makes an excellent choice as textbook, and it whets the appetite for the more comprehensive story to be presented in upcoming volumes of Writings. Scholars will appreciate that errata lists for both volumes are posted by PEP at its web site: http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/web/ep/ep.htm. Tables of contents, introductions, extended headnotes, and editorial notes are also available there.

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Don D. Roberts


In this provocative new book, John McCumber blends folk-historiography with philosophical argument to produce a biting critique of the philosophical profession in America since the 1950s. The main thesis of the book is that the dominance of analytic philosophy in America can be directly traced to McCarthyite political pressures. According to McCumber, the threat of McCarthyism imposed on the profession the requirement that philosophical activity “be restricted to investigating the truth of sentences” (163). Hence the dominant philosophical paradigm in America today is relentlessly obsessed with logic, science, and semantics, and resolutely indifferent to broader issues concerning the good life, human solidarity, and politics. Concerns of the latter sort, McCumber contends, were forced out of the profession by McCarthyism. The profession in America has yet to recover from this “hidden protocol” (163) of social disengagement because it has not yet come to terms with its own past. American professional philosophy has been “in the ditch” (the allusion is to Thales) since the 1950s.

This is a bold and intriguing thesis. In making his case, McCumber draws upon a variety of sources including official APA and AAUP documents, personal interviews, and anecdotal accounts. (McCumber’s appeals throughout to Bruce Wilshire’s as yet unpublished manuscript on “The Pluralist Rebellion in the American Philosophical Association” will be of special interest to SAAP members.) As the argument progresses, several disturbing facts of our disciplinary history are brought to light. For example, Philosophy was the discipline hit hardest by McCarthy’s committee: “Philosophers, it seems, were 6 time as likely to be attacked by [McCarthyite] witch-hunters as English professors, and twice as likely as economists . . . no other
discipline except for physics comes close" (26). Furthermore, the APA resolved to not involve itself in the "First great academic freedom case of the McCarthy era" (33), despite the fact that this case involved a professional philosopher (34); the APA officially "assigned responsibility for academic freedom to the AAUP and placed itself above the fray" (35). Data such as these are supplemented with frequent and insightful reflections on the nature and history of philosophy, and figures as diverse as Quine, Hegel, and Foucault are discussed with a view to suggesting a way professional philosophy might recover.

McCumber’s narrative is compelling, and his criticisms of the status quo in professional philosophy in America—especially of the analytic / continental split—are incisive. However, the case for his claim that McCarthyism is responsible for the dominance of the analytic philosophy in America never rises above the level of post hoc ergo propter hoc, and faces many other difficulties. Moreover, McCumber’s recommendation for getting philosophy “out of the ditch,” which is developed in the final chapter of the book, is in need of further elaboration to be a proper prescription. Despite these flaws, *Time in the Ditch* is highly engaging and should be read by anyone with the slightest interest in the philosophical profession. Hopefully, it will incite more discussion among philosophers of the aims, presuppositions, and history of their discipline.

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Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000) is considered by many to have been most the articulate, widely respected and influential advocate of process philosophy, indeed of philosophy proper, of the 20th century. Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884-1953), was a leading Boston School exponent of personalism, or personalistic idealism. These two philosophers maintained an ongoing dialogue that started when Hartshorne, while still a student, wrote a note asking Brightman to speak at a Harvard University Philosophical Club meeting in 1922. And twenty-three years later, after dozens of letters, notes, and postcards, their direct communication concluded with several heated exchanges on