‘naturalized Hegelian Pragmatism’ and in ‘concrete universals’, because for him ‘norms’ are psycho-sociologically active, open-textured and agent guiding, they are composed or organized in constellations and yet are never fully consistent nor fully determinate... Thus norms are permanently mutating and most importantly they are ‘ab avo’ governable and governed (p-293).

This book may serve as the source book for all the students of Contemporary pragmatic trends. Students of American Philosophy may use this book for general reading; yet to enjoy fully, one needs the knowledge of Frederic L. Will’s Pragmatic Philosophy as a prerequisite. I am highly indebted to the very lucid explanation of Will’s philosophy by Kenneth R. Westphal in his ‘Editor’s Introduction’.

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_Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities_, Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley
Vanderbilt University Press, 1997 pp. x + pp. 216 + note, bibliography, and index

‘The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the one which is true.” William James

“The task of future philosophy is to clarify men’s [sic] ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day.” John Dewey

Jacquelyn Kegley’s latest book (albeit a couple of years old now), _Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities_, follows in the tradition of the great American works in philosophy, particularly in service of the idealist philosophy of Josiah Royce. In short, Kegley’s book attempts to sketch out Royce’s philosophical conceptions of selves, communities, and loyalty in order to "apply" or play out the possible consequences of a Roycean analysis on contemporary issues. And to show my cards early, I believe the book to be quite successful, not only in its use of Royce but also in its analysis of issues.

However, for those looking for Royce the Absolute Idealist, you will not easily find him here. Kegley’s use of Royce avoids (whether intentionally or unintentionally) much of his idealistic temperament and deals primarily with his more practical, earth-bound discussions. Her Royce in many ways could be Dewey or Mead, where individuals are social constructs and communities are groups bonded by common goals and experiences (or "loyalties," if you prefer) that feed back into the development of the individuality of their members. In all honesty, it is this Royce that is more tenable to the many naturalists/pragmatists who make up the majority of those who study classical American philosophy. Now, for the idealists, this may be a tragic loss, but it is hard to deny the functionalist/pragmatic elements in Royce. For example, though often contrasted with his colleague William James, it is interesting to note the many similarities
between Royce's chapter "The Human Self" from *The World and the Individual* (series 2) and James's chapter "The Self" from *The Principles of Psychology*. Furthermore, as I have mentioned, the Roycean self, like Mead's, is a "social product" that mediates and interprets relationships in order to develop both stronger bonds and more stable individuals. Oh sure, Royce throws in the Absolute to mitigate fears of chaos that might reign without such an over-arching metaphysics, but Kegley does not, and needs not, appeal to this move in Royce's own philosophy (I would argue that Royce did not have to make such an appeal himself). We do see Royce's idealist stripes more so in chapter 4 where Kegley explains Royce's famous ethical principle of "loyalty to loyalty," but I have long thought that Dewey showed us, in his work *The Public and Its Problems*, that the best parts of Royce's "loyalty" idea can be naturalized, particularly as it pertains to community development. (John J. McDermott has long argued that Dewey owes a great debt to Royce which he never really acknowledged.)

But I am no Royce scholar and am treading on ground that is not all too familiar for me, and if I should continue in this vein, may find a price on my head; so instead, it is best that I devote the rest of my discussion to the second half of Kegley's book (particularly, chpts. 5-7) where she nicely analyzes several current social/ethical issues: family, education, and medicine (closing with a brief summary chapter). As she says, "In dealing with each of these three areas, my focus will be on their function as 'enlightened provinces,' as 'genuine communities,' which can build individuals and communities capable of self-expansion."  

In her chapter on the family (which might have been better titled in the plural "Families"), Kegley, taken from Oppenheim, views families as "original communities," that is, the locus of the formation of individual selves through intimate, caring relationships that begin early in life and have the tendency to remain strong over time. Kegley argues, with the help of sociologists, family therapists and others, that though the institution of "family" is not in crisis, as some have suggested, social policy must adapt itself to a broader and more pluralistic definition of "family." Kegley argues that fundamental to the issues raised around families is the problem of "absolutizing the finite," which occurs often in the guise of stereotypical accounts of family e.g., "Father Knows Best" or "Ozzie and Harriet." These accounts portray a singular image of the family, and the roles played therein, as normative. Instead, Kegley explains that families come in a variety of forms. However, in order for any of these forms to "succeed," she argues, it is useful to see families, like Royce did, as "a necessary 'formative crucible' for creating genuine individuals." In order to foster this form of "genuine community," it is important that families share and build their stories with others, that they recognize that families are a process defined by attitudes of care and commitment. According to Kegley, family process therapy has much to offer in these regards "with its focus on family as an interactive system." Families are ethical relationships; members perform important interpreting and mediating functions for each other that help mitigate conflict and develop shared goals and interests while intimately developing genuine individuals.
The following chapter, 6, focuses on education because "like the institution of the family, [it] shapes the lives of almost every individual and community (129)." and also, analogous to statements about the institution of the family, much has been said about a "crisis" in education. Surely, education today is lacking in many ways, but it is also being asked to do too much. Education cannot take the place of other relationships and communities, though it can certainly help fortify their efforts. Primary to the problems of education is an emphasis on what Kegley calls the cognitive-knowing self. Much of what passes for learning is simple knowledge-gathering, facts-based and "value free." Social and ethical aspect of intelligence and education are ignored. As such, education is incapable of developing genuine community members. Kegley, on the other hand, believes that education, again like family, is fundamentally in process, situated, and ethical. Education must be communal, that is, it must do service to the nature of individuals as communal. In this light, she suggests that education expand the walls of the institution to include professional and other social concerns as part of the educational experience. It should be collaborative and "playful," developing habits that are elastic and open to new possibilities. Again, storytelling is important as a way of situating information and learning within the context of a culture or community. The communities to be developed from this kind of education, a multi-cultural education, must also celebrate diversity, for individuality should never be subsumed by the community but enhanced by it. "The unity it achieves is an 'aesthetic unity,' a unity of diversity (150)." Kegley concludes the chapter by pinpointing a new model of teaching as a necessary to her educational reforms. Showing her sensitivity to the relationship between means and ends, she says, "If classrooms are to become 'genuine communities of learning,' the teaching must itself become communal and community enhancing (152)." Her approach sees teachers as facilitators not simply loci of information. As she intimates, education is like playing jazz where the theme is to be expounded upon through free and flexible improvisation that takes the tonality seriously but playfully. The teacher may be the leader of the band setting the tone and rhythm, but s/he facilitates free play to his/her musicians to explore the theme and create something new from it.

Mirroring the same form as the previous two chapters, Kegley's look into medicine begins by calling forth the many critiques of medicine present in contemporary discussions, criticisms based primarily on the belief that medicine is based on an outdated, Cartesian mind/body dualism which isolates physical bodies from the persons who "posses" them and medical science from healing arts. Kegley proposes "a fruitful model for contemporary medicine by arguing that we view medicine as a 'mediating practice' (162)." Once again, Kegley calls forth such ideas as communal, situated selves, mediation/interpretation, and storytelling/narrative processes to offset the rampant mechanistic, materialistic account of medical practice that has long held sway. "Medicine must become a 'mediating practice,' along with law, politics, and theology. These practices have an obligation to integrate and intersect various levels of human meaning and praxis in order to promote harmony of individuals and communities (188)." The physician's role, then like that of the teacher as a facilitator, interpreter. S/he must attempt to understand the patient narratives in light of the medical realities and engage patients in their own healing processes. This develops, what I have called elsewhere,
"community as healing" which moves swiftly away from classical liberal autonomy-based medical ethics, to one sensitive to communally situated selves. Participation, not mere consent, is the primary goal. As Kegley rightly points out, this is no easy task; "the process of interpretation has a strong moral base. It requires the virtues of humility, compassion, patience, hope, prudence, [and] courage (201)."

Taken as a whole, the book is triumph of melding scholastic and practical philosophy, or better yet, using scholarship in the service of contemporary social issues. What strikes me is that Kegley has succeeded in distilling into a chapter the major concerns about AND some solutions for such book-length topics as families, education, and medicine (see such good works as Lomansky's Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community, Wilshire's The Moral Collapse of the University, or Trotter's The Loyal Physician).

However, having recounted a few of the basics from Kegley's writings on contemporary issues, I am aware that I have rarely pinpointed exact allusions to Royce, but be assured that his voice is found throughout. Kegley adequately demonstrates that Royce's philosophy is well-suited to engaging the issues of today. But the real strength of the book is Kegley's use not only of Royce but of feminist, Afro-American, gay/lesbian, psychological, sociological, and literary writings to support her conclusions. Also, Kegley attempts not only to analyze the problems of families, education, and medicine, but to offer practical (if not always fully detailed) suggestions for promoting better models based on Roycean themes of socially situated selves and enlightened communities. In all, then, this is a book worth reading and recommending for anyone interested in the relationship between selves and communities, and how those relationships might better be served through institutions of family, education, and medicine.

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This wonderful collection of Peirce's writings extends the well-it path laid down by its predecessor, The Essential Peirce: vol 1 (EP 1). That first volume highlighted Peirce's achievements chronologically up to 1893; this one does so from 1893 to 1913, a few months before his death the next year. As the executive editor of the Peirce Edition Project working on a projected 30-volume edition of Peirce's work and author of significant Peirce scholarship, Houser is a guiding light to Peirce students novice or seasoned. Here he provides a penetrating introduction, headnotes before each selection, and engaging notes in the appendix. These trace Peirce's intellectual development, provide helpful pointers to complementary Peirce passages, and explicate Peirce's sometimes elusive references to others' works.