
Judith Jones has written a really fine book. Non-experts familiar with Whitehead's basic ideas will find it a great help in understanding his whole project. Experts (many of whom she respectfully but directly confronts) will be provoked to rethink and, undoubtedly, to respond to her dual task of exegesis and revision. The exegesis involves a careful elaboration and application of intensity, the conceptual lens she says is best for displaying Whitehead's relational ontology. To establish a relational ontology from the "peculiar atomism of intensive actualities" requires showing how ontological subjectivities can and do interpenetrate. Jones believes that Whitehead often distorted his own deep insight into the essential interconnectedness of atomic actualities. He was "mistaken to think that intensive, evaluative individuality had to be confined to a radically perishing conception of presentness" (xii). She admits, however, that her interpretation "may indeed amount to a serious revision of process as Whitehead seems to have described it" (p. 210). At the heart of this revision is a notion of ecstatic individuality intended to show how "temporalized intensive individuals are spread out across any and all temporal modes" (p.xii). In short, the subjective life of a concrescing actual entity doesn't completely perish. With careful exposition and interpretation of Whitehead's notion of intensity, her goal is to recast the subjective-objective relation and, especially, to offer "a thoroughgoing critique of the classical conception of the four causes, particularly ... efficient and final causality" (P.60). She also contends that Whitehead's ontology is especially well suited to a defense of moral realism, suggesting in her final chapter that Whitehead's whole apparatus may have been designed with that goal in mind.

This brief review can only hint at a few of the salient topics. The first two of the book's five chapters serve as an excellent introduction to Whitehead's categorial system in Process and Reality. Chapter One, "Intensity of Satisfaction," explores five basic notions (intensity of feeling, contrasts, subjective form aesthetic order and satisfaction), each having to do with the general systematic framework needed to achieve a revised understanding, that is, "to find a way to continue the subjectivity of existents into their objectifications" (p.29). Those who have been chagrined (and who hasn't?) upon encountering Whitehead's elaborate scheme will find Jones' discussion of Aristotle and Kant on their understanding of categories an insightful and useful way to begin. In her view, Whitehead's Categorial Obligations best deserve the name of 'category'. These early discussions serve to bring out certain ontological problems raised by atomism and to set up her general thesis that the intensity of feeling or 'satisfaction' attained by an entity has an "uncanny existential status" (p.3 1), that the satisfied entity, usually described as having "perished," has not lost all of its subjective immediacy, that living agentive feeling really is communicated by the superject. Thus, the real locus of atomic existence is equally, if not more so, in the superjective nature of an entity. It is this reconfiguration dissolves any hard and fast
distinction between final and efficient causality and, she believes is the basis for a reconstructed process ontology.

Chapter Two, "Intensity and the Categoreal Obligations", turns to the business of explaining the meaning and importance of each of the categories. Besides her descriptions of how entities construct themselves according to the categoreal conditions, one appreciates her honest appraisal of the sources of confusion and paradox in Whitehead. By duly noting these, her overall project becomes progressively clearer and compelling. There are many insightful discussions of particular points. For example, when reading about Conceptual Reversion one finds an important treatment of the meaning of "depth" as involving not only a private dimension of experience but as indicating "the full ontological connectedness and real continuity with" what is yet to emerge and with what has already occurred (p.70).

Chapter Three, "The Ontology of Intensity," is where Jones develops her view about the interpenetration or "existential solidarity" of entities. If an actual entity has a vibratory existence, then "there is something nonvibratory and non-life like about the description of subjectivity as something somehow causally and ontologically different from objectivity" (P.84). In a long section devoted to the Concrescence/Concretum distinction, she argues forcefully that there is only one ontological reality and it is "expressible only as the hyphenated subject-supeject" (p.89). Due attention is given to interpreting many Whiteheadian remarks which seem to separate past actualities from active concrescences. Numerous passages dealing with "intensity" are discussed to show that the often-alleged dead or perished past of an entity is still agentive or active. The revisionist Jones continues to argue that Whitehead had an unfortunate "lingering attachment to radical individuality" (p.95). Ecstatic individuality is meant to avoid the distortions of a merely private agency. "If something is only itself in virtue of its location in future entities and its continuity and interwovenness with previous entities, then it can metaphysically only be conceived as thus 'ecstatic' in its being" (p.97). This is the core claim of relational atomism. The latter part of the chapter is devoted to showing how the analysis of satisfaction, when properly represented, can illuminate a number of complex statements in PR but only if we "tenaciously stick with the vocabulary of esthetic attainment,...[of] creative achievement of intensity" (ibid).

Among the many other topics of interest in Chapter Three are the treatment of quantitative satisfaction, the relation [an identity] between qualitative and quantitative pattern, why the elements involved in a pattern must be thought of as relational elements, i.e., not ontologically separable, and why Whitehead, despite "explanatory indiscretions" (p.103), is not guilty of cryptosubstantialism. Noteworthy also is her critique of Ivan Leclerc's view that Whitehead cannot account for the unity of ordinary macroobjects, which includes how one ought to understand the teaser that "a physical feeling is a feeling of another feeling." Jones is at her best in explaining how the processes involved in the constitution of ordinary objects "feed into each other" (p.107). Some may worry that she has cut loose stable objects into the free floating space of philosophical idealism, but she argues with considerable dialectical skill, placing her insights inside her discussions of key Whiteheadian texts. She is surely correct in stressing that everything depends upon how one conceives the nature of individuality. Thus, transition and
concrescence are not two distinct processes but only "phases" of one process. How such matters bear importantly on understanding creativity in Whitehead is also included.

Discussions of historical influences on Whitehead, notably his dispute with Kant regarding space and time, the origins of mathematically significant elements for the notion of intensity (especially the development of projective geometry), the influence of Samuel Alexander, the repudiation of the doctrine of infinitesimals, et al, help explain how Whitehead reached his conception of a prehensive event. Here Jorge Nobo and George Lucas are criticized for the way they interpret the meaning and status of 'repetition' of actual entities. Both, she says, fail to appreciate the importance of "contrasts," especially as this functions via Whitehead's principle of intensive relevance (p. 125). Without the right view of this, one cannot appreciate the condition of comparability which, she claims, is universal and was the major metaphysical project of Religion In the Making (to show that all value is comparative) and a key point of Science and The Modern World (where eternal objects have relational essences).

Chapter Four, "Intensity and Intellectual Experiences," extends her argument about the centrality of intensity to the role of propositional feelings as "lures," especially as relevant to consciousness, belief and judgement as types of higher order experiences. The aim throughout is to defend "the nonsubstantialism of Whitehead's characterization of experience in general, and specifically of his account of mind" (p.134) as well as the claim that the main function of intellectual feelings "is not the procurement of truth or even necessarily of belief, but instead, of intensity" (p.141). Several pages are devoted to Whitehead's theory of mind as rooted in 'psychological physiology." At stake is not only the connectedness of physical and mental experience but how to explain the unity of mental experience without recourse to substance metaphysics. Whitehead's doctrine of life, freedom and novelty in experience are included with a substantive discussion of his "two stage epistemology" involving presentational immediacy and causal efficacy in order to clarify how intensity of experience, the emotional content already operative at the level of causal efficacy, becomes known and enhanced via symbolic reference. Perhaps the essential insight in this discussion is reflected in the Whiteheadian claim that "...God's purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of intensities. The evocation of societies [e.g., human persons] is purely subsidiary to this absolute end" (P.146) Jones acknowledges, however, that even if it is true that "in a vibratory cosmos, intensities must come to be" (p. 148), still the question asking why such a universe should exist is left unanswered.

Jones' intention of showing "how thoroughly Whitehead has recast 'being' in terms of value instead of substance, matter, or any of their imposters" (p.145) gets its most direct application in "An Essay On The Morality Of Attention," Chapter Five, where she presents the amoral application of the general metaphysics of intensity" (p. 194). The focus is on the nature of experience in its specifically moral and religious character by way of the centrality of aesthetic realization of value. Searching for "a new mode of conceiving the moral situation" (p 172) Jones marries Whiteheadian intensity as "theoretical architectonic" to an ethics of attention or attentive discernment based on aesthetic experience as a model of moral intuition as found in the work of Iris Murdoch. Her revisionism continues "There is no room," she writes, "in this metaphysics for a substantive will, or faculty of mind corresponding functionally to such a will" (p.176). Given
the essential dismissal of the traditional way of conceiving substantial agents, nothing less is involved here than a serious rethinking of moral agency and the family of related notions, such as responsibility, of ourselves as "transcendent creators, conditioners of creative action" (p. 175), etc. Against Robert Neville and others, she sees in Whitehead's atomism the resources for a robust notion of agency. Her potent challenge is this: "It is simply not empirically evident that when acting as a moral agent, one acts as a totalizing enduring object to which agency must be ascribed in some overarching form. This conception of agency begs the question of the nature of existence, deciding beforehand what type of entity we are looking for" (p.177). Moral experience, she contends, has an "irremediable partiality and episodic character" which neither requires nor makes room for traditional notions of substantive agents. Better to see agency as "a kind of limiting concept, a way of describing the offices of human experience in regard to certain types of activity, namely the creation of some pattern of value" in response to the real world (p.177/178).

Whitehead's understanding of "the real temporal creation of events" means that each moral event bears in itself the responsibility to effect the achievement of value appropriate and possible for it" (ibid). Whether his "connected atomicity" really can replace the metaphysics of substantive agency and redefine will "as the organ of attention to reality" (re Murdoch) will require careful consideration. She also uses William James' claim "that attention is the only volitional act involved in human conscious experience" (p. 183) to argue that volition is the result of our aesthetic syntheses when we attend to novel patterns of value/ 'Will' is "what happens qua valuation when attention is turned a certain way and paid with some kind of subjective quality" (183/184). While this discussion is not free of all ambiguity and paradox, Jones weaves enough texts from Modes of Thought, Adventures of Ideas, as well Whitehead's essay on "Mathematics and The Good," and many from Murdoch's writings, to initiate a debate about the viability of that locontemporary moral Platonism" she seeks to build, a moral realism where authentic moral response is a form of "obdience" to the reality of values. Her concluding 'sketch' of an Ethics of Intensity, with four "moral categories" (analogous to categorial obligations), leaves one hoping for a fuller development in the near future. But Judith Jones has said already a very great deal in this book which merits serious responses from the community of process thinkers.

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Blues is often considered a male dominated musical form in which women performers either adopt male perspectives on sex and love or accept the misogynist vision of women created by male performers. Much of the literature on blues is biographical or recounts the physical or psychological travels of discovery of an author confronting the blues and blues performers. Angela Davis has written a thematic study of the works of three blues women: Gertrude Ma