socially-situated and created, both “developed by and developing of community itself” (pg 48). This pragmatic concept of the self is used to re-conceive the physician-patient encounter and relationship, as well as its end goal—“living healthily” by promoting a process/community of shared meaning and action for all individuals involved in medical encounters. As Hester notes, “Through the inclusion of individual desires and a striving for mutual satisfaction of multiple desires, medical encounters become vehicles for communal participation by both health care professionals and patients engaged in the mutual attainment of common ends in and through living healthily” (pg. 80). Rather than a simple promotion of autonomy to make space for individual choices (which Hester believes is of limited use, and has little positive function other than the often pro forma role of informed consent), Hester’s position requires the promotion of active patient agency, the ability to act meaningfully, by participating in the “community as healing.”

My only critique would have to be the lack of practical recommendations to enable the “community as healing.” While it is true that each medical encounter and relationship is different, and it is in the working specifics, the narrative of the actors, that the real work is to be done, I wish Hester had more concrete suggestions for the current health care professional than a change in orientation in approaching the medical encounter. He does state that the most important place to begin this work is in medical school, by training future physicians to value and work with the “human condition” and not just with the natural sciences. I would agree, yet still wish for more. Hester concludes, in part, that, “[t]his book itself will not be complete until it can bear fruit beyond its own arguments and examples” (pg 84). Perhaps the “more” I am looking for is the challenge of the book to all of its readers.

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Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1998. xix plus 516 pp. 51 EUR.
The subject matter of Hingst's *Perspectivalism and Pragmatism* is best described by the book's subtitle, "A Comparison on the Basis of Nietzsche's and James' Conceptions of Truth and Philosophies of Religion." The text, which is based on the author's 1996 doctoral dissertation at the University of Hamburg, constitutes a detailed and exceedingly thorough comparison/contrast of Nietzsche and James on truth and religion. The work is remarkable for its Teutonic *Gründlichkeit*: Hingst documents his study with well over 3000 footnotes. In addition to giving a comprehensive view of Nietzsche's and James' published work, he includes references to manuscripts, notes, and correspondence. An entire chapter is devoted to an analysis of Nietzsche's *rapprochement* to the pragmatic point of view in the notes he compiled during his last decade of intellectual activity. The author also displays an impressive acquaintance with the relevant secondary sources on his subject, and in several instances he provides careful consideration of competing interpretations in the secondary literature. In short, the whole book is characterized by painstaking commitment to the highest standards of scholarship, and will undoubtedly be of value to anyone interested in the topic.

Hingst's text is well organized and follows an outline form. The book's four major sections—a division each on Nietzsche's perspectivalism and James' pragmatism, a comparison of the two philosophies, and the aforementioned analysis of Nietzsche's *Nachlaß*—can be read together or independently. Despite the technical nature of his subject, Hingst's German prose is clear and quite readable.

As the book's title suggests, the author argues that Nietzsche's metaphysical and epistemological commitments constitute a type of perspectivalism that can be clearly distinguished from James' version of pragmatism. After carefully documenting the various pragmatic insights in Nietzsche's work, Hingst qualifies the great German philosopher as a "descriptive pragmatist." While Nietzsche accurately described the pragmatic conception of truth in human thought and behavior, he could never bring himself to pragmatically reconstruct his own standard of truth. Instead of making a "Pragmatic Turn," he was content to point out the instrumental nature and practical value of human beliefs—with the reservation that the philosophically
astute will not be fooled into taking such “truths” at face value, but recognize that they are really falsehoods. Although Nietzsche held that genuine—that is, absolute, univocal, and eternal—truth was unattainable by human beings, he nevertheless continued to employ it as a standard by which to measure actual truth claims.

On Hingst’s analysis, the key philosophical differences between Nietzsche and James are due, in large, to differences in temperament. At least in principle, both thinkers would have been receptive to such an interpretation, since both held that personal psychology plays an important role in the adoption of philosophical views. The author argues that Nietzsche was prevented from fully developing his pragmatic insights by an underlying romanticism and attraction for the extreme. These unconscious or subconscious tendencies left him blind to the exaggerated nature of his own philosophical standards. Concludes Hingst, “Nietzsche wanted more than is possible, that is, he wanted too much. Perhaps in this respect Nietzsche is very German.” (p. 363; reviewer’s translation). The author points out that although James’ thought also contains a romantic element, it is tempered by a sober acceptance of human limitations.

Hingst traces the differences in Nietzsche’s and James’ views on religion to their divergent views about truth. Because Nietzsche resists identifying truth with satisfactory results (however the word “satisfactory” be construed), he tends to see religious belief as a lack of intellectual honesty, regardless of whatever benefits faith may bestow upon the faithful. Religion, so Nietzsche, is for the weak of spirit. On the other hand, James, who holds that the consequences of a belief are constitutive of said belief’s truth value, generally regards religious faith as a resource or strength. James’ pragmatism allows him to conceive of a possibility not available to Nietzsche: namely, that of an individual who unites both intellectually honesty and religiosity.

In a concluding set of observations, Hingst notes that one would do Nietzsche an injustice to consider him as a pragmatist manqué (“als einen verhinderten Pragmatisten,” p. 475). If he merely means by this that Nietzsche’s thought is more than simply an ultimately unsuccessful approach to pragmatism, he is of course quite right. His statement, however, seems to overlook the
possibility that one could view Nietzsche as a sort of failed pragmatist without losing sight of his other contributions. And there is much in Hingst’s own analysis that suggests such an interpretation—cited in the final example, in an earlier footnote (#142, p. 348) the author asserts that Nietzsche’s pragmatism was “incompletely carried out” (“unvollständig durchgeführt”).

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As I try to think of the best way to characterize Bruce Wilshire’s new book, *Fashionable Nihilism: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy,* I keep returning to a question, perhaps the question, that John J. McDermott asks in his classroom lectures, “What is it that I am in on?” The point is that nearly everything hinges on how we evaluate, overlap and live through the various cosmologies (physical, metaphysical, cultural, political, professional and so on) that we construct in response to this question. I take the nine essays which comprise this volume to be windows into Wilshire’s own inquiry that takes as its subject the world of academic philosophy in contemporary America. They allow the reader access to the way in which a philosophical pluralist comes to terms with his professional culture that is anything but pluralistic.

Let me be clear, *Fashionable Nihilism* is not the sort of book you would hand to your analytic colleagues and say, “There, go and read this! At last, thanks to Bruce Wilshire, you will see the error of your ways!” Despite the book’s subtitle, *A Critique of Analytic Philosophy,* Wilshire’s work is not a straightforward critique of analytic philosophy so much as it is an indictment of the culture which maintains and is maintained by analytic philosophy. In short, do not expect a sustained, point-by-point engagement with the presuppositions and methodologies mobilized by analytic philosophy. Rather, Wilshire begins his chapter “The Nihilistic Consequences of Analytic Philosophy” by ostensively defining “the analytic habit of mind.” He points to a graduate student from Princeton who, when asked in a job interview if he would ever consider