among the intellectual styles of philosophy as it is currently practiced. Philosophy in the analytic vein tends to accept the traditional modernist assumption of the objectivity of the world and the capacity of inquiry, especially science and mathematics, to reveal its nature. Philosophy of the more post modernist sort tends to emphasize the creative aspects of human experience and interaction with nature, and the inherent limits of human access to the world, and the twain do not often meet. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary, because in crucial respects both are right. It is a virtue of ordinality that it expresses an understanding of nature in which it is possible to understand how both can be right. If the complexes of nature are by definition relational, then those complexes that are related to human being will have their nature defined in part by the role played by human beings in their constitution. This is the creative place of human being in nature. At the same time, however, there is nothing mysterious or uniquely subjective about this. The complexes of nature are what they are, not by the fiat of any person or simply by result of human inquiry, but by the relations that stand among their constituent complexes. Those constituents may include human beings, but that fact does not render the relations any less "objective." In other words, nature as understood ordinally is such as to suggest both human creativity and "natural definition," or objectivity. These are not mutually exclusive approaches to nature, and for me the greatest service that ordinality as a concept plays is to show how this is the case.

"Some Reminiscences of Justus Buchler."

James Campbell, Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, University of Toledo

I came to Stony Brook in the Fall of 1974 to study with Justus Buchler. I had been introduced to his Nature and Judgment at the end of my undergraduate career, at just about the time that I was ready to abandon all hope for contemporary philosophy. This volume seemed to me on first reading to be a masterpiece – it still does – and I decided that I needed to do my graduate work with the person who could produce such a philosophy. My initial interest was to explore, and perhaps further develop, Buchler's moral thought; but I eventually decided that attempting an ordinal ethics would violate what he was about. I began, instead, to draw more on his insights into the history of American philosophy, although I continued to keep his larger
metaphysical vision in mind. Even today, I think that it is 'correct,' although I realize that any such evaluation is sadly inept.

In what follows, I would like to discuss a few memories of my interactions with Buchler during my years at Stony Brook (1974-79). These reminiscences are not meant to challenge anyone who might remember differently; but they may serve to remind those who were there of the extraordinary fortune that was ours, and perhaps to inspire the inquisitiveness of those who were not. I am very sorry that I cannot be there to discuss these experiences with you in person.

THE INDEX CARDS. To those graduate students who were slaves to the over-preparation of excessively detailed lecture notes, Buchler was always a wonder. He came to class with no more than the appropriate text, by Locke or Santayana or Whitehead, and a simple index card on which he had written a series of page numbers and cryptic phrases that would somehow propel him through the entire afternoon's seminar without lull or repetition. After the obligatory attention to one of our fellow's more-or-less valiant attempts to sketch out some philosophical issue related to the day's reading, Buchler would go to work. Sometimes, he simply read carefully; sometimes, he challenged assumptions unstated in the text; sometimes, he proposed alternative insights. Often, the reading did not survive his ministrations; but we students always benefited from his insightful probing. Whatever he did, however, on each occasion his only tool was his index card.

A SHORT CLASS. Buchler's seminars usually lasted the full two-and-one-half hours, and frequently ran a bit over. Once, however, I remember a class that was greatly abbreviated. The circumstances were as follows. We were well into the course, at the point when he would introduce one of his own volumes as the text. The class began, as usual, with a student presentation about the reading for the day. After that concluded, Buchler spoke for a few minutes about his motivations for writing the volume under consideration. Then, I guess, we unthinking students awaited his usual process of careful exposition and query that would probe what we had read for indications of philosophical or metaphysical weakness. This was what had happened ten or so classes in a row; this was how he conducted a seminar. Buchler, of course, was unable to engage his own work in this way—that was to have been our job—and so after a few fumbling attempts on our part and lots of awkward silence, he ended the seminar for the week without shaming us too explicitly for our failure to engage with his ideas.
NARROW SOURCES. My only ongoing conflict with Buchler's approach to teaching was with his method of attempting to draw a philosopher's position on some topic—like Dewey's understanding of 'science' or 'experience—from a single textual source. (He followed this same method, although less rigorously, in his written work.) I recognize that there were a number of benefits from his approach. For example, it suggested to us the need for a higher level of thoroughness and care in our presentations and writing so that we would say what we intended to say and leave nothing out. This method recognized the fact that no one could expect only Jamesian readers, ready to seek out parallel formulations found elsewhere. Similarly, continued references to other texts would prevent the careful consideration of the one that had been selected. I was Jamesian enough, however, to believe that any formulation will of necessity be inadequate, and that it must be supplemented with a consideration of how the author dealt with the topic elsewhere. In his own case, of course, Buchler's deliberately constrained output makes such comparisons relatively simple.

PENCIL COMMENTS. After years of receiving papers back from professors full of fierce comments designed to show how the papers had engaged them—and often with coffee stains and cigarette burns as further signs of the professors' enthusiastic interest—I was somewhat disappointed to receive a paper back from Buchler that looked as pristine as when I had submitted it. Had he read it? Was he totally unimpressed? A more careful examination indicated some comments and a grade in a fine pencil hand. After he returned a series of other papers in similar condition, I began to attribute his reticence to mark them up to a respect for the sacredness of a typed page that deserved to be treated as a kind of relic of the author's labor, and to his expectation that the very same paper might be further submitted to a journal or a conference. Now that submitted papers are just token copies of an electronic original, perhaps Buchler would comment more heavily, and in ink.

A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCLUSION. From the broad sweep of Bud-lien's work, I would like to consider one theme: validation. All that we make or say or do is a kind of evaluation that he calls 'judgment.' These judgments are our products. "As events in nature the products of men are complete and inexpugnable," he writes. "But as potential vehicles of communication they stand in need of a certain kind of actualization which, we shall suggest, can never be wholly achieved: they require to be validated." Through validation our judgments are justified. "Every judgment implicitly seeks justification, because of the commitment incurred by the perceiver in judging." He continues, "[t]he primordial
claim latent in human existence itself is the claim of valid perpetuation."3 This sort of validation, however, comes to few.

Even within our relatively narrow philosophical circle, an individual could complete graduate study, continue an active research life, teach a career's worth of classes, and still never come across the work, or even the name, of Justus Buchler. Such individuals do not feel inadequate — and maybe they should not — but it is still unfortunate for them that they were not exposed to and nurtured by his well-crafted and penetrating insights.4 This reminder that philosophical quality alone does not guarantee popular success should commit us to further efforts to validate Buchler's work. Prevalence as a philosophical figure requires favorable circumstances; but, as James has taught us, these circumstances remain at least partly under our control.

NOTES:

1. Cf. Beth J. Singer: "the absence of a theory of morality is the most conspicuous gap in Buchler's metaphysics of judgment" (Ordinal Naturalism: An introduction to the Philosophy of Justus Buchler_[Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 1983], 218).

2. This readiness is a corollary to such Jamesian comments as: "Our fields of experience have no more definite boundaries than have our fields of view. Both are fringed forever by a more that continuously develops, and that continuously supersedes them as life proceeds" (Essays in Radical Empiricism. [Cambridge: Harvard UP, (1912) 1976 ], 35).


4. We all recognize, of course, that, just as others would benefit from the study of Buchler, we would benefit from the study of an innumerable set of other philosophers.

"Ontological Parity and Philosophy (Teaching)"

Richard E. Hart, Bloomfield College

Sidney Gelber has written that "A philosopher invents and shapes categories in order to render the world more intelligible," and to further "...the inventive life of human beings" (10). This statement captures for me the