evidenced by his article entitled “The Ethics of Animal Experimentation (LW2: 98-103)” in which he advocates the use of animals in scientific and medical experimentation, but not the use of human beings. Dewey then, or McDonald on his behalf, is hard pressed to offer a justification for why such treatment is acceptable in the case of nonhuman animals, but impermissible with regard to human beings, which does not privilege the human species over nonhuman species. If he cannot, then he must give up the claim that Dewey’s ethic is non-anthropocentric. This difficulty arises because McDonald bought into a presupposition prevalent in much of the contemporary work done in environmental philosophy, namely, the belief that it is not possible to construct an anthropocentric environmental ethic which will provide sufficient environmental protection.

Aside from the questionable attribution of intrinsic value and non-anthropocentrism to Dewey’s philosophy as an environmental ethic, McDonald’s book is an important catalyst to a continued examination of pragmatism, and Dewey in particular, in environmental ethics.

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The American philosophical tradition in aesthetics is marked, although not uniformly, by ‘starting low’ rather than ‘starting high.’ Instead of taking its initial motivation from puzzlement about the status of ‘art,’ it begins with an analysis of experience or experiential structures. In the American tradition, and its paradigmatic and classic figures, the aesthetic dimension is not marginalized, but made focal, in various ways and with different weightings, to philosophical projects as a whole.

It is hard to imagine a more concentrated attempt to make the aesthetic dimension focal in a comprehensive conceptual scheme than Dombrowski has undertaken to show in his labor of love engagement with the total work of Charles Hartshorne. According to Dombrowski, the great merit of an Hartshornian aesthetics is precisely that it resolutely
"starts low," in the fundamental stratum of sentience, and "ends high," indeed as high as one could possibly go, in the unsurpassable divine reality. The felicitous rubric of "divine beauty," as indicated in the title, is to be taken in the twofold sense that the realization of 'beauty' is the unsurpassable value, goal, and norm of all experiencing and that the divine reality itself is essentially, if not exclusively, to be defined in terms of beauty.

It is the creative tension between these two poles, the 'divinity of beauty' and the 'beauty of divinity,' that makes the book both intellectually insightful and existentially moving. It is insightful by reason of its analytical scope and conceptual flexibility. It is existentially moving by reason of the ultimacy of the subject-matter, its bearing upon the ultimate disposition of ourselves and upon the point of living (and of dying). Dombrowski’s goal, resolutely pursued, is to examine the sources, adequacy, and heuristic fertility of Hartshorne’s life-long concern to develop "an experientially adequate aesthetics" (141) within the framework of his neoclassical metaphysics and the neoclassical theism that lies at its heart.

Dombrowski charts and brings into relation central and related theses of Hartshorne’s aesthetics and philosophical framework as a whole: the priority and ultimacy of the aesthetic dimension in human life, which grounds the cognitive and the ethical dimensions; the definition of the aesthetic in terms of satisfaction, creation of value, intensity of felt experience; aesthetic value as intrinsic, not extrinsic or instrumental, an immanent telos of human feeling; the establishment that what is first revealed or disclosed in human experience are feeling tones, affective wholes, rooted in an intersensory continuum, whose reflective or analytical unfolding comes later; beauty as not the only aesthetic value, but rather the ideal mean in terms of which other aesthetic values are to be understood; the spreading of the aesthetic field, the aesthetic dimension, over all of human existence; the inextricable relation between an aesthetic matrix of theism and a theistic matrix of aesthetics. Dombrowski has mined all of Hartshorne’s writings, including his early work on the philosophy and psychology of sensation and his work on birdsong, in order to show the systematic set of internal relations that make up Hartshorne’s world of thought from the aesthetic point of view.
Dombrowski does not try to establish or to explicate the full internal set of conceptual relations that constitute Hartshorne’s framework. Nor need he do so at any rate. The book is more a presentation that an argument. This is not a criticism, but simply a characterization of what he set out to do and what he accomplished. The real task that Dombrowski took on was to establish and chart the centrality of the aesthetic dimension in all of Hartshorne’s work. We end up, in his opinion, with both a theistic aesthetics and an aesthetic theism. The mediating terms are intensity and value, understood as ‘intense value’ or ‘valued intensity.’ Dombrowski does not claim pure originality for his insights or angle of analysis here. He consciously and graciously locates his discussion in light of cognate contributions from both within and without the explicit tradition of process philosophy. With Judith Jones he sees the pivotal role of the concept of intensity in process thought. With Donald Sherburne he sees how the Whiteheadian framework leads not just to explication but to the development and transformation of aesthetics itself. And while staying close to Hartshorne’s texts, he nevertheless helpfully draws parallels between and contrasts to a large chunk of the philosophical tradition. So, Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas, Cassirer, Dewey, and Langer and others make both sporadic and at times more substantial appearances in his book. Rather than closing the discussion off, however, these historical and systematic allusions call out for more explicit confrontation and expansion, as do the more explicitly substantive claims that a properly understood ‘aesthetic logic’ implies a theistic position and, indeed, cannot stand alone. While Dombrowski himself is utterly convinced of Hartshorne’s substantiality and correctness, it is really the substantiality of Hartshorne’s contribution that he is most concerned to establish. This he does most successfully indeed.

Dombrowski’s book, as I see it, is more an argument for the importance of rather than an argument for the total adequacy or truth of Hartshorne’s aesthetics. Rather than a set of finished conclusions, this book offers us multiple points to ponder and sets us tasks to try to cash out the promissory notes that Dombrowski has issued along the way. A fuller and more explicit engagement with Sherburne, which Dombrowski for the most part restricted to the notes, is to be welcomed. Likewise, the many positive connections
between Hartshorne and Dewey and Langer, which Dombrowski clearly sees, need to be made more explicit and a subject of discussion in their own right. A fleshing out and a concretization of the deviations from beauty as ideal mean would thicken the analytical apparatus and establish in detail its heuristic fertility and effect a transition to the objective pole of the aesthetic relation.

There are no false claims to originality, although there are clearly original components to the Hartshornian position and to Dombrowski's presentation. Originality can also come from a creative schematizing of relations, of putting elements in novel orders and contexts, and of seeing connections where others have only seen disconnected theses. The book is not 'technical' in any pejorative sense. It is eminently accessible even to those not fully familiar with Hartshorne's work as such. Its workmanlike citation of Hartshorne's central texts, many of them both intellectually challenging and potentially existentially shattering, will give rise to disciplined reflection, both positive and negative. The 'ideal reader' of this book is clearly someone already familiar with Hartshorne's work, but even a less than ideal reader, an 'actual reader,' will profit from the great effort of extraction, compilation, and synthesis that Dombrowski has accomplished.

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Here is a highly successful and important collection of essays by indigenous American philosophers. It is (probably) the first major appearance in print in full academic garb of Indian philosophy by Indians, other than the articles in the APA Newsletters.

These are essays written by philosophically astute writers (eight with PhD's in philosophy), with varying degrees of rootage in native ways, able to stand within two changing cultures and reflect philosophically about each one and on the issues of bridging them. One finds standard philosophical topics and references to familiar