obligations. In addition, to rule out patently strange claims for "map reader rights," a fuller account would help of why community membership is not sufficient for rights.

Second, while some might take exception to her view permitting (indeed, embracing) communal and group rights, she makes a strong case for taking such collectives as rights-holders. However, it is difficult to square these sorts of entities as rights-holders with her assertion that to have rights "presupposes the ability not only to understand what it is to have an entitlement and to respect entitlements, but also to acknowledge the obligation to do so and hold others to be similarly obligated" (p. 153). We certainly need a fuller account of how collectives can understand and respect and acknowledge. In addition (pp. 182-3), she allows dead humans to enjoy operative rights via proxies and newborn humans to enjoy operative rights via their potential to become members in normative and perspectival communities (though neither collective directly meets the above criteria of understanding, respecting, and acknowledging). These, however, are more assertions than arguments, and they demand and deserve fuller treatment.

Finally, Singer's claim that rights-holders "have" generic rights in the sense that they ought to be made universally operative calls for more warrant: why ought they be made universally operative? The traditional views of rights can and do offer a variety of answers: utility, moral agency, human nature, duty, etc. Here, as with the concerns raised above, we await greater explanation and elaboration from Singer.

Despite these concerns, Singer has provided a fine complement to her Operative Rights. More than anyone else, she has focused a pragmatist eye on the nature of rights and has provided the rest of us with both fruitful questions and thoughtful answers.

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In Creatures of Prometheus Gender and the Politics of Technology, Kaufman-Osborn wants to recast the Cartesian subject/object problem of knowledge so that he can assess it as a problem of the relations between things and their makers rather than between things and their thinkers. His intention is to break apart the "Cartesian paradigm" and rework it as an interaction
between artisan and artifact, parallel to mind and body. The story of Prometheus is the unconventional contrivance the author has used to situate the problem's historical dimensions so that the duality of agent and artifact can be argued into a pragmatic whole, understood and useful, in the spirit of Dewey's reconstruction in philosophy. The primary artifacts of Kaufman-Osborn's attention are gendered objects, men and women. They take their meaning from their reciprocal understandings of themselves. The process of their mutual understanding is Kaufman-Osborn's version of Elaine Scarry's "projection" and "reciprocation," a dialectic initiated by the need for an artifact to perform a service, the projection. Once the original need for the service is forgotten, the "artifacts remake agents by releasing potentialities that would remain untapped absent the work done by the fruits of fabrication" through reciprocation. Gender is the artifact of projection and reciprocation.

That the distribution of labor has defined gender through the ages is old news. Likewise, that a more equitable distribution of labor will transform gender sensibilities and definitions has seemed obvious for a long time. Is the intention here to recommend gender equity? No. Kaufman-Osborn's intention is to affirm the ambiguities of things made. "Only when artifacts assume the form of so many puzzles, of so many unsettled things whose meaning is available for renegotiation, only then can we begin to uncover their specifically political import." It is more than body and mind, which interact to create the experience of gender and gendered discourse. Cultural, legal and social forces are powerful agents of the gender artifact. When reciprocity evolves into dependency, society, as collective agent, can become blinded by the artifact of the good. Take, for example, the golden rule and its complications. The author cites, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." But "the good I would do, I do not" when constructed notions of what is good for me become what is good for all of you. Here some suggestive deconstruction of artifacts and their relations to their agents might lead us to a new place, but Kaufman-Osborn demurs to sum up with Prometheus' answer to a chorus of elders who has asked him how "he had causes mortals to cease foreseeing doom: "I placed them in blind hopes."

On the whole what is substantive in this work is not new, but Kaufman-Osborn has had a good time saying it, merging a passion for anxiety mythology, with pragmatic philosophy and gender study. His convoluted mythology is less useful than enjoyable as yarn to knit the work of Elaine Scarry and Judith Butler into the fabric of his own ideas. It will either delight the reader or drive him crazy. Perhaps the author's own precautions to reading the Preface are the best commentary on the whole book. "A preface is a sort of
confessional, a place to reveal matters otherwise private, to say things perhaps left unsaid. Readers who find such disclosures embarrassing are invited to move on. Those given to the pleasures of voyeurism are welcome to remain."

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Diane Villemaire


Using newly discovered Royce family materials, John Clendenning, professor of English at California State University at Northridge, here brings the Josiah and Katharine Royce of his earlier biography into a far more distinct focus. In particular, Royce’s youth in California and his final years with Katherine are wonderfully enriched. The result? Josiah Royce, America’s professor of genuine loyalty and community, finally receive that expert portrayal of his life and philosophy that Americans urgently need and rightly deserve.

In this revised and enlarged work, Clendenning, reveals how sensitive he has grown to the philosophical questions around which Josiah Royce’s life centered. Clendenning has also become increasingly aware of the physical, familial and academic contexts of Royce’s thinking. In sum, this work allows one to enter the world of Royce’s life and thought far more intimately than did his earlier 1985 edition.

Employing new resources, Clendenning has created this substantially revised and enlarged edition. Royce’s family papers were discovered in 1989. After Clendenning and I created an overview of this treasure (see the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 36 [1991]: 131-45; see also Transactions 36 [2000]: 334-38 for Griffin Trottar’s balanced review of Clendenning’s revised volume) he invested the summer of 1996 to do a careful mining of the ore found in these family papers. Clendenning could thus portray far more accurately than previously Josiah’s family relations—especially with his wife, Katharine, and their first-born son, Christopher. Secondly, since 1985 when Clendenning’s Life and Thought of Josiah Royce first appeared, more than a few significant studies have appeared concerning Royce and his milieu. Fortunately, Clendenning not only familiarized himself with these new resources but also deepened his own deftness in locating key points in the philosophical discussion Royce was carrying on.