This is not to say that *The Work of Friendship* does not score rhetorical points against Rorty, but only that the book falls short as an epistemological analysis of public/private. Of course, Rorty himself affirms that there are no solid epistemological grounds for refuting such a distinction, and that discreditation by rhetorical means, in this case, by allusion-based arguments from authority and adversions to the author's own performativity, can be just as valid as standard logical modes of debate. But this text is so overloaded with personal references and philosophical allusions that its basic argument is muffled. Readers will find it too difficulty to sort through the layers of commentary (for instance, Chapter Three analyzes the opening of Bloom's *The Anxiety of Influence* from three different perspectives, a Hegelian one, A Rortyian one, Bartkyan one) to recover the basic point Rothleder poses. One might admire Rothleder's sophisticated knowledge of her sources and believe that they pinpoint problems in Rorty's ethics. But it is unfortunate that Rothleder didn't digest these sources ahead of time and then speak with her own voice with a clear, focused analysis of Rorty's ideas, one that worked upon concepts, distinctions, and inferences, not upon names, "I" usages, and accidental transitions.

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This book has been a long time in the making. *Metaphysics* is the edited text of Josiah Royce's lectures in Philosophy 9, a two-semester seminar he taught at Harvard for over two decades. Roughly eighty-two years passed since Royce spoke his last words of these lectures until they passed from the hands of three editors and went to press. The final product, though, more than compensates for the wait. What we have here are some of the last fruits of Royce's genius. The final lecture of the course was delivered on May 27; Royce died on September 14, 1916.

The editors deserve profound thanks for their labors, collecting relevant material and three times redrafting the lectures to put them into book form. The work was begun by
William Ernst Hocking who supplemented the stenographic record of Ralph Brown with notes taken by Byron Underwood. Final editing was undertaken in the early 1990s by Richard Hocking and Frank Oppenheim who produced two more critical drafts before publishing the present book. The text is enhanced by the following supplements: Frank Oppenheim's "High Points in Josiah Royce's Intellectual Development" and "Provenance of the Phil. 9 Course and Present Text of Royce's Lectures on Metaphysics, 1915-1916;" Richard Hocking's analytical table of chapters; and excerpts from William E. Hocking's "The Ontological Argument in Royce and Others."

Royce's *Metaphysics* appeals to readers on at least three levels. One is of Royce as teacher: "History has fortunately saved this lively classroom record of Royce caught in the act of teaching," as the editors put it (xi). Another is that of a critical examination of developments in metaphysics first fifteen years of the present century. The third is that of an interpretation of his earlier works that shows the viability of his idealism in having anticipated and answered many of the criticisms raised by the New Realism. He often cited his earlier books, sometimes to apply, defend or reinterpret earlier ideas (cf. pp. 218f and 257f), sometimes to criticize them (p. 23). But it would be mistaken to suppose that that Royce simply taught Royce. Not at all. He rethought the material, developed new ideas, and up-dated the course each time he taught it with ideas from the recent works of others. In 1915-16, these included James, Bergson, Perry, Russell, Santayana, Dewey, Whitehead and others whose views he critically interpreted and sometimes incorporated into his own thought.

This is true especially with respect to Peirce's work in logic and semiotic the impact of which Royce made plain in *Problem of Christianity* and now sought to extend to his metaphysics. The structure of the course suggests how Royce intended to adjust his statement of absolute idealism to assimilate Peirce's community of interpretation; Royce began with the social approach to metaphysics and followed up with logical approach. The content of his lectures supports this claim, but it also shows that he had no intention to subordinate the former to the latter. In Part I of the text, Royce presented the social approach in which he introduced Peirce's triadic schema of interpretation (pp. 24-30), argued for the existence of a community of selves as necessary for interpretation (p.45), and included a measure of Peirce's fallibilism (pp. 43, 47-49). These themes Royce developed into social theories of knowledge.
and truth in which three ideas stand out as deserving special comment: the temporal dimension of interpretation, the role of "crucial tests" and the denial of Perry's "egocentric predicament."

Royce held that perception and conception, though essential, do not exhaust the "modes of knowledge" (p. 41). There is a third, relational mode, interpretation, a process of comparison and contrast that is inherently temporal and social in character. Given the discreteness of perception and the abstractness of conception, neither mode in itself provides the conditions necessary for knowledge, as does interpretation. To recognize perception as distinct from conception is itself an example of an act of interpretation.

Interpretation is a threefold process involving that which is interpreted, an interpreter, and one to whom interpretation is addressed (p.45). As such, it is temporal (1) it involves alternating among different aspects of what is being considered and (2) any interpretation is but one possible way of taking what is being compared/contrasted. Choosing a specific interpretation (for its truth or likelihood) requires that it be tested against the past and future experience of the interpreter and against the experience of the others to whom one is addressing the interpretation. In some cases, "crucial tests" determine whether an interpretation is either verified or conclusively falsified (pp. 43, 52-53). On such a view, interpretation is always open to correction (p 47). Royce thus held that interpretation is a mode of knowledge that always calls the individual beyond any particular moment or experience, and towards others in the community. Conceptions of reality framed in this ways, Royce concluded, are logocentric, not egocentric. It is the interpreter among a community of interpreters who establish a public, increasingly coherent interpretation that is primary. Thus there is no egocentric predicament.

Part II of the text is devoted to the logical approach to metaphysics. Here we meet familiar themes of Royce idealism modified to incorporate the ideas introduced in Part I. We find here his characteristic analyses of mysticism, empiricism and realism (re-worked to apply to the thought of Santayana and Russell), and his teleological theory of the truth of ideas being "the fulfillment of ideal purposes" now extended in scope to include interpretation. But by far, the most interesting issues discussed are the relational form of ontological argument
and identity.

Royce accepted the common distinctions between essence and existence, universal and particular, and concepts and experience. Royce also accepted the criticism that the existence of a specific individual cannot be derived a priori from the concept of its essence. But he rejected the assumption of many realists (referencing Santayana and Russell) than the essence/existence distinction is so hard and fast that there is no relation between the two (p. 116), and that the existence of an individual can only be determined by “experience or evidence” (p. 120). Rather, he held that experience alone cannot establish an individual's existence that only any appeal to evidence is tantamount to appealing to essences. Royce argued and illustrated that existence is quite commonly inferred from essence especially in cases identity, recognition, causality, and temporal relations. In cases of individual identities, experience without reference to essence no more no more establishes an existent individual than it acquaints us with bare existence as such. For example, to recognize one's brother requires not only that some particular be present in immediate experience, but also that whatever is present answer to a set of essential characteristics, or evidence in virtue of which the individual's identity is established and without which, on experience alone, no existential claim could be justified. A similar conclusion is drawn from a causal example: From such evidence as tracks in the snow, one infers that a particular cat of a specific weight, size, etc. made the tracks; thus one infers an existential judgment from essential characteristics.

Royce further supported his position with analyses of other causal and spatio-temporal relations the subtleties of which I cannot do justice to in the space remaining. Suffice it to say that each argument and example Royce used was used to show how different angles on the essence/existence issue and that however we approach it, experience alone is insufficient to justify existential claims. Thus, Royce concluded, existence and essence are necessarily related.

It might be argued, of course, that this only shows that essence is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish the existence of an individual. But the classical ontological argument is supposed to prove that at least in one case essence is sufficient to establish its existence.

But Royce did not leave matters there. In Chapters 8 and 9
Royce analyzed the essence/existence issue in terms of interpretation which, in Part I, he used to reconceive his theory that true ideas are "the fulfillment of purposes." He now brought all of these lines of thought together. Essence, which is necessary to establish existence, is itself an interpretation. But the latter is related to a more complete system of ideas, a coherent and complete interpretation that ultimately leads to the idea of absolute being.

If one thinks here that one has found oneself in an old and familiar territory, that would be partly correct. For even "old ideas" receive a new interpretation. Furthermore the sophistication of Royce's learning and reasoning is impressive; consider his use of counterfactuals and possible worlds examples in advance of developments later in our century (cf. pp. 120, 170). No doubt, this is what the editors mean by their words, "new and renewed ideas" were produced in this period (p. x).

Whether or not one is convinced by Royce's arguments, one can't help but be enlightened by them. Besides, I doubt that one should seek only that which convinces, for in a very obvious sense, Royce still at work in this text. He had not finished his tasks. In the end, however one decides the merits of Royce's arguments, the lectures will be a pleasure for Royce's scholars, and a valuable resource to all devoted to critical thought.

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For those who have been following Professor Haack's spirited exchanges with the anti-scientific and epistemologically anarchistic arm of the academic Left, this new book is a gem. Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate collects eleven essays-- all but one have been published previously-- addressing an array of topics at the intersection of epistemology, the philosophy of science, social philosophy, and culture theory in its various manifestations. As many of the articles appeared originally in interdisciplinary forums such as the Partisan Review, Haack's Manifesto is formulated in a style and tone which is accessible to general readers and students. Although there is a considerable degree of repetition from essay to essay, I should think that Haack's book would make a valuable