Holt preserves, given that Holt will be cited repeatedly in later chapters as a connecting link between James and Gibson.

The second part of the book summarizes the basic features of Gibson's ecological psychology, along with running comparisons and contrasts with radical empiricism. This includes an instructive account of the key idea of affordances as properties of an environment having "perceived functional significance" for an individual. Affordances are percepts rather than concepts. In perceiving a cup as a cup, as opposed to sensing merely colors and shapes, we perceive its graspability, its liftability, its ability to convey drinkable liquids from point to point, and so forth. Thus it is not just the case that affordances are perceived but that they are always the core content of what is perceived. A second distinctive idea in ecological psychology is that of invariants as stimulus information, where the detection or extraction of invariant information in changing ambient sensory arrays yields the rawest information available to the perceiving individual. Detection of invariants and perception of affordances are thus Gibson's alternatives to a traditional (and problematic) distinction
between sensation and perception. Heft shows how radical empiricism provides independent philosophical backing for these key ideas, in turn showing how ecological psychology can help to shore up some weaknesses in radical empiricism. For instance, James himself acknowledged a problem inherent in his conception of pure experience concerning the possibility of "two minds" experiencing one and the same object. Heft shows how the idea of extracting invariant information from ambient sensory arrays essentially solves this problem (162--169). Likewise, James's analysis of time and the notion of the temporally extended character of the experienced present is rather sketchy. Heft shows how this analysis can be clarified as a straightforward consequence of the idea that perception fundamentally involves the detection of invariants that can be revealed only in contexts of temporally extended change (174--183).

The third part of the book considers the relationship of ecological psychology to other schools of thought besides radical empiricism. It is argued that Gestalt psychology, while an influence on Gibson, is basically opposed to ecological psychology insofar as the latter grew out of radical empiricism while the former retained a "traditional dualist formulation through its Kantian roots." Two chapters are also devoted to showing a close alliance between ecological psychology and the ecobehavioral social psychology of Roger G. Barker. This leads to a more general discussion of the importance of sociocultural processes in human experience---moving beyond perception and physical environments to cultural ecology and its role in a wider-ranging account of human cognition and knowledge. The emphasis here goes beyond just the systemic reciprocity of physical environments and perceiving organisms to include social networks and "socially distributed cognition." This latter kind of consideration is all but absent in James's various writings on radical empiricism.

If we assume, then, that Heft establishes that James's radical empiricism had definite influences on Gibson's ecological psychology, we are left with at least two questions. Namely, is James's radical empiricism essentially correct so far as it goes; and if so, is it an adequate philosophical foundation for ecological psychology?

If the first question is answered negatively, then this book does not bode well for ecological psychology. Heft supplies extended arguments in favor of a positive answer. Even if specific details of radical empiricism are incomplete or even
downright wrong, something very much like it is needed to get beyond the morass of modern epistemological problems that bedevil behaviorist and recent cognitivist approaches to psychology (if the latter is conceived only in terms of the computational-representational theory of mind that has held sway since the 1980s, being hardly more than modern empiricist psychology with a computer metaphor in place of a steam-engine metaphor).

The fact, though, that ecological psychology is able to correct and improve certain problematic or poorly developed features of James's radical empiricism suggests that an answer to the second question may be only partly positive. With no room really to pursue this question, we are lead to a cryptic and unsatisfactory final observation that "an emerging conceptual foundation for an ecological approach in psychology," if it were to draw on pragmatist thought at all, may also do well to include the work of other classical pragmatists. In that case, the issue is no longer what did or did not influence Gibson but rather what may or may not inform present understanding and future developments of ecological psychology.

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Sharyn Clough has written a first rate neo-pragmatist critique of the implicit correspondence theory underlying epistemological writings by feminist critics of science. The arguments are sound, informed by a grasp of the literature, and presented with elegance and clarity. She undertakes her critique in a spirit of respect, not antagonism, expressing appreciation for the achievements of feminist science studies pioneers. I recommend this book not only to feminist science scholars, but also to a broad audience interested in epistemology, philosophy of science, pragmatism, and evolutionary theory. Clough relies on Davidson's account of knowledge and Rorty's neo-pragmatist interpretation of that account. This is not classical pragmatism, but the critique of "representationalist" ontology and resulting epistemology, and the adoption of Davidsonian fallibilism are consistent with the fallibilism of Dewey and Peirce.