Royce analyzed the essence/existence issue in terms of interpretation which, in Part I, he used to reconceive his theory that true ideas are "the fulfillment of purposes." He now brought all of these lines of thought together. Essence, which is necessary to establish existence, is itself an interpretation. But the latter is related to a more complete system of ideas, a coherent and complete interpretation that ultimately leads to the idea of absolute being.

If one thinks here that one has found oneself in an old and familiar territory, that would be partly correct. For even "old ideas" receive a new interpretation. Furthermore the sophistication of Royce's learning and reasoning is impressive; consider his use of counterfactuals and possible worlds examples in advance of developments later in our century (cf. pp. 120, 170). No doubt, this is what the editors mean by their words, "new and renewed ideas" were produced in this period (p. x).

Whether or not one is convinced by Royce's arguments, one can't help but be enlightened by them. Besides, I doubt that one should seek only that which convinces, for in a very obvious sense, Royce still at work in this text. He had not finished his tasks. In the end, however one decides the merits of Royce's arguments, the lectures will be a pleasure for Royce's scholars, and a valuable resource to all devoted to critical thought.

Gary Cesarz
Auburn University


For those who have been following Professor Haack's spirited exchanges with the anti-scientific and epistemologically anarchistic arm of the academic Left, this new book is a gem. Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate collects eleven essays--all but one have been published previously--addressing an array of topics at the intersection of epistemology, the philosophy of science, social philosophy, and culture theory in its various manifestations. As many of the articles appeared originally in interdisciplinary forums such as the Partisan Review, Haack's Manifesto is formulated in a style and tone which is accessible to general readers and students. Although there is a considerable degree of repetition from essay to essay, I should think that Haack's book would make a valuable
contribution to "Culture Wars" courses that are increasingly becoming the responsibility of philosophy departments at universities around the country.

The question driving many of the key selections can be stated easily. Now that Kuhn has unmasked the Enlightenment image of science as a uniquely rational and therefore privileged mode of seeing the world, must we resign ourselves to Feyerabendian anarchism, Foucauldian "power," the relativism of unsophisticated sociologists, and the perspectivism radical feminists? Put into Haack's terms, is there a defensible via media between the Old Deferentialist approach to science and the attitude of the New Cynics who claim that since science has "no peculiar epistemic authority and no uniquely rational method," it is therefore "just politics" (92)?

In several of the chapters of her Manifesto, Haack promotes and defends a view according to which science is neither "sacred," as the Old Deferentialists would have it, nor a "confidence trick," as the New Cynics insist (94). Here, Haack furthers the position of her 1993 book, Evidence and Inquiry (Oxford: Blackwell). She rejects the views associated with the New Cynicism on the grounds that they rest upon "shallow rhetoric" and "self-defeating arguments" (94). She departs from the Old Deferentialists insofar as she maintains that the objective epistemic standards of evidence and justification, which operate in science, are not unique to or generated by science itself. The metaphor of a crossword puzzle explains the objective standards of evidence, which operate in inquiry. Haack explains:

The clues are the analogous of experimental evidence, already-completed entries the analogue of background information. How reasonable any entry in a crossword is depends upon how well it is supported by the clue and any other already-completed intersecting entries; how reasonable, independently of the entry in question, those other entries are; and how much of the crossword has been completed. An empirical proposition is more or less warranted depending on how well it is supported by experiential evidence and background beliefs; how secure the relevant background beliefs are, independently of the proposition in question; and how much of the relevant evidence the evidence includes. How well evidence supports a proposition depends on how much the addition of the proposition in question improves its explanatory integration. (95)
In this way, scientific inquiry is continuous with other kinds of inquiry. Although not epistemically privileged, science is our most successful and thoroughgoing embodiment of the ideal of rational inquiry; accordingly, Haack sees science "not as privileged, but as distinguished epistemically; as deserving, if you will, respect rather than deference" (94).

This account of science and its success with regard to our objective standards of evidence informs most of the chapters in the book. Haack brings these considerations to bear on questions surrounding feminist epistemologies, multiculturalism, and relativism. Other chapters confront issues such as affirmative action in the academy, the role of metaphor in inquiry, the ethics of philosophical research, and (of course) the muddle of so-called neopragmatism. Members who attended the banquet at the 1995 SAAP meeting at Bentley College will remember with delight Haack's mini-play, "'We pragmatists . . .' Peirce and Rorty in Conversation," which is transcribed in full.

All things considered, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate is an important book. It is indeed refreshing to find a philosopher in the pragmatist (pragmaticist?) tradition addressing the tendencies in contemporary society that are most in need of philosophical clarification in a way that is accessible to a general audience.

Hunter College

Robert Talisse