all" (p. 107). Lachs does not agree with those who argue that dread of the process of dying or what lies beyond is worse than the fact that "we will not be able to continue with our projects" (p. 107). "The sense that we have only so many more days, even though we don't know how many, is particularly worrying." (p. 108). He does not believe in waiting for death all through one's life. "Waiting for death is a losing proposition: those who expect to die are disappointed day after day and, when their expectation is at last fulfilled, they are not likely to have a chance to enjoy it" (p. 109). The very transitoriness of things is what gives them their value. "We love variety and structure and bite-size realities: nothing is special without context and limit" (p. 109). Lachs believes that "to live an entire life in accordance with its seasons may be difficult, but there is no goal more worth pursuing" (p. 114). He does not think that death is unnatural or an indignity which needs to be denied or rebelled against. "Facing the facts is no indignity; if we were dealt cards for poker, we cannot switch games to play chess" (pp. 115-16). Finally, for Lachs, there is such a thing as a good death, "if things fall out right" (p. 122). This does not mean that we should simply accept death. Rather, "we must fight until near death but, in the end, surrender ourselves in a moment of grace. If nothing else, we can cheat death by going in peace" (p. 122). As Lachs himself knows all too well, however, no bell goes off to indicate just when death has become too near to be responded to by struggle. In his final analysis of the issue however, acceptance seems to win over personal rebellion. As he puts it, "the continuity of our lives and our personalities makes the death of any one individual an event of little moment: the great celebration of existence goes on" (p. 123).

In sum, John Lachs presents the reader with a "recipe" for life-something like: three "parts" Dewey and one "part" stoicism. Like any good recipe offered by an accomplished chef, it should be taken metaphorically rather than literally. As such it is a wonderful gift to the reader, offering a rich meal for mental taste buds.

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There is no more timely and hotly debated a topic at the cross-section of medical ethics and genetics than the possibility of human cloning (or just "cloning"). Regardless of its current viability or social acceptability, people are concerned. From my own experiences teaching medical ethics, college-aged students are both fascinated and (prima facie) appalled by the prospect. And even before the ability to clone mammals from adult somatic cells became a reality, movies were being produced and writings gathered up which discuss the many social/ethical/religious facets of the issues surrounding cloning.

Into this mix Glenn McGee just last year created an anthology entitled The Human Cloning Debate. It is a collection of essays (most of which were previously published in magazines or journals) which specifically discuss human cloning from scientific, philosophical, and religious perspectives. Divided into five "parts" with a fictional tale by Richard Kadrey as an Epilogue, McGee puts together a collection that is
readable and informative for anyone interested not just in how cloning is done, nor whether it should be done, but maybe even more fundamentally, what cloning is and is not.

After McGee's introduction which "sets the scene," as it were, Part One consists of two never-before-published essays. Potter Wickware's essay explains in "lay" terms the science of cloning while broadly defining cloning as a "genetic xerox copy made from a previous existing template or master (20-21)." It is this definition that calls into question whether or not our current techniques truly create "clones" at all. He then goes on to explain different cloning techniques including the now famous nuclear transfer technique that, though it has existed for several decades, is now famous with the advent of Dolly the "cloned" sheep in 1997. Ina Roy's article scans the philosophical landscape of ethical theory and attempts to show, at least in a cursory fashion, how utilitarianism, deontology, and the like might approach issues of human cloning. But while Wickware's simplified science successfully introduces scientific ambiguities about the meaning of cloning as applied to current techniques and gives a very understandable discussion from the scientific angle, Roy's essay is a bit disappointing, attempting too much in too little space as it ranges from harm to benefits, feminism to personhood.

Parts Two, Three, and Four express the viewpoints of philosophers, legal ethicists, scientists, and the President Clinton's National Bioethics Advisory Committee (NBAC) which have, since 1997 at least, taken up the debate. Space does not permit a full recounting of each article, but brief gestures will be made.

In part two, John Robertson's legalist views take shape as the one article in the entire collection that almost unflinchingly supports human cloning, at least as long as it occurs within the context of a desire to nurture the offspring created by the process. Arthur Caplan's appeal to the idea that ethics should not be of "secondary" concern in any scientific practice; instead, ethics is precisely that which comes into play when there is uncertainty. (If scientific research and experimentation is not a field of uncertainty, there is none.) McGee's own entry in the debate is co-authored with Dolly's scientific creator Ian Wilmut. In their article, McGee and Wilmut argue that what they call the "reproductive freedom" (typically rights-based, see Robertson) and "pediatric" (central concern is for the cloned children, see Kitcher) models do not do justice to the conflicts between individual and community interests. Instead they put forth an "adoption" model for making decisions over cloning, one that would use the kind of legal and psychological oversight that is currently in vogue for adoption in most states. Of these three articles, Caplan's is least controversial while Robertson's libertarian acceptance of human cloning will certainly strike many as cavalier and McGee/Wilmut's "adoption" may seem too "communitarian" with individual desires subsumed under communal ones.

Philip Kitchens article in Part Three adds only a little to the mix as it quickly re-explains cloning processes and then reminds us that a genetic code is not equivalent to a full human being. He ultimately appeals to child-centered ("pediatric") concerns that, though they do call for fear and trembling in these matters, do not entirely close the door.
for cloning. Possibly the finest retort to "cloning" hysteria, though, is found in Richard Lewontin's piece which as a response to the NBAC report on cloning and its recommendation to ban cloning at this time, disagrees, at least in part, to all counts raised by the Commission. Like many of the other authors and the Commission itself, however, Lewontin does believe that the current safety of the processes is not great enough to support out-right support of cloning at this time.

The NBAC gets its chance with the publication of its "Recommendations" in Part Four. Based almost solely on the potential for malformation and/or death of a large number of potential clones, the Commission requests a ban on human cloning at both federal and state levels, but only when clones would be developed for the purpose of coming to term. Leon Kass is also against cloning, but his is an "intuitionist" argument that relies on an undefined conception of what it means to be fully human. Alternatively, however, Ronald Bailey sees nothing wrong with cloning \textit{per se}, so long as we treat cloned individuals as fully human.

It is with the last "part" that this collection both improves and diminishes. Entitled "God and the Clone," Part Five pulls together some relatively conservative, but not always insightful religious perspectives on cloning. Its strength is that this section makes the collection more than just an anthology of secular ethics in a society rife with religious questions. However, its weakness is that, particularly with the "Christian" perspectives (Meilander, Post, Haas, and Fielding) nothing but anti-cloning rhetoric is heard. I have to wonder if all thoughtful people who consider themselves "Christian" believe cloning is wrong. I suspect not. The addition of both Buddhist and Islamic voices is much appreciated, though I did find the Buddhist section wanting for more to fill out the brief quotes from practitioners and scholars, and I found it difficult to determine the position of both Islam and the author in the Abdulaziz Sachedina's essay. Finally, Richard Lindsay's retort to religious injunctions against cloning claims that only a morality based on secular rationality can do real work here, but his account is too reductive with religious arguments.

Finally, a couple of comments can be made about the book as a whole. First, though I do not care to see the number 277 ever again (the number of attempts it took to successfully clone Dolly which is mentioned by two-thirds of the authors), it is clear that most every voice in the debate is greatly concerned by this number. At bottom, most every author thinks that the idea of human cloning is premature (at best) at least until we can reduce the number of "failed" attempts using the Wilmut (or some modification thereof) method. Second, the debate is hardly settled. Not only in public policy but public scientific knowledge and ethical understanding, much work must be done. As Lewontin points out, we simply do not understand what we are talking about when we discuss cloning. Until we do, we are bound to conflict and make ignorant choices. Furthermore, Caplan is correct; it is now that ethics must be employed, now at the juncture \textit{before} we employee cloning practices and \textit{before} we irrationally eschew such technology.
In sum, what makes *The Human Cloning Debate* a successful collection is the broad spectrum of opinions and the readability of the pieces. The insights to be gained from science, ethics, and religion can only help us make intelligent choices as we move into a future that may just contain the practices of human cloning. Ultimately, however, the degree to which this book does not just debate the issues but helps settle some of them in the public arena, through stimulating us to action, is the degree to which it will be more than just another anthology for academics and their students and become public literature. It just might succeed.

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This is a handy selection of substantial readings from Peirce, James and Bergson to Dewey, Whitehead and Hartshorne. Also included are Samuel Alexander, Mead, and, surprisingly, Nietzsche. There are brief biographical essays and lists of primary and secondary works. The selections focus on metaphysics, so that ethics, social philosophy, aesthetics and religion are deliberately not treated. There is a nice balance of standard pieces like Peirce's "The Law of Mind," James on the stream of consciousness, and the chapter on "Nature, Life, and Body-Mind" of Dewey's *Experience and Nature* with significant, lesser-known material such as Dewey's "Time and Individuality" and Whitehead's "The Grouping of Occasions" from *The Adventure of Ideas*. The Bergson, Mead and Hartshorne selections are also important.

Myers is listed as the editor of the second edition, so this is apparently a revision of the earlier anthology edited by Browning and published by Random House in 1965. In the revision the selection by C. Lloyd Morgan from *Emergent Evolution* was dropped. This is a reasonable deletion, given the inclusion of Alexander to cover the British scene between the wars, although Morgan (with Jan Christian Smuts and Bernard Meland) should not be forgotten. Hartshorne's "The Development of Process Philosophy," was published for this anthology, appearing as the Introduction to the first edition, here included among the Hartshorne selections, which is appropriate given the addition of a Hartshorne section in this second edition. This is the essay in which he suggests that the term "process philosophy" was coined by "perhaps my friend Bernard Loomer."

It is easy to take shots at the exposed position of any editor, but the choice to include Nietzsche and not Henry Nelson Wieman or Bernard Loomer causes a small demurrrer. The inclusion of the American pragmatists is very appropriate. The choice of the Alexander essay was brilliant, but with no mention that for him "deity" (not God), is the universe pregnant with the future is to lose a key piece of his view. The Nietzsche readings give no hint of his discussion of the struggle of powers as a key to understanding the world, certainly a process notion. The Peirce selections skipped significant treatment of God and a clear treatment of the categories. The omission of the last paragraph of