The Essential Dewey promises that Dewey's radical ideas will continue to challenge new readers in the 21st Century. What is missing from The Essential Dewey, however, are some interpretive essays by the editors. As students of American philosophy know all too well, Dewey's thoughts do not usually attract philosophers from the analytical tradition since they fail to see Dewey's radical departure from dualistic theorizing. To avoid the over-simplification of his ideas by uninformed readers, as occurred earlier with his educational philosophy, it is necessary to provide a larger context of interpretation.

Finally, while it is merely a personal observation, the editors' judgment of what is essential to understand Dewey seems not to be located in his writings on art and aesthetics, but in his thought on logic, technology, and philosophy proper. Dewey's philosophy is about the nature of experience that always reflects the dynamic relationship between resistance, tension and the movement towards "an inclusive and fulfilling close". In my view, those who fail to see the aesthetical nature of Dewey's life work also fail to see the essential Dewey.

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Terry Hoy argues that Aristotle's naturalism, David Hume's theory of natural sentiments, John Dewey's naturalistic humanism, evolutionary biology, and deep ecology can be understood as compatible components that together form the basis for a naturalistic political theory. Hoy believes continuity exists between the positions, an "integrative perspective" made explicit by Dewey's naturalistic humanism (117). Relying on Hans Gadamer's logic of hermeneutical interpretation, Hoy argues that a Aristotelian framework which links ethics and scientific naturalism captures the connections between, for example, the natural historical development of a community and the concurrent development of individual members' philas, or senses of community. In a discussion of Hume's notion of natural sentiments, Hoy argues Hume was laying the groundwork for a form of biological-cultural political framework that would find full expression in the work of Dewey. The shift from Hume to the naturalistic humanism of Dewey comes easily as Hoy nicely characterizes how Dewey's belief in the multiple sources of
morality is compatible with and further develops Hume's own dual-sourced morality. After discussing how neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology "reinforces the continuity from Aristotle through Hume to Dewey" with its consideration of how human capacities might be a result of biological-cultural interactions, Hoy's naturalistic political theory thesis begins to suffer from a number of stresses (xv).

Although relegated to Hoy's treatment of deep ecology, these stresses are significant because Hoy believes deep ecology provides a framework for sustaining a naturalistic political theory. These stress points result from a mischaracterization of deep ecology that itself results from a highly selective and limited reading of the environmental ethical literature on the subject. At the end of his chapter on evolutionary biology, Hoy paraphrases R.C. Lewontin's claim that, "A rational environmental movement ...must abandon the unfounded commitment to a harmonious and balanced world, and turn to the real question of how people want to live and arrange their lives" (86). Hoy takes Lewontin's remark as suggestive of a deep ecological approach. This, however, overlooks one of the two founding principles of deep ecology, biospherical egalitarianism. Contrary to Hoy's starting point for deep ecology, deep ecology does advocate harmonious and balanced ethical treatment. This oversight might be attributable to Hoy's omission of Arne Naess, the undisputed founder and intellectual kingpin of deep ecology. While Hoy's inclusion of George Sessions, one of Naess' de facto disciples, may account for this omission, one minimally wonders why Hoy makes no explicit mention of deep ecology's principles. Hoy's grouping of certain individuals under the deep ecology banner is also suspect. Hoy labels Aldo Leopold as a founding figure of deep ecology, itself curious insofar as Leopold's scientific-based management philosophy required periodic unequal treatment of species (i.e., therapeutic hunting) which runs counter to the thesis of biospherical egalitarianism. But he also links Holmes Rolston to deep ecology and to Hume. While Hoy's identification of J. Baird Callicott's approach as Humean is correct, his suggestion that Rolston who is a devout deontological environmental ethicist would endorse leaving environmental and political responsibility to a Humean sentiment-based framework is incorrect. While Rolston has advocated naturalizing environmental ethics, his naturalization is neo-Kantian. Hoy also labels Murray Bookchin's social ecology approach as a "leading exponent of the view that central features of deep ecology can be formulated within an Aristotelian framework" (103). Perhaps, but to substantiate
this claim one would need to reconcile, to some degree, these two famously contrary positions. Perhaps Hoy's mischaracterization of deep ecology does not threaten his overall project. It is, after all, only one of five chapters and therefore may simply be considered the weakest link. Since, though, deep ecology represents part of the framework that brings pragmatic and practical efficacy to the project of developing a naturalistic political theory, without it Hoy's project is only a partial success. In the end, Hoy's linking of disparate positions stands as perhaps the strongest element of his project. Surely, not every reader will agree with how well he was able to establish linkages. Nonetheless, what can be appreciated is the attempt to develop, in a substantive manner, a basis, for a naturalistic political theory.

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At the outset of his work, Larry Hickman clearly states that *Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture* is a further development of the themes, ideas, and arguments he advanced in 1990's *John Dewey's Pragmatic Technology*. Hickman continues his reconstruction of our notion of technology and his reworking of our understanding of its role in philosophy, in culture, and in our lives. In *Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture* these tasks are accomplished not only through the use of the specific context of the writings of John Dewey, but also by means of explorations in the areas of art, education, media, literacy, and debates ranging throughout the philosophy of technology and social-political theory.

Although seven of the book's nine chapters are revisions of previously published essays, *Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture* does not read like an anthology. Rather, it develops, from the opening chapter, a reconstructed notion of technology which is then applied in a variety of contexts not only to further refine Hickman's arguments, but also to show how his (and Dewey's) understanding of technology can be made relevant and helpful to a wide-ranging selection of social, cultural, and political problems.