includes a nine point proof for pragmatism. The points are derived cogently from the essays found in this volume, particularly the 1905 Monist essays and those Peirce developed during the subsequent years, but which were unpublished. Taken collectively, then, these pragmatism (and pragmaticism) essays, which build upon the earlier essays in this volume, move toward Peirce’s desired magnum opus of a System of Logic, Considered as Semiotic, which he left incomplete at the time of his death in 1914. In many ways, then. Volume 2 is the Essence of Peirce, not merely the Essential Peirce.

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Stanley M. Harrison provides a comprehensive yet succinct introduction to this new edition of Father Potter’s 1965 doctoral dissertation and, at the same time provides an excellent introductory essay to Peirce’s normative sciences. Potter’s dissertation was published originally by the University of Massachusetts Press but has been out of print for thirty years. Since that time there has been relatively little published on Peirce’s normative theories. This book (and its introduction), along with Potter’s Peirce’s Philosophical Perspectives (1996, Fordham University Press), and books like John K. Sheriff’s Charles Peirce’ Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human Significance (1994, Indiana University Press), go a long way to fill the gap on Peirce’s comprehensive philosophical perspective.

The book is divided into three parts: I. Pragmatism and the Normative Sciences; II. Synechism and Law; and III. Tychism and Evolution. Throughout, Potter presents a unified view of Peirce’s pragmatism, showing how each portion (e.g., synechism, tychism, or evolutionary love) is essential to the whole. He accomplishes this by beginning with the normative sciences, and quotes Peirce, who stated: For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feelings, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something. *(The Essential Peirce*, vol. 2:200see review in this SAAP Newsletter) Since pragmatism is a philosophy of the conduct of life, albeit the process life of a scientist, the end is a crucial component to the reasonableness of any act. The reasonableness of the act requires the understanding of what is reasonable, thus the study of logic. The essence of a reasonable act, however, is an ethical issue not so much studying what action is morally right, but rather, what makes right right. That right, however, presupposes some quality (or qualities), which is a Peircean firstness; therefore, ethics suggests a need for the study of ends which are to embody qualities namely esthetics. Neither Peircean ethics, nor esthetics, are precisely what the larger philosophical community would expect from those terms, but then, neither is his logic. All are more comprehensive, and far more integrated. That integration presupposes a continuity (synechism) and the reality of generals (particularly
as understood as Peirce categories of signsthe law), chance (tychism) and determinism (evolutionary love and the Summum Bonum). If the life of a scientist is to find truth, then, simplistically, there must be a continuity between the essence of the life of the scientist and the subject studied (a pre-Copenhagen subjectivism), and there must be an order or a system that is at once part of the subject studied and part of the mind studying. That system is Peirce's architectonic theory his categories, which define his signs. The unfolding of the categories, and the study itself, are driven by both chance and determinism.

Potter (and Harrisons Introduction) explicates the necessary union of these seemingly disparate thoughts, showing, for example where Peirce moves beyond Scholasticism, or how he differs from James. In a relatively short space. Potter is able to provide a setting for Peirce's thoughts and a rationale for his philosophy. Additionally, Potter shows how ideas that can be found in early Peircean essays come to full fruition in the mature Peirce. This timely reissuing of Potters work becomes a quality companion reader for the recent publication of The Essential Peirce, Volume 2,' which provides a critical edition of many of Peirce's essays explained by Potter. George W. Stickel Cobb County Schools & Georgia Institute of Technology


Robert Roth's Radical Pragmatism: An Alternative adroitly challenges traditional pragmatist readings of topics such as evolution, inquiry, hypothesis formation and religion. He orients his work from an explicitly religious position, and consequently urges pragmatists to resubmit a belief in God to the pragmatic test. He persuasively argues that such a belief not only passes the test, but in fact clarifies aspects of pragmatist theory. While I have some misgivings about Roth's conclusions, I believe that his work offers an important and uniquely spiritual perspective on pragmatism that remains honest to pragmatist inquiry and his Christian faith.

His work rotates around two interrelated arguments. First, he charges that "pragmatists should be more willing than they have been to reflect more deeply, more radically, on consciousness and awareness as internal processes"(157). Pragmatism needs to attend to these issues with greater tenacity, says Roth, because it "has not sufficiently examined the nature of [hypotheses] and the implications they have for describing the human being as a knower and moral agent"(10). He then argues that critical attention to this lacunae in pragmatist theory will open the door for a new consideration of the "spiritualist hypothesis," or the idea that some greater-than-human consciousness -- a force that is both transcendent and immanent -- directs human evolution and hypothesis making. It is this second argument that motivates Roth to call his alternative reading of pragmatism "radical." Roth believes that a careful appraisal of our experience (in