As a young graduate student who has stumbled into this business called professional academic philosophy, I often find myself asking a not-so-polite version of McDermott’s question, “Just what the hell have I gotten myself into?” As far as I am concerned, Fashionable Nihilism is a reply from an older, established philosopher who has been around the professional block so to speak. To his credit, Wilshire is a disillusioned pluralist for whom there can be no false hope, no easy answer. With great lucidity Wilshire recognizes that the concealing of concealment which is at work everywhere in mainstream analytic philosophy ensures that James’ pragmatic method, Nietzsche’s genealogy and the Heideggerian reversal of thinking never become live options for the analytic temperament. This book betrays his weariness, frustration and bitterness, as if to say, “Someday that student from Princeton will be your department head...someday this mess will be your burden and you will know all too well what I am talking about here in this book.”

Nevertheless, Fashionable Nihilism is also a celebration of the pluralistic culture which survives despite prevailing conditions. Wilshire seeks to console and remember those who have championed openness and pluralism, “I have assembled this book in an effort to reflect, to recall myself to remembering. Maybe it will help others also.” More importantly this book establishes Professor Wilshire as an example for those of us who have our heads down, scrambling for degrees, publications, jobs and tenure by showing us that it is possible to look up and stay the course within this hostile culture. Fashionable Nihilism is an invitation to comport ourselves as human beings engaged in a deeply meaningful profession rather than as nihilistic, professionalized human beings.

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The third and final volume of John T. Graham's in-depth study of the Spanish philosopher-writer, José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), has appeared. As was his procedure for his two previous volumes, *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Life in Ortega y Gasset* (1994) and *Theory of History in Ortega y Gasset: The Dawn of Historical Reason* (1997), reviewed by me in the *SAAP Newsletter*, 78 (October 1997), 15-18, Graham utilized books in Ortega's personal library, with their underlinings and marginal notes, the eighty reels of microfilm of Ortega's papers in the Library of Congress, and the various unpublished documents, manuscripts and correspondence in the Fundación Ortega y Gasset (Madrid) to supplement his extensive research into Ortega's published works and the voluminous, worldwide secondary studies.

As mentioned in my earlier review, Graham -- by now Professor Emeritus of European History at the University of Missouri-Kansas City -- began to detect parallels between Ortega and William James while studying both in 1984, parallels that seemed more than coincidental. A check into Ortega's unpublished writings and extensive private library revealed the influence of James' pragmatism, as well as of Husserl's phenomenology. Ortega had utilized the "metaphysical assumptions of pragmatism and [the] terms and techniques of phenomenology (120)" to "overcome both -- each by the other (xx)," and later Leibniz's "universal science" and Dewey's "instrumentalism," uniting epistemology and ontology, realism and idealism, to creatively "synthesize" his thoughts on the three "dimensions" of life: philosophical, historical, and sociological. But, Ortega did not present his position in a systematic manner, for various reasons, and it has taken much time, patience and skill on the part of Graham, as his research clearly reveals, to bring together -- sometimes by "reconstructing" promised but never completed studies by Ortega -- the various writings on each of these three "dimensions" for a total of 1334 pages, with ample notes for the reader to retrace his research and suggestions for further research.

Graham's preface, "Towards Synthesis: Ortega's 'System' of Life in Three Dimensions." provides a valuable overview. Its brief section on "From Pragmatism to Postmodernism," will be of special interest to the SAAP membership, asserting as it does that "[p]ragmatism (now) helps us integrate Ortega's thought as a whole, social as well as philosophical and historical-- and postmodern too (xix)." However, according to Graham, "Ortega was clearly no imitative 'epigone' of James or of his successors in philosophy, theory of history or sociology. Nevertheless, there are interesting connections or parallels in Ortega's
social theory to Pierce, Dewey, Cooley and Mead [and Morris] (xxi)."

The volume consists of nine chapters, each devoted to a separate topic and the major work(s) that deals with it, although as one would suspect, there is overlapping and interrelating between the topics and chapters. "All of his writings examined in this third volume are oriented to 'future' [social] reforms of thinking, institutions, and culture, which though admittedly 'utopian' [with roots in James], so often resemble what are now called structuralist postmodernist, or poststructuralist works (l)." The topics of the first two chapters are (1) the information crisis (even in the early twentieth century, with the basic questions of "What are books?" and "What is reading?") utilizing Ortega's Mission of the Librarian, (2) and his "new philology" or "new linguistics" (with hermeneutics and historiography), as seen in various publications, especially in the last two sections of Man and People and in The Idea of Principle in Leibnitz. For Ortega, language is the paradigm of the social.

The chapters that follow are on: (3) "sociology" (mostly from Ortega's posthumous Man and People); (4) metaphilosophy and theory, or toward a social unity in the humanities and sciences (from Leibnitz); (5) "new history" of colonial life, gender, and women (from La Criolla, or The Creole Woman, not translated into English); (6) politics (from the Revolt of the Masses, Ortega's best known, but much misinterpreted, publication); (7) art and culture (from The Dehumanization of Art); (8) education (from Mission of the University); and (9) lastly religion (from Ideas y creencias, or Ideas and Beliefs, also not translated). I shall treat briefly only those topics which are of the greatest interest to me (although as a student of Ortega for over forty years, after having been a student of Dewey for the previous ten years, including writing a doctoral dissertation on Dewey, I have some interest in all the topics).

Graham rightly points out that "in a sense this whole volume" is on Man and People since each topic has a societal foundation (98). He acknowledges that "[it] has taken the many of us who study Ortega a long collective effort to get to where a comprehensive 'reading' of Man and People is now possible (99)." This is because the book, which was to have completed and integrated Ortega's "system" of thought, has come to us incomplete. (For two main reasons: Ortega's private Institute of Humanities in Madrid was closed by the Franco government before he could complete the lecture series on which the book is based; and Ortega died before he could prepare the lectures for publication.) Nevertheless, the book is indispensable for understanding Ortega's philosophy of life. (After reading
and rereading *Man and People* for more than twenty years, as one of four books in a course I offered on "Person and Society," I can say that no work has had a greater influence on my own personal thinking.) In it Ortega "reduces" social acts to their root, human life as the "radical reality" given in our experience. What I would have emphasized more strongly than does Graham is Ortega's assertion that "the social" will never be understood clearly if it is contrasted to "the individual"; rather it becomes transparent only when viewed in contrast to "inter-individual" actions (that are fully human because they are not performed under pressure from society).

One of the brightest spots in Ortega's work is his early advocacy (1939) of a new "women's history," apparently occasioned by his trips to Argentina and admiration for the women there (above all for the writer Victoria Ocampo). Despite the fact that Ortega meant to be "both chivalrous and realistic," he comes across in *La criolla* as a European who is condescending and patronizing. Nevertheless, he appreciated intelligent women and, as Graham observes (252), Ortega would have sincerely supported women's rights. If I read Graham correctly, I disagree that "the last and one of the better things he ever did on 'the second sex' is to be found in *Man and People.* Leaving aside Ortega's remarks on Simone de Beauvoir's book by that name (which I cannot believe he read in its entirety), what can one conclude about the position of a man who stated: "In the presence of a woman we men immediately divine a creature who on the level of 'humanness' has a vital station somewhat lower than ours. No being has this twofold condition -- being human, and being less so than a man is (131-132 of the Norton edition of *Man and People*)"?

You can well imagine how this went over in my Women's Studies section of "Person and Society." But, it gave me the opportunity to point out how Ortega was inconsistent with his own general principle: "the duality of the sexes has as its consequence that men and women are constituted by their reference to one another (133, Norton edition)." This inconsistency has always bothered me, especially since his disciple Julián Marias in his *Metaphysical Anthropology* (English edition, 1971) concluded from the same principle that man and woman, woman and man, are complementary. When I pressed Professor Marias on this, while interviewing him for my Twayne volume on him, he admitted that he too found an inconsistency. Professor Marias said he could not convince Ortega, who finally said their different conclusions must be due to a "generational" difference. And, that is precisely the point. In a book that aides us in discerning how society pressures us into misinterpreting experience, Ortega failed to detect his own
misinterpretation of women. This, despite his statement: "What we call 'woman' is not a product of nature but an invention of history. . . (134, Norton edition)".

Finally, a word about Graham's last chapter, utilizing Ortega's still untranslated Ideas y creencias. It is to Graham's credit that he addresses himself to what he calls Ortega's "sociology of religion," as this area is almost always ignored. Although Ortega early (c. 1898) distanced himself from the cultural Catholicism of his upbringing, he was not anti-clerical or anti-Catholic or atheistic. At times Ortega exhibited an interest in the phenomenon of religion as a social usage, and seems to have been tolerant toward all religions, an attitude that Graham attributes to the influence of James. Ortega was always against those who used religion as a club, not in their zeal for truth but in their lust for power and domination, making it clear that he objected less to Spanish Catholicism than to Spanish Catholicism (465). (This attitude has enabled Ciriaco Morón Arroyo to outline in Spanish a Catholic theology based on Ortega's philosophy, and Julian Marías—a lifelong practicing Catholic—to base his various writings on Christianity on his mentor's philosophy, the latest of which has recently appeared in English as The Christian Perspective through Halycon Press.)

It is to Graham's merit that this volume is permeated by a hope that Ortega's variant of post modernism can still appeal to younger readers, and that Ortega's theory of education, with its social-cultural emphasis, can help bring about a better future for liberal democracies (219, 393). For many decades to come this three volume study by Graham will be among those very few worldwide works that must be consulted by anyone doing serious study and research on Ortega.

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The recent publication of Josiah Royce's, The Sources of Religious Insight, is a welcome addition to the relatively meager number of texts focused explicitly on questions of religion and spirituality from within the framework of Classical American philosophy. The book offers an apologetetic for pursuing religious questions, for believing there to be a supernatural reality that is just