"community as healing" which moves swiftly away from classical liberal autonomy-based medical ethics, to one sensitive to communally situated selves. Participation, not mere consent, is the primary goal. As Kegley rightly points out, this is no easy task; "the process of interpretation has a strong moral base. It requires the virtues of humility, compassion, patience, hope, prudence, [and] courage (201)."

Taken as a whole, the book is triumph of melding scholastic and practical philosophy, or better yet, using scholarship in the service of contemporary social issues. What strikes me is that Kegley has succeeded in distilling into a chapter the major concerns about AND some solutions for such book-length topics as families, education, and medicine (see such good works as Lomansky's Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community, Wilshire's The Moral Collapse of the University, or Trotter's The Loyal Physician).

However, having recounted a few of the basics from Kegley's writings on contemporary issues, I am aware that I have rarely pinpointed exact allusions to Royce, but be assured that his voice is found throughout. Kegley adequately demonstrates that Royce's philosophy is well-suited to engaging the issues of today. But the real strength of the book is Kegley's use not only of Royce but of feminist, Afro-American, gay/lesbian, psychological, sociological, and literary writings to support her conclusions. Also, Kegley attempts not only to analyze the problems of families, education, and medicine, but to offer practical (if not always fully detailed) suggestions for promoting better models based on Roycean themes of socially situated selves and enlightened communities. In all, then, this is a book worth reading and recommending for anyone interested in the relationship between selves and communities, and how those relationships might better be served through institutions of family, education, and medicine.

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This wonderful collection of Peirce's writings extends the well-it path laid down by its predecessor, The Essential Peirce: vol 1 (EP 1). That first volume highlighted Peirce's achievements chronologically up to 1893; this one does so from 1893 to 1913, a few months before his death the next year. As the executive editor of the Peirce Edition Project working on a projected 30-volume edition of Peirce's work and author of significant Peirce scholarship, Houser is a guiding light to Peirce students novice or seasoned. Here he provides a penetrating introduction, headnotes before each selection, and engaging notes in the appendix. These trace Peirce's intellectual development, provide helpful pointers to complementary Peirce passages, and explicate Peirce's sometimes elusive references to others' works.
The volume deepens longstanding themes of Peirce and introduces new ones. It's suitable for many courses as a required text or as a source for complementary readings. In "Immortality in the Light of Synechism," Peirce defines synechism as "the tendency to regard everything as continuous." (1) This means that "physical and psychical phenomena are [not] distinct, but...some are more mental...others more material."(2) Speaking of a friend who came to feel music more intensely after he became deaf, Peirce argues likewise that "when the carnal consciousness passes away in death, we shall at once perceive that we have had all along a lively spiritual consciousness..." This illustrates how synechism is applicable to both science and religion, and so brings them closer together.

Houser describes Peirce's lifelong warm personal and philosophic relationship with William James. In 1898, Peirce was in dire financial and emotional straits, and James arranged for him to give the Cambridge lectures (two are here). In like circumstances, James repeated the favor in 1903 when he arranged for Peirce to deliver the famous Harvard lectures on Pragmatism (all seven are here). Peirce was deeply moved by James' dedication to Peirce in his 1897 book "The Will to Believe and Other Essays" and, in response to James' emphasis on "our passional nature," became more concerned, Houser writes, with instinct's shaping the hypotheses our reason considers. Late in 1898 after the Cambridge lectures, James ventured to Berkeley, CA, and delivered his famous lectures acknowledging that Peirce originated the pragmatic maxim in the 1870's (see 1878 in EP1) and galvanizing the pragmatic movement. Houser suggests that this in turn refocussed Peirce's attention on finding a proof for pragmatism that would distinguish his conception of it from others. (xxi, xxiv) Peirce attacked this problem on several fronts, which Houser keenly analyzes in his introduction. (xxxiii-xxxvii) An important step lay in Peirce's Harvard lectures in 1903.

James called the lectures "flashes of brilliant light relieved against Cimmerian darkness!" In the first, he restates the maxim of his 1878 paper (which, of course, appars in EP 1): "Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have; then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conceptions of the object." and states that his problem is "to puzzle out" its meaning. Now, the second lecture, "On Phenomenology," flashing frequently, is one of the more accessible essays. Peirce discusses his three universal categories of experience. The First is the awareness of presentness in a color, smell, or other simple sensation. It is a "Quality of Feeling,...what it is regardless of anything else." The Second is "the element of Struggle" or resistance between two objects, as when you force open a door or react to a flash of lightening. The Third is general laws, the living "influence upon external facts" that embraces more than mechanical interaction of bodies according to "the...laws of motion." Peirce offers a provocative example: two kinds of molecules whose physical structures are alike, but that one has a right-handed spiral structure, the other has a left-handed. The first bends light to the right, the second to the left. "No chemical process can transmute one into the other," yet certain living organisms feed on the one "modification,...and...leave the other untouched." Peirce maintains that this physical difference "is absolutely incapable of mechanical explanation." Instead, this
Peirce treats topics that he deems essential to his main theme. Beginning students benefit by concentrating on what interests them. In the "Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents," Peirce analyzes Cantorian infinitudes and ideas of probability. (77) He objects that historical probabilities are too often "merely subjective...expressions of preconceived notions," (114) and distinguishes corollarial from theorematic deduction. The terms only roughly correspond to the terms corollary and theorem. In theorematic deduction, "it is necessary to introduce the definition of something which the thesis...does not contemplate...[and which]...ought to be supported by a proper postulate." (96) Mathematical examples include the introduction of lines, sets (or collections, in Peirce's usage), and numbers. Historical examples include illusions to a particular monument or document. Peirce argues that we should rely on our "deep and primary instinct" to believe historical testimony unless we find reason to the contrary, and that we test historical hypotheses not merely by seeing if other facts are consistent with them, but rather by looking to see whether consequences of the hypotheses are verified or falsified. (114)

Several chapters focus on Peirce's semiotics, or theory of signs. This ultimately grounds the entirety of his thought: Every reality "has the life of a symbol." He classifies signs in several ways. Icons, indices, and symbols differ as to how they represent their objects, what they refer to. Icons reveal a likeness, as a photo; indices a physical connection, as a sound; and symbols a conventional law of linkage, as a word. (5, This piece, "What is a Sign?" is best for beginners.) A second division depends on what category the object represented belongs to, whether possibility, fact, or law. (275) And a third turns on whether the signs themselves are qualities, existing objects, or laws -- which of the three categories they exemplify. (291) Peirce uses these "three trichotomies...[to]...divide signs into Ten Classes..." (294) Finally, the appendix deepens Peirce's semiotics in correspondence with James and Lady Victoria Welby, a semiotics expert in her own right.

In "The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," Peirce is "most enigmatic" (Houser), but a few pages here (446,448-9) will appeal to most undergraduates. Peirce argues that in "musing" upon the idea of God, many come to believe in God. The neglected step would build on this fact or "humble argument" and note that this "latent tendency...is a fundamental ingredient of the soul." Peirce suggests that this is a special application of the pragmatic maxim, but to make this out requires "a strict proof...of the [pragmatic] maxim."

In sum, this book stands tall among Peirce volumes, thick or thin. With its predecessor volume 1, it provides the best representative, and indeed most comprehensive, selection of Peirce's writings at a reasonable cost. Undoubtedly, it will lead many, novice and expert alike to draw sustenance from in Sidney Hook's words quoted by Houser) that "meteoric genius ...[who once] flashed across American skies.".

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