restricted only by the constraints set by the reasoner. Parker gives much attention to Peirce's disagreement with Cantor's conception of infinitesimals, and he does so in a very cogent way. After explaining the difference, Parker argues that Peirce's disagreement with Cantor is not based on mathematical objections, but on philosophical ones. Cantor's infinitesimals, though good for mathematics, cannot properly be applied to the world of experience.

The world of experience, and the way in which we should try to make sense of it, form the subject matter of Part III. This third part runs from phenomenology to the philosophy of science. Given the nature of Peirce's rejection of Cantor, one may expect here a thorough discussion of the application of the mathematical notion of continuity to the three areas discussed: phenomenology, the normative sciences, and semiotics. Unfortunately, Parker's discussion remains too sketchy at this point, and more effort should have been made in interpreting Peirce's fragmentary and sometimes obscure observations, such as the remark, quoted twice, that our knowledge always swims in a continuum of uncertainty and indeterminacy (CP 1.171, 1897). The result is that the reader remains in the dark about whether there is a clear and articulate principle of continuity at work in Peirce's thought, or whether Peirce's application of the mathematical definition of continuity remains largely intuitive.

In the fourth and final part, Parker discusses how the principle of continuity works out in Peirce's metaphysics. One will find here a clear overview of Peirce's mature metaphysics. The author is especially to be commended for drawing attention to the fact that for a good understanding of Peirce's metaphysics one must look at his contributions to mathematics, as they are often the source of his metaphysical concepts. Unfortunately, the sketchy discussion of the application of the principle of continuity in phenomenology and semiotics, precludes a fullfledged account of the principle in metaphysics.

Parker is to be praised for drawing attention to Peirce's principle of continuity and for making it accessible. The book presents an excellent introduction to some of the more difficult elements of Peirce's work, especially his views on infinitesimals. Many diagrams present a clear view of Peirce's often elaborate distinctions, and the book comes with a detailed and helpful index. Parker's *The Continuity of Peirce's Thought* is certainly a book that may not be ignored.

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This is an ambitious book, with several interrelated aims. One of them is to carve out some legitimate place for Feminists like Jane Addams and Charlotte Perkins Gilman within the American philosophical tradition. A second aim is Seigfried's intention to offer a Feminist critique of such Pragmatic figures as James and Dewey, both considering what they had to say on
relevant issues and pointing out what they failed to say. Her general position here is that James's understanding of women's lives and potential contributions to society is inadequate and he contributes little of a theoretical nature to offset this, but that Dewey's understanding is better than James's and his potential theoretical contribution is stronger. I would suggest, however, that more important than these two aims is Seigfried's intention to rethink and reconstruct the valuable but dated insights of the Pragmatic movement for our contemporary intellectual context. What she has in mind here is best indicated in such passages as "feminist theory can critique, extend, and transform pragmatism" (9). In a context in which issues largely unappreciated by Pragmatism have moved from the fringe of social consciousness more toward its focus, we must make some changes. This is how I would interpret the metaphor of her subtitle: 'reweaving the social fabric.'

We all recognize that Pragmatism was the product of a particular social situation: one that flourished among the college-educated and college-affiliated in a society that had few of either; one in which a significant segment of the academy was beginning to view itself as the progressive version of the ministry; one in which matters of poverty and power, and sometimes even class, were beginning to be addressed as 'social problems'; but one in which issues that are now so obviously central to the ongoing life of society -- especially the topics of gender and race -- had made little headway. The question of how we are to 'reweave' this history to guide our understanding as we move into the future is especially important for us now because our society no longer accepts Progressivism's one essential trait: faith in continued, incremental progress.

Like any other historian of American Philosophy, Seigfried is interested in deepening and broadening the understanding of its past that we hand on to the future. We can always use new materials and insights; and her efforts over the last few years to explore its Feminist aspects have enriched us all. In this volume, her Pragmatic interest is primarily in James and Dewey, with occasional insights drawn from the work of Mead and Tufts. She reminds us often that there is a "range" of positions within Pragmatism; and she points to a number of factors that helped to keep it unified as a philosophical and extra-philosophical movement. Among these was its antiintellectualist, or anti-epistemological, spirit. In her words, Pragmatism challenges "the traditional philosophical privileging of theory at the expense of practice" (277 n.4) and "takes the continuity of experience and nature as revealed through the outcome of directed action as the starting point for reflection" (6). Seigfried also points to Pragmatism's "criticism of philosophy as traditionally practiced and its plea to turn away from problems found only in academic philosophy journals and toward problems that arise in actual experience" (37). A third unifying theme that she recognizes is the questioning of doctrine and custom by experience that has been an essential aspect of American Pragmatism since the days of Benjamin Franklin. Within these general limits on the range of Pragmatic positions, no doctrinal test should be applied to determine who is to be admitted into what James once called "the pragmatic church" (McDermott ed., 316 n.3). Those earlier Pragmatists who were interested in experience-based critiques of doctrines and customs related to problem areas of education or religion or art do not constitute a full set; plenty of space is available for those who would focus now upon class or race or ethnicity or gender or sexual orientation or physical ability.
It is here that Seigfried's contribution enters. She clearly shows the parallels between Pragmatism and Feminism: both offer critiques of scientism and approaches to experience that emphasize epistemology over a fuller understanding, or logical abstractions over cultural life; both stress the interpenetration of facts and values, the importance of the aesthetics of everyday life, and the integration of intellectual theory and social praxis. Above all, both Pragmatism and Feminism are committed to the necessity for pluralism. "Both outlooks," she writes, "recognize that in this imperfect world of ours there are no guarantees that the moral choices we make are the right ones, and both insist that a place be found for each one's values in the total universe of values, insofar as this is possible" (223; cf. 153).

I think that Pragmatism and Feminism is a fine volume, well worth repeated readings and careful study. I would dispute one minor point: I think that Seigfried is too willing to incorporate valuable material from across the broad sweep of American philosophy into her presentation of Pragmatism. While more than once she offers an explicit recognition of the distinctness of the Pragmatic contribution within the broader field of American philosophy, she still sometimes fails to preserve this distinctness, as when she allows: "Classical American philosophy, a designation often simply shortened to pragmatism." (3-4; cf. 6, 13, 277 n.4.). I think, however, that this is a 'minor' point because the extra-Pragmatic material that she introduces is important and because her interest in exploring the American philosophical tradition in this volume is itself pragmatic. This is what I take to be her fourth intention. In addition to her desire to establish a place for women Pragmatists, to offer a Feminist critique of James and Dewey, and to update the inherited Pragmatic perspective for our present situation, Seigfried also wants this volume to remind many of the participants in current intellectual debates about the harsh realities of non-academic life where "ideological divides" and "litmus tests" are too often counter-productive. "What difference does it make to the everyday world outside of higher education what version of feminism one adheres to," she asks, "when feminism itself is under attack and many of its causes are losing ground?" (265-6). She directs this reminder especially to those "American feminists in social and political philosophy [who] look exclusively to European philosophers for models, even when applying them to our national scene in the United States" (15). There are, as Seigfried clearly shows, valuable native models for Feminism within the (broad) Pragmatist tradition.

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This book is intended for general readers and students, especially in logic or related courses. It could fit into many core curriculum courses. Drawing largely on Peirce, it seeks to "show that the experimental, trial-and-error method known as pragmatism is the common denominator in our acquisition and development of knowledge, whether in an academic,