With only five volumes of *The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition* published, representing the years 1857 to 1886, the scholar does not have available critical editions of Peirce's mature thoughts. While the Collected Papers have served the Peircean community well for almost seventy years, the growing international interest in Peirce requires, even mandates, access to Peirce's later works, before the *Chronological Edition* could ever accomplish the task. This second, critical edition volume of the *Essential Peirce* provides the scholar with some of what is needed, by continuing the philosophical theme of the first volume. However, it does leave out the more technical papers on mathematics or logic, some of which can be found in the Collected Papers, or Eisele's New Elements of Mathematics. The papers included in Volume 2 were written between 1893 and 1913 and, with a few exceptions, are manuscripts that Peirce never published during his life. Although many of those manuscripts (or their fragments) can also be found in the Collected Papers, Ketner's edition Reasoning and the Logic of Things, or Turrissi's edition *The 1903 Harvard Lectures*, they are collected here, thematically, to stand as one of the two books any Peircean scholar must necessarily own and quote. It should also be noted that while there are extensive notes (pp. 503-556 and a comprehensive index, pp. 557-584), records of editorial interventions employed in this work are available at [http://www.iupu.edu/~peirce](http://www.iupu.edu/~peirce). The editors explain that another volume is foreseen which would address Peirce's existential graphs, so that those works from this period are not included in this second volume, nor are the following included, because of space: Our Senses as Reasoning Machines, 1900, written for Cosmopolitan; Carnegie Institute application for publication of his memoirs on logic, 1902 (see Eisele's New Elements: Volume 4); A complete representation of his 1898 Cambridge Conference Lectures; or The complete 1903 Lowell Lectures.

What is contained in the volume is a wealth of writing on pragmatism, reasoning, semiotics, and logic, including the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, the 1900 *Monist* publications on pragmatism and pragmaticism, A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (1908), and excerpts from letters on semiotics to Lady Welby (1906-08) and to William James (1909). Crucial essays on synechism, the definitions of signs, the nature of logic, and the conduct of life are found herein. Additionally, the role of reason, clarification on belief from his 1877-78 papers on pragmatism, chance and determinism, and vagueness make this volume required reading for anyone following these topics in the last several volumes of *Writings*. The maturity of Peircean thought during these years is evidenced in these essays, as he moved from nominalism to realism, around the end of 1896, and as he developed comprehensive arguments for pragmatism, in the introduction Houser, in his inimitable way, paints Peirce's intellectual portrait during this period, and
includes a nine point proof for pragmatism. The points are derived cogently from the essays found in this volume, particularly the 1905 Monist essays and those Peirce developed during the subsequent years, but which were unpublished. Taken collectively, then, these pragmatism (and pragmaticism) essays, which build upon the earlier essays in this volume, move toward Peirce's desired magnum opus of a System of Logic, Considered as Semiotic, which he left incomplete at the time of his death in 1914. In many ways, then. Volume 2 is the Essence of Peirce, not merely the Essential Peirce.

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Stanley M. Harrison provides a comprehensive yet succinct introduction to this new edition of Father Potter's 1965 doctoral dissertation and, at the same time provides an excellent introductory essay to Peirce's normative sciences. Potter's dissertation was published originally by the University of Massachusetts Press but has been out of print for thirty years. Since that time there has been relatively little published on Peirce's normative theories. This book (and its introduction), along with Potter's Peirce's Philosophical Perspectives (1996, Fordham University Press), and books like John K. Sheriff's Charles Peirce' Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human Significance (1994, Indiana University Press), go a long way to fill the gap on Peirce's comprehensive philosophical perspective.

The book is divided into three parts: I. Pragmatism and the Normative Sciences; II. Synechism and Law; and III. Tychism and Evolution. Throughout, Potter presents a unified view of Peirce's pragmatism, showing how each portion (e.g., synechism, tychism, or evolutionary love) is essential to the whole. He accomplishes this by beginning with the normative sciences, and quotes Peirce, who stated: For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feelings, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something. (The Essential Peirce, vol. 2:200see review in this SAAP Newsletter) Since pragmatism is a philosophy of the conduct of life, albeit the process life of a scientist, the end is a crucial component to the reasonableness of any act. The reasonableness of the act requires the understanding of what is reasonable, thus the study of logic. The essence of a reasonable act, however, is an ethical issue not so much studying what action is morally right, but rather, what makes right right. That right, however, presupposes some quality (or qualities), which is a Peircean firstness; therefore, ethics suggests a need for the study of ends which are to embody qualities namely esthetics. Neither Peircean ethics, nor esthetics, are precisely what the larger philosophical community would expect from those terms, but then, neither is his logic. All are more comprehensive, and far more integrated. That integration presupposes a continuity (synechism) and the reality of generals (particularly