Habermas gives little attention to the obstacles to coherent interpretation of the constitutional rights that have concerned legal scholars since the constitutional power of the federal courts mushroomed in the United States after the turn of the century.

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Kelly Parker's The Continuity of Peirce's Thought provides an excellent account of Peirce's philosophy. It is not, as one might expect from the title, a chronological account of Peirce's thought, showing there are no sharp transitions justifying a separation into distinct periods. Instead, Parker focuses on Peirce's classification of the sciences, and does so in a way that presupposes rather than argues for a continuity of Peirce's thought. This can be seen clearly from the quite casual way in which he combines texts from different dates. Parker's motivation is a different one, however. With a reference to MS 949 (c.1902), where Peirce declares the principle of continuity to be the "master key to philosophy," he sets himself the task of showing that Peirce's mature philosophy is "best understood as an extended exploration and application of his novel concept of the mathematical continuum" (p. xiv). This makes the book primarily a discussion of Peirce's principle of continuity.

A second, parallel motive lies behind the book, however. This is to provide a fresh in-depth introduction to Peirce's work. Guided by this, Parker gives lucid and quite extensive accounts of Peirce's contributions to mathematics, logic, phenomenology, value theory, semeiotic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and cosmology. In all these areas Parker has valuable things to say, which makes this book valuable for specialists as well.

If we take these two motives to make up the purpose of the book, however, I am not entirely convinced that Parker is successful. The desire to provide a general introduction, although never unrelated to his cause, not only diverts the attention away from the issue of continuity, but also hampers a more thorough discussion of it.

Let me run briefly through the main argument presented in the book. The book is divided into four parts. Part I is devoted to Peirce's architectonic philosophy and the principle of continuity. Parker shows that, for Peirce, a philosophy that fails to account for continua will run into Zeno-type paradoxes. He explains that Peirce interprets a continuum as a sequence that cannot be broken down into discrete parts, but in which each part can be further subdivided into parts of the same kind, and so ad infinitum. Parker then applies this notion to space, time, the categories, inference, and semeiosis.

Peirce's conception of continua raises immediately the issue of infinitesimals. This brings us to the second part of Parker's book, dealing with mathematical hypotheses. Parker shows that Peirce conceives of mathematical reasoning as a process that takes place in a vacuum: it is
restricted only by the constraints set by the reasoner. Parker gives much attention to Peirce's disagreement with Cantor's conception of infinitesimals, and he does so in a very cogent way. After explaining the difference, Parker argues that Peirce's disagreement with Cantor is not based on mathematical objections, but on philosophical ones. Cantor's infinitesimals, though good for mathematics, cannot properly be applied to the world of experience.

The world of experience, and the way in which we should try to make sense of it, form the subject matter of Part 111. This third part runs from phenomenology to the philosophy of science. Given the nature of Peirce's rejection of Cantor, one may expect here a thorough discussion of the application of the mathematical notion of continuity to the three areas discussed: phenomenology, the normative sciences, and semeiotics. Unfortunately, Parker's discussion remains too sketchy at this point, and more effort should have been made in interpreting Peirce's fragmentary and sometimes obscure observations, such as the remark, quoted twice, that our knowledge always swims in a continuum of uncertainty and indeterminacy (CP 1.171, 1897). The result is that the reader remains in the dark about whether there is a clear and articulate principle of continuity at work in Peirce's thought, or whether Peirce's application of the mathematical definition of continuity remains largely intuitive.

In the fourth and final part, Parker discusses how the principle of continuity works out in Peirce's metaphysics. One will find here a clear overview of Peirce's mature metaphysics. The author is especially to be commended for drawing attention to the fact that for a good understanding of Peirce's metaphysics one must look at his contributions to mathematics, as they are often the source of his metaphysical concepts. Unfortunately, the sketchy discussion of the application of the principle of continuity in phenomenology and semeiotics, precludes a fullfledged account of the principle in metaphysics.

Parker is to be praised for drawing attention to Peirce's principle of continuity and for making it accessible. The book presents an excellent introduction to some of the more difficult elements of Peirce's work, especially his views on infinitesimals. Many diagrams present a clear view of Peirce's often elaborate distinctions, and the book comes with a detailed and helpful index. Parker's The Continuity of Peirce's Thought is certainly a book that may not be ignored.

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This is an ambitious book, with several interrelated aims. One of them is to carve out some legitimate place for Feminists like Jane Addams and Charlotte Perkins Gilman within the American philosophical tradition. A second aim is Seigfried's intention to offer a Feminist critique of such Pragmatic figures as James and Dewey, both considering what they had to say on