misdirections of philosophy, and his argument moves along other lines than strong claims of difference. Such disagreements, however, often are the most efficient means of making important discriminations clear. Innis's goal of exemplifying the connections between European and American philosophers seemed to wash everybody in the same pool. Critical opposition did emerge in the final chapter on technology, and I think this enhanced the flow of that argument. This is a mild criticism relating more to the tone of the argument than the substance.

There is a bit of a cautionary tone in the end of this book. Let me summarize it and conclude with a brief comment. When Innis explores the result of information technologies on the human subject, he concludes, with Peirce, that the aim of our cognitional scheme is concrete reasonableness, which comprises rational habits and is exemplified in self-control and methodical self-reflection. If we are caught up in technical play that reduces capacities for self-control then we have, Innis says, a situation similar to Cassirer's loss of freedom and autonomy (224). In some ways the drift of technology toward an abstraction and disembodiment undermines both our rationality and prospects for self-control. I agree with Innis's diagnosis, however I would respond in a slightly different manner. To the focus on the labyrinthine "charmed circles" I would add the orientation toward the content of perception and language in relation to which self-control corresponds. At least this is the direction my self-reflection began to move as I worked through this book, and the capacity for my self-reflection on these problems was clearly enhanced by this fine philosophical tool. Pragmatists, aesthetes, and semioticians alike owe Innis a debt of gratitude.

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A distinctive feature of many American philosophers is their desire to reconnect philosophy with other areas of thought and practice. In his recent book Becoming John Dewey, Thomas C. Dalton explores the variegated context and
interdisciplinary development of one of America’s favorite sons. Despite its shortcomings, when treated as an account of traditionally overlooked and heretofore unknown influences on Dewey’s thought, *Becoming John Dewey* stands as an important contribution to the current history of American philosophy.

Understanding and evaluating Dalton’s work requires recognizing that one of its major drives is to recast Dewey in light of new research. In the Introduction we read, “Through correspondence and interviews, diaries, unpublished manuscripts, and other documents, this new information about how Dewey used science and his knowledge of politics and the arts to understand the role of consciousness in human judgment and inquiry was pieced together” (3). *Becoming John Dewey* is presented as an intellectual biography that draws on fresh sources and aims at fresh results. In this respect Dalton’s work is a great success.

Dalton threads some thought-provoking arguments through his largely historical tapestry. One of the most prominent is the case he makes for the continued, long-lasting influence of Hegel’s thought throughout Dewey’s life. Beyond studying under George Sylvester Morris at Johns Hopkins and working in late-nineteenth century Ann Arbor, we see that Dewey’s gradual outward distancing of himself from some of Hegel’s ideas need not overshadow his transformation of Hegelian phenomenology into a naturalistic theory of mind and judgment. This argument prompts the interesting prospect of revisiting the later works of Dewey with a mind attuned to Hegelian themes, an approach traditionally reserved for Dewey’s earlier writings.

Dewey’s reworking of Hegel is viewed alongside his ongoing incorporation of evolutionary themes into a wide-ranging naturalism. Dalton explores Dewey’s dealings with the thoughts of Darwin, Huxley, and Samuel Butler, and continually supports (in line with Morton White’s *The Origins of Dewey’s Instrumentalism*) the notion that Dewey was driven by a belief that “Darwinian and Hegelian conceptions of development could be reconciled” (258). Dalton keeps naturalism at the heart of many sections devoted to Dewey’s emerging thought, and in doing so we are given significant philosophical insights beyond mere historical commentary.
Another area of extensive focus is Dewey’s integration of scientific psychological study with his theory of inquiry. According to Dalton, Myrtle McGraw needs to be recognized as a chief player in Dewey’s perspective on these matters. McGraw, a prominent researcher in child development, was not only an intellectual catalyst for the psychological basis of Dewey’s theories, but also a close friend and companion. With the inclusion of C. L. Herrick, Charles O. Whitman, and Frederick Tilney (among others), we are given an in-depth picture of the experimental roots of Dewey’s philosophy. Dalton also gives many insightful remarks on Freudian psychology and argues that, while their theories are fundamentally opposed, Freud and Dewey can be compared and contrasted in fruitful ways.

Other notable aspects of Dalton’s work include his exploration of Dewey’s interaction with Albert Barnes and Henri Matisse. We gain a fresh perspective on Dewey’s aesthetic theory in light of these interactions, including Matisse’s influence on Art as Experience and Dewey’s continued pursuit of a “unified field theory” covering all areas of human judgment, including science and art. This latter notion is further demonstrated in Dalton’s account of how Dewey had a window into the development of quantum theory through his daughter Jane’s post-doctoral research with Bohr, Heisenberg, and others. Dalton writes, “Dewey believed that Bohr’s principle made it theoretically possible to render physical, biological, and cultural forms in commensurate terms that were intersubjectively understood” (151). Dalton also explores Dewey’s pursuit of social reform, his educational perspectives, and his engagement in discussions of democracy and politics. Towards the end of the book, Dalton looks at Richard Rorty’s recasting of Deweyan themes and presents elements of a defense against contemporary attempts to “denaturalize” Dewey’s philosophy.

While successful to a great extent, there are some deficiencies in Becoming John Dewey. Dalton’s use of previously untapped resources reveals new connections between Dewey and thinkers beyond the periphery of philosophical circles, but his failure to include the influence of other major classical American philosophers paints an incomplete picture of Dewey’s intellectual development. For instance, in the significant depth of research into Dewey’s conceptions of human psychology,
there is very little mention of the influence of William James. Dewey’s colleague at Michigan and Chicago, George Herbert Mead, is only briefly referenced, yet Dalton himself admits that Mead “forged a close relationship with Dewey that would have lasting intellectual consequences” (49). *Becoming John Dewey* leaves its reader in need of other studies concerning Dewey’s relationships to American philosophers (those he agreed with as well as those he disagreed with) in order to augment its focus on interdisciplinary influences.

Another criticism of *Becoming John Dewey* is that it leaves one wanting more information on certain areas of Dewey’s philosophy, along with the context and development of those areas. Two obvious facets that could have received more attention are Dewey’s instrumentalism and functionalism. While given a few pages of explicit reference, we are never given a robust discussion and are often left with more on psychology than philosophy. Working from influential people to the ideas they helped develop is a strategy Dalton admittedly employs, but it leaves us wondering what other insights might come by beginning with major elements of Dewey’s thought and then uncovering connections within the wonderful body of historical research Dalton utilizes.

Despite its few shortcomings, *Becoming John Dewey* is an illuminating and enjoyable study that opens many new vistas concerning not only the historical development of Dewey’s thought but also the current study and application of his philosophy. Readers will find insightful closing comments as consideration is given to how contemporary philosophy can recapture and reincorporate the spirit of Dewey’s work. In *Becoming John Dewey*, Thomas C. Dalton has provided an important perspective on both the past and present of one of America’s most preeminent minds.

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**John Dewey and Environmental Philosophy** by Hugh P. McDonald

*State University of New York Press, 2003.*

There are two driving and related questions in environmental ethics which are sometimes made explicit, though the answers to each are very often assumed and