conservative, since he is at least somewhat critical of almost all modern trends of thought beginning with the Renaissance (1558) and not excluding pragmatism (113-4). What ties together all these problems of modernity for him is their egotism, their sense that either the universe revolves around human beings (old egotism) or human beings construct their own universe (new egotism) (88, 90, 179).

It often happens that the first and last stages of a process of development resemble one another more than either resembles the middle one, thus the postmodern may resemble the premodern, but it is still an odd sort of postmodernist who sometimes seems to imply we might have been better off if we had stuck with St. Thomas Aquinas. A correspondence theory of truth also seems much at variance with postmodernism: "An opinion is true if what it is talking about is constituted as the opinion asserts it to be constituted."(110)

But there are tantalizing hints that his opposition to one modern ism may be just a wee bit less complete than is generally believed. I mean romanticism. There was a romantic strain in him, at least in terms of being rooted in a time and place and blooming where one is planted: "When a way of thinking is deeply rooted in the soil, and embodies the instincts or even the characteristic errors of a people, it has a value quite independent of its truth..."(97)

A book's strength is often its weakness. By focusing down on Santayana's works of social criticism of the United States, this book avoids the "scattershot" approach to selection. But it also presents just one facet of a multifaceted thinker. Since Santayana is, alas, regarded as a minor thinker, to whom entire courses are rarely devoted, its narrow focus may rule it out as the one work of his chosen for a survey of American Philosophy course. It may find a home in American Studies.

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John Dewey's legacy for American philosophy continues to
unfold as more of his thought and as more is discovered about the relation of his thought to the wider tradition of reflection and culture in which his ideas were articulated. Two recent books restate each arm of this discovery. *Principles of Instrumental Logic: Dewey's Lectures on Ethics and Political Ethics, 1895-1896*, edited by Donald Koch, reproduces lecture notes from two courses Dewey taught at the University of Chicago, Ethics and Political Ethics. In these brief but packed paragraphs Dewey unveils the framework of his instrumental ethical inquiry and natural psychology. Koch provides a helpful introduction to each set of lecture notes, pointing out main motifs and their later development in Dewey's published texts, such as the Tufts collaboration, *Ethics, and How We Think*. The two lecture courses face the twin practical problems of a) how a theoretical account of ethics is possible that emerges continuously with an analysis of action and the development of the self, and b) how moral inquiry finds its place within the structuring disciplines of Politics and Economics. In this vein Dewey describes the possibility of a social consciousness and its dependence on individuals. "If there is a social consciousness," he says, "it must be found in the individual and not somewhere outside, as in the present day argument on social consciousness" (134). The development in these lectures of individual consciousness and the statics of habit and habit change reflect a similarity to *Experience and Nature* but without the stilted prose.

The second book is Raymond D. Boisvert's *John Dewey: Rethinking Our Time*. This self-proclaimed "little book" is large in scope, containing treatments of Dewey's main themes, Life-World, Thinking, Democracy, The Public, Educating, Making, and Devotion. Boisvert masterfully blends the traditions of Western philosophy and the immediate cultural and philosophical context of Dewey's work with Dewey's ideas. In surprisingly short but satisfying chapters Boisvert illuminates Dewey's thought with secondary sources and concise quotations from his texts. Boisvert's foil is a three-fold negative thesis he poses as the heart of Dewey's criticism of philosophy. Dewey, he claims, resists Galilean Purification, the Plotinian Temptation and the Asomatic Attitude (5). I will discuss the role of this tripartite rejection in describing Dewey's positive philosophical statement below. As a critical tool, however, Boisvert uses this formulation consistently throughout the book giving Dewey's wide-ranging corpus a sense of cohesion. One of the unavoidable failures of this book is that it does not present the richness of the developmental reversals in Dewey's
thought, such as his rejection of Hegel, his personal religious devotion become religious qualification, and his tendency toward metaphysical speculation translated into instrumental descriptions. These developments are not ignored but the full measure of this developmental character of Dewey's thought is subordinated to more discrete formulations of Dewey's published and heralded ideas. In this primer such subordination is essential, even if it is a little misleading.

Both of these books reflect Dewey's critical opposition to any trajectory of ideas that avoid intersection with the practical issues of reflective growth and change. They also reveal Dewey's insatiable urge to respond positively to the human situation. Dewey faces the threat of theoretical abstraction directly in the Ethics courses. The sterility of the dualism of person and principle in Western ethical thinking is Dewey's special target, but hitting this target entails supplying the instrumental backup for the phenomenal character of ethical discipline and reflection. In fact, his most striking ideas respond to the need for ethical theory as a concrete element of developing consciousness. He also maintains that ethical theory cannot be abstracted from the continuum of lived experience and the evaluative analysis of immediately future action. In these lecture courses Dewey sought to discover the logic whereby an ethics that really constrains action by a moving principle is consequently refined and evaluated by that same organism in action.

The outgrowth of this logic is evident in Dewey's for action that produces a difference in education, making, and in politics. Boisvert makes this abundantly clear. In all these venues Dewey repeats his rejection of dualisms in favor of "dissolving them" or "getting behind" them. In Dewey's Ethics course this is possible only after the breakdown of action and a subsequent "new value" which appears as "the complete idea, ... the value is a single idea in the mind" (Koch, 44). The self, which Dewey presents as a drive toward unity but not closure (Koch, 81) responds to tension that is outside the self with a holistic reorganizing of the self in relation to the tension. The inclusion of the tension in the reordering of the self is what Dewey calls the moral aspect, as opposed to the aesthetic and intellectual aspects. Each of these aspects, aesthetic, intellectual and moral, becomes religious when it requires the "whole devotion of the being" (Koch, 59). This devotion depends on the indicative moment of direction beyond the current unity of self and idea, and in the course on Political Ethics
Dewey calls these attained unities "saturation values." These are stable values but not permanent values, and any tendency to make them permanent is a sign of abstracted thought.

This critique becomes a static conception in Dewey's thought and he becomes suspicious of all "saturation values" that do not evince a tension that he can observe and identify. For example, Boisvert accurately describes Dewey's view that traditional religion makes religious experience into a false tension by demanding that the primary conflict is over its historical origin instead of discovering the urgency of all indicative moments within experience. He calls this attitude natural piety, and in his own words describes it as "a conviction that some end should be supreme over conduct" (Boisvert, 143). Dewey's rejection of supernaturalism is curious in light of his own arguments for an atemporal wholeness of the self and this demand for supremacy but points to his principle of rejecting dualisms as the ground of this judgment. Supernaturalism was one among many dualisms that prevented reflective access to the motivating tensions that inspire human life.

This conception of enlivening tension raises the question of Boisvert's tripartite formulation of Dewey's philosophical tension. Are these three principles saturation values or indicative moments? Boisvert tends to use them as saturation values, as values to be absorbed and applied as explanatory devices. Boisvert doesn't puzzle over their origin as indices of the wholeness that Dewey seeks in his aesthetic, intellectual and moral judgment. Boisvert adopts a frame for understanding Dewey that is polytemporal as opposed to pre-or post-modern. "Our quest should be," he says, "to absorb and update what is best from the past, adjust its misplaced emphases, eliminate its errors, and incorporate novel elements needed to address our time" (Boisvert, 158). What Boisvert desires are admirable -- not to historicize novelty, not to dismiss recurring human puzzles and concerns as unreal. But the formulation of this meta-temporality might tend to downplay or evade the temporal pressure of Dewey's developing conception of his own finite individuality bound to particular indicative moments while facing the ascension to or loss of quasi-temporal saturation values. Dewey did not write in response to the asomatic attitude as much as he worried that his ideas not be too abstract to be helpful to people who lived in and through bodies. The same is true of intellectual purification and the tendency toward the philosophical unity. When Boisvert formulates these tensions in
the polytemoral form he runs the risk of missing the living tension that makes Dewey's thought truly coherent.

In response to these two books we may summarize that we American philosophers are critical thinkers but not yet self-critical. We are finding an origin in Dewey, even if that image may be manufactured to some degree, as all origins must. But the question that remains is if this origin is sufficient for further philosophy. In the renaissance of Dewey's thought that followed three decades of Lethean forgetfulness following his death, can we find an image of a return to the philosophical tension in Dewey that is sufficient to work our own return? Boisvert has made a significant step in this direction, although I think we still haven't captured the "must" that pervades Dewey's work. Dewey did not work like a philosophical free-willer and simply choose his tensions. Rather, these tensions confronted him and determined the need for individual and social adjustment. The reflective life, for Dewey, cannot be resisted but it must be described. This response to the "must" of individual ethical inquiry and political ethics is the subterranean force that enlivens Dewey's lectures, and it reveals the need for a better warrant for Boisvert's well-articulated three part thematic rejection. What is human absence? What is the opposition that is not a dualistic opposition, but the felt demand for further development and self-critical transformation? This is the question that still confronts us in Dewey's thought.

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Dianne Rothleder's earnest monograph presents itself as a general assessment of the public/private distinction in Richard Rorty's ethics and anti-epistemology. The Work of Friendship covers a host of social issues that turn upon this distinction, including education, gift giving, cruelty, and community. But the manner and method with which Rothleder addresses her subject make the book read more like a personal exercise in citation, in which the author discourses not to substantiate a thesis, but to amass passages from topical authorities and to display her own