philosophy can give us); a comparison between Foucault, Habermas, and Rorty; and the relationship between philosophy and politics. The final excursus of Kwiek's book compares Rorty and Zygmunt Bauman over contingency and solidarity.

Kwiek, who benefited from a one-year Fulbright fellowship at Charlottesville, has written an intriguing and worthwhile study on Rorty's thought and its relation to an impressive number of European intellectuals. The range of intellectuals compared and contrasted is indicative of Rorty's engagement as intellectual, and the worth of his thought as evidenced in it transcending American philosophy.

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In The Pragmatic Mind Mark Bauerlein strives to reorient contemporary neopragmatism through an act of critical recovery. In their attempts to extend "antitheory, pluralistic ideas to the sociopolitical sphere" and thus to "reform" critical theory, neopragmatic critics, Bauerlein argues, emphasize the study of practice and consequences over cognition (xvii). However, "if one of pragmatism's basic principles is that practice and belief go hand in hand and that belief is a mental habit, a tendency to interpret in a certain way, then, to change our practices, we must address the mental habits and tendencies that go along with the old practices" (xvii). To this end, Bauerlein's book turns to nineteenth-century American philosophy in order to explore pragmatism's "initial conceptual field" and return the pragmatic method to cognitive roots that neopragmatic critics have tended to ignore or elide and that, properly understood, would enhance contemporary pragmatism's analytical power. After all, as Bauerlein points out in his introduction, pragmatism inherently concerns the relationships between "belief and consequences, idea and act" (4).

Representing this "initial conceptual field" are Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, and C.S. Peirce, intriguing selections given that a recent anthology of pragmatic essays fails to include Emerson's work, and Peirce is often slighted by neopragmatic writers. Bauerlein devotes a chapter to each figure, offering highly detailed and incisive readings of how these three philosophers theorized the origins, psychological development, and operations of human cognition. What emerges is the thesis that "pragmatic analysis," or the "pragmatic method," developed from extensive formulations of the "pragmatic mind." Thought, inference, and intellect thus remain essential components of such critical practice because, Bauerlein tells us in the conclusion to the chapter on James, "A pragmatic outlook of pluralism and anticorrespondence requires a pragmatic state of mind embracing provisional belief and revisionary habits" (62-3). The book locates this "pragmatic mind" in, for example, Emerson, James and Peirce's common understanding of cognition in relational terms, their shared resistance to ossified modes of thought, and their common theorization of extra-cognitive otherness that
activates cognition by delimiting the terrain of thought and rendering reality contingent upon conceptualization. Throughout the book, Bauerlein’s analysis unfolds patiently, yet efficiently, as he offers fresh readings of these writers while effectively demonstrating that Emerson, James and Peirce are not simply early figures in the genealogy of pragmatic thought but theorists whose work provides the necessary conceptual validation for pragmatic analysis.

The chapter on Emerson offers a good illustration of the method and organization of Bauerlein’s study. Familiar Emerson works, such as *Nature*, are placed alongside lesser-known writings like “The Method of Nature” and a wide range of contemporary criticism. Skillful selection of textual evidence combines with logically precise argumentation as Bauerlein explicates the philosophical justifications for Emerson’s elementary psychological premises, the complexities of these premises as they inform the writer’s distinction between creative intelligence and passive observation, and the ways in which such cognitive theories impact the critical investigation of an endlessly various natural world. This carefully formulated discussion leads to the conclusion that Emerson strives “to make thought just as active as body is” by modeling a cognitive “continuum of fixations and dissolutions” that allow mind to interact with nature in a “productive” manner (21). The chapter thus persuasively contributes to one of the book’s primary points: the “cognizability” of objects is the true focus of any pragmatic inquiry aimed at analyzing and influencing the “practical reality” of historical, social and political events (21). Any neopragmatist striving to accomplish a similar goal would thus do well to consider seriously Emerson, James and Peirce’s emphases on methodology over ontology and on cognizability as a component aspect of reality.

*The Pragmatic Mind* enriches our understanding of the influential relationship between nineteenth-century American philosophy and late twentieth-century critical theory. With that aim in mind, I do wish that Bauerlein had explored in greater detail Emerson, James and Peirce’s arguments about language, its relation to the psychological operations they describe, and its role in determining “reality,” as these theorists understood it. In the preface and introduction Bauerlein stresses that Richard Rorty incorrectly differentiates pragmatism from neopragmatism by the latter’s greater emphasis on language. Moreover, he emphasizes the crucial role language plays in any pragmatic analysis, recognizing that “one of the things that distinguishes pragmatism is that it makes traditional philosophical questions about being and knowledge depend on the philosopher’s choice of language” (1). After reading this book, however, the reader remains uncertain whether “the pragmatic mind” it has recovered is itself shaped linguistically or whether basic cognitive operations determine the linguistic framework within which pragmatic analysis is enacted and expressed. A discussion of this issue might have further assisted readers in synthesizing Bauerlein’s work with neopragmatism and ascertaining the place of the pragmatic mind and method within the field of philosophical or literary criticism.

Nevertheless, Bauerlein’s discussions of “the pragmatic mind” are so intricate and deftly executed that readers will find themselves provided with sufficient theoretical
foundations for considering such complex issues on their own. His significant insights are advanced in a compelling fashion amidst an engaging spirit of inquiry, making *The Pragmatic Mind* an important contribution to American literary studies and philosophy.

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Griffin Trotter's *The Loyal Physician* is an original contribution to the area of medical ethics since it is the first comprehensive treatment of medical ethics using Josiah Royce's philosophy. Royce always intended his theory to become a template for a professional ethic, yet Trotter was the first to accomplish this task for medical ethics. The overall purpose of Trotter's book is to develop a coherent set of primary and secondary ethical principles that the physician can use in his/her profession. The primary ethical principle is loyalty, and it is a foundational principle since the secondary principles are derived from it. The secondary ethical principles that stem from loyalty are: beneficence, altruism, honesty, empathy and sympathy, humane health care, and compassion. Trotter argues that loyalty ought to be the overarching moral principle in medical ethics, and that the current disarray in the medical tradition can be alleviated almost entirely if loyalty was made into an ideal that the physician and patient consistently adhered to.

According to Trotter, the medical tradition is ethically and humanistically deficient, and a process of renewal is essential to restore medicine to its proper place. One of the main reasons the tradition is fractured is that it does not contain moral principles that cohere with one another. The former ideal of medicine, exemplified by Marcus Welby, of the omnicompotent, happy, admired, and personally fulfilled physician has been eroded. Medical ethics has been replaced by legal statutes and principles. From the legalistic standpoint, physicians need not be concerned about the morally right thing to do in their medical practice; instead, they should merely be concerned with avoiding legal sanctions. However, physicians have a duty to ensure that patients are medically and psychologically cared for in a way that extends far beyond these minimum legalistic standards.

As a result, the medical tradition is undergoing a kind of institutional identity crisis since it cannot give an adequate answer to such questions as: What does the medical institution stand for? What does it revere? and Where is it headed? When physicians and medical students are asked these questions, a kind of paralysis results. This institutional crisis points to a deeper moral problem, one that originates from the physicians within the medical tradition. Trotter argues that since medical doctors lack personal identity, the tradition also lacks an identity. For Trotter, professional identity and personal identity tends to overlap, and this is especially the case for medical doctors.