It is here that Seigfried's contribution enters. She clearly shows the parallels between Pragmatism and Feminism: both offer critiques of scientism and approaches to experience that emphasize epistemology over a fuller understanding, or logical abstractions over cultural life; both stress the interpenetration of facts and values, the importance of the aesthetics of everyday life, and the integration of intellectual theory and social praxis. Above all, both Pragmatism and Feminism are committed to the necessity for pluralism. "Both outlooks," she writes, "recognize that in this imperfect world of ours there are no guarantees that the moral choices we make are the right ones, and both insist that a place be found for each one's values in the total universe of values, insofar as this is possible" (223; cf. 153).

I think that Pragmatism and Feminism is a fine volume, well worth repeated readings and careful study. I would dispute one minor point: I think that Seigfried is too willing to incorporate valuable material from across the broad sweep of American philosophy into her presentation of Pragmatism. While more than once she offers an explicit recognition of the distinctness of the Pragmatic contribution within the broader field of American philosophy, she still sometimes fails to preserve this distinctness, as when she allows: "Classical American philosophy, a designation often simply shortened to pragmatism." (3-4; cf. 6, 13, 277 n.4.). I think, however, that this is a 'minor' point because the extra-Pragmatic material that she introduces is important and because her interest in exploring the American philosophical tradition in this volume is itself pragmatic. This is what I take to be her fourth intention. In addition to her desire to establish a place for women Pragmatists, to offer a Feminist critique of James and Dewey, and to update the inherited Pragmatic perspective for our present situation, Seigfried also wants this volume to remind many of the participants in current intellectual debates about the harsh realities of non-academic life where "ideological divides" and "litmus tests" are too often counter-productive. "What difference does it make to the everyday world outside of higher education what version of feminism one adheres to," she asks, "when feminism itself is under attack and many of its causes are losing ground?" (265-6). She directs this reminder especially to those "American feminists in social and political philosophy [who] look exclusively to European philosophers for models, even when applying them to our national scene in the United States" (15). There are, as Seigfried clearly shows, valuable native models for Feminism within the (broad) Pragmatist tradition.

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This book is intended for general readers and students, especially in logic or related courses. It could fit into many core curriculum courses. Drawing largely on Peirce, it seeks to "show that the experimental, trial-and-error method known as pragmatism is the common denominator in our acquisition and development of knowledge, whether in an academic,
vocational, or professional setting or in life at large." One of the merits of this book is the use of examples from a variety of academic and nonacademic areas.

There is much of merit in this book. There is a clear description of the Problem-Hypothesis-Test method. There is a clear discussion of the difference between deduction and induction, of validity, and of elementary deductive forms including *barbara*, *modus ponens*, *modus tollens*, disjunctive and hypothetical syllogisms. There is a good discussion of the role of analogy in learning, of the importance of predesignating consequences for testing, the role of nonrational insight, and the parallel between the experimental method and biological evolution by natural selection. The reference to an ethics of the mind, of avoiding dogmatism, of being willing to rid oneself of error whatever the discomfort is highly laudable.

Examples are interesting, helpful, educational, and clearly described, including the humoral theory of disease, Kepler's discovery of the elliptical orbit of planets, appreciating Van Eyck's painting of "The Last Judgment," and whether platypuses are mammals. There is even a fascinating discussion of early electromagnetic logical machines by Peirce and Marquand in the 1880's which were important anticipations of Shannon's early computers of the 1930's. These were used to illustrate the concept of algorithms.

There are three difficulties with this book which should be discussed by a teacher who assigns it. First there is a superficiality in asserting that the experimental method is the common denominator in the development of all knowledge. To put it one way, why are all philosophers not pragmatists? Granted that we would be better off if many beliefs sanctioned by an institutionalized religion were put to a pragmatic test. Nevertheless, is there an unexplicated positivism operating, such that religion and many areas of philosophy are inevitably either dogmatic or to be avoided? Or are these areas just simply not "knowledge." Some discussion is called for.

Further, are all high-level positions, rather like Kuhn's paradigms, easily and simply testable? Surely the differences between an extreme and a moderate liberal and an extreme and a moderate conservative in American politics (to make a simplified four part division) cannot be adjudicated simply by the pragmatic test. Surely the considered responses of different people to FDR, President Reagan, or the Viet Nam War are not to be adjudged simply by the experimental method.

Although Stewart grants that the testing of some higher level scientific theories, such as the humoral theory of disease, takes time, nevertheless he clearly implies that this theory would not have persisted as long as it did if practitioners were concerned to subject the theory to experimental test. However, this seems like an oversimplified picture of scientific progress which fails to account for how research programs can survive a great deal of negative tests by changes in their auxiliary hypotheses (Imre Lakatos or Larry Laudan).

Third, the experimental approach may be useful in coming to understand Euclid's geometry, yet there is an important deductive dimension to Euclid and mathematics generally
which Stewart's text ignores. Finally, referring to pragmatism as "experimental, trial-and-error, 'scientific' method," overlooks that the word also refers to a school of philosophy.

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On September 10, 1989 philosophers, semioticians, logicians, and others celebrated Peirce's birthday with a Charles S. Peirce Sesquicentennial International Congress, with 26 countries represented by over 450 scholars. One of the foci of the Congress was a "principal logic symposium," which provided technical papers on Peirce's contributions to logic and his impact on contemporary logic. This long-awaited edition of that symposium has been expanded beyond the symposium papers, to include the philosophy of logic. In the editors' words: "We think the result is the most comprehensive account and exposition of Peirce's contributions to technical logic."

The text is indeed comprehensive, with authors presenting- proofs; nuances of Peirce's logic; explications and impacts of his logic; relationships between his logic and mathematics, semiotics, linguistics, and existential graphs; and extrapolations from his works. The essays are not categorized into sections, although, in general, there is a flow from foundational and the mathematical works, which are more technical in nature (from a logician's perspective), to more philosophical papers, although there are historical and philosophical essays interspersed. Papers with common Peircean concepts, typically, are Juxtaposed; for example papers addressing his logic of relatives, or existential graphs, or binary connectives are grouped together. The reader, also, must be aware that the text is a Peircean edition on logic, implying the broader Peircean parameters to logic, which may differ from the contemporary field.

Nathan Houser begins the text with an introduction to Peirce the logician, explaining the importance of Peirce to logic and why he did not influence the field more than he did. Houser also sets the stage for the debate about Peirce's approach to logic, i.e., whether he was a mathematical or an algebraic logician, admitting that the debate must continue beyond the text.

Ivor Grattan-Guinness continues the debate, with the relation between Peirce's logic and mathematics, providing the historical context and details of the problem. Paul Shields follows with an explication of the "technical achievements," of Peirce's 1881 article "on the Logic of Number," which provided an "axiom system for natural numbers." Randall Dipert, then, presents a philosophical vantage of Peirce's concept of collections, more properly called "sets," comparing Peirce to Boole, Dedekind, and Cantor. Angus Kerr-Lawson's essay is more speculative and epistemological, comparing the philosophy of mathematics today with Peirce's views. Stephen Levy's, "Peirce's theoremic/corollarial distinction and the interconnections between mathematics and logic," continues the relation of logic and mathematics, arguing that they are interdependent.