the polytemoral form he runs the risk of missing the living
tension that makes Dewey's thought truly coherent.

In response to these two books we may summarize that we
American philosophers are critical thinkers but not yet
self-critical. We are finding an origin in Dewey, even if that
image may be manufactured to some degree, as all origins must.
But the question that remains is if this origin is sufficient
for further philosophy. In the renaissance of Dewey's thought
that followed three decades of Lethean forgetfulness following
his death, can we find an image of a return to the philosophical
tension in Dewey that is sufficient to work our own return?
Boisvert has made a significant step in this direction, although
I think we still haven't captured the "must" that pervades
Dewey's work. Dewey did not work like a philosophical
free-willer and simply choose his tensions. Rather, these
tensions confronted him and determined the need for individual
and social adjustment. The reflective life, for Dewey, cannot be
resisted but it must be described. This response to the "must"
of individual ethical inquiry and political ethics is the
subterranean force that enlivens Dewey's lectures, and it
reveals the need for a better warrant for Boisvert's well-
articulated three part thematic rejection. What is human
absence? What is the opposition that is not a dualistic
opposition, but the felt demand for further development and
self-critical transformation? This is the question that still
confronts us in Dewey's thought.

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Dianne Rothleder. *The Work of Friendship: Rorty, His Critics,
and the Project of Solidarity*. Albany: State University of New
Sciences. Notes, bibliography, index. 163 pp.

Dianne Rothleder's earnest monograph presents itself as a
general assessment of the public/private distinction in Richard
Rorty's ethics and anti-epistemology. *The Work of Friendship*
covers a host of social issues that turn upon this distinction,
including education, gift giving, cruelty, and community. But
the manner and method with which Rothleder addresses her subject
make the book read more like a personal exercise in citation, in
which the author discourses not to substantiate a thesis, but to
amass passages from topical authorities and to display her own
critical currency.

This authorship focus appears initially in Rothleder's rhetorical habit of announcing her interpretative turns and responses. For example, after quoting Rorty on "ironic redescription" (Rorty's preferred means of reform), Rothleder says, "First, I note that the ironist incites not rioting but the adoption of a 'partially neologistic jargon.' Second, I note that because the jargon is only partly neologistic, its revolutionary possibility is limited" (12). The point is simple—that Rorty believes in progress by incremental changes in vocabulary, not by radical upheavals—so why inflate it with the "I note" byword? Why insert, in other cases, phrases like "Now I will cite. . ., " What I would advocate is . . .," "My notion of . . .," and "What I think is . . ."? The self-references add no content to the sentence, but have only a performative function, namely, to spotlight the critic herself. Sometimes they signal Rothleder's intentions (as in the chapter openings); other times they register her impressions to cited passages (e.g. "What I find striking in this passage is . . ." (127)); a few times they publicize details of her private life (ix, 108). In every case, the removal of herself from the prose would entail no loss of substance, but it would diminish the text's rhetorical purpose, which is the appreciation of the critic's act of reading.

These specimens of self-involvement are stylistic features of the presentation, operating on the sentence level. When Rothleder graduates to more thematic aspects of her dismantling of Rorty, a paradoxical reversal takes place. While her sentences insistently refer to the flow of her argument and the evidence she adduces come almost entirely through others, Rothleder develops her points by invoking another's text, adopting another's perspective, wielding another's critique. She refutes not by counterargument, but by countercitation. Her method is to start a chapter by paraphrasing a Rortyan position, adding a few critical rations, but then proffering a series of more or less related assertions by rival philosophers. Chapter Two first contains nine pages summarizing Rorty on cruelty, but then concludes with sixteen pages of material from Derrida, Artaud, Nancy Fraser, Wittgenstein, and Vivian Paley. Chapter Four sandwiches a discussion of Rorty on care with expositions of Harold Bloom, Hegel, Sandra Lee Bartky, Derrida, Foucault, Habermas, Lyotard, and John McCumber. In the final chapter, Rothleder selects a phrase from Paley, and then promises, "I will read this phrase through the works of Luce Irigaray, Jacques Derrida, Aristotle, Herbert Kohl, Jean-François Lyotard,
and once again, Rorty himself)" (107). The personal reference gives away to a derivative commentary, an assemblage of statements that putatively executes Rothleder's basis purpose, to discredit Rorty's public/private distinction.

One problem with this mode of criticism is that it does not follow a determinative line of analysis. The sequence of citations too often flows casually, as when Rothleder effect transitions with phrases such as "At this point, we might consider . . .," "Given such and such, it will be worthwhile to recall . . .," or "Here, it would seem, is a good place to look briefly at. . . ." Shifts from Derrida to Aristotle (122) become creative ones, not logical ones, leaving readers to judge Work of Friendship not as more or less true, but as more or less interesting. Rothleder disputes Rorty's ideas not by exploding them, but by comparing them unfavorably to others' ideas. On those occasions when Rothleder does analyze Rorty's notions on her own, she argues not be deducing their material implications or conceptual problems, but by envisioning their unpleasant political potentialities. Here is how Rothleder rejects Rorty's focus on pain solidarity:

Because Rorty would have us make judgments about the validity of pain claims, he privileges pain over other potentially more intersubjective experiences. What seems to result is a parading of pain--not unlike what is on daytime television talk shows--in an attempt to elicit sympathy. If each pain and pained subject must stand for judgment, then we end with pain as spectacle (television shows and talk shows), boredom over other people's pain (disaster burnout), and a ratcheting up of intensity to combat the boredom (talk shows leading eventually to a murder). (2)

Rorty's choice of pain becomes a "privileging" of pain at the expense of other experiences. Next we have a seeming result, the "parading of pain." On this apparently inevitable outcome, Rothleder builds a conditional statement--"If each pain. . ., then we end up with. . . ." that terminates in social catastrophe. Rothleder presents this outcome as a determinate succession, but there is no reason to believe that empathy necessarily ends up objectifying pain as a spectacle and yields talk show exploitations and murder. One could defend Rorty by saying that the parading of pain is non-empathy, that Rorty's injunction that we be sensitive to others' pain is precisely what prevents the ethical decline Rothleder forecasts.
This is not to say that *The Work of Friendship* does not score rhetorical points against Rorty, but only that the book falls short as an epistemological analysis of public/private. Of course, Rorty himself affirms that there are no solid epistemological grounds for refuting such a distinction, and that discreditation by rhetorical means, in this case, by allusion-based arguments from authority and adversions to the author's own performativity, can be just as valid as standard logical modes of debate. But this text is so overloaded with personal references and philosophical allusions that its basic argument is muffled. Readers will find it too difficulty to sort through the layers of commentary (for instance, Chapter Three analyzes the opening of Bloom's *The Anxiety of Influence* from three different perspectives, a Hegelian one, A Rortyian one, Bartkyan one) to recover the basic point Rothleder poses. One might admire Rothleder's sophisticated knowledge of her sources and believe that they pinpoint problems in Rorty's ethics. But it is unfortunate that Rothleder didn't digest these sources ahead of time and then speak with her own voice with a clear, focused analysis of Rorty's ideas, one that worked upon concepts, distinctions, and inferences, not upon names, "I" usages, and accidental transitions.

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This book has been a long time in the making. *Metaphysics* is the edited text of Josiah Royce's lectures in Philosophy 9, a two-semester seminar he taught at Harvard for over two decades. Roughly eighty-two years passed since Royce spoke his last words of these lectures until they passed from the hands of three editors and went to press. The final product, though, more than compensates for the wait. What we have here are some of the last fruits of Royce's genius. The final lecture of the course was delivered on May 27; Royce died on September 14, 1916.

The editors deserve profound thanks for their labors, collecting relevant material and three times redrafting the lectures to put them into book form. The work was begun by