It is impossible to do full justice here to the excellent set of papers that makes up *The Rule of Reason*. Every one of them is well worth reading and touches upon many important aspects of Peirce's work. Let me, therefore, briefly introduce each one of them, and conclude with a general remark.

The collection begins with a paper by Jaakko Hintikka. The lack of attention Peirce's logic received, Hintikka argues, is due to the model theoretical approach that underlies it, and which went out of fashion. When this approach regained prominence, partly due to the introduction of game theory, Peirce's work was either forgotten, or considered obsolete. Hintikka's paper provides valuable insights into the kind of contributions to contemporary logic a study of Peirce's work is likely to result, as well as some of the risks involved.

The following two papers, written by Isaac Levi and Paul Foster respectively, address Peirce's views on probability. Levi explores how they relate to his views on inference and logic; Foster shows how they make Peirce embrace a form of indeterminism as soon as 1866, which is much earlier than is generally believed. The subsequent topic is Peirce's graphical logic. Robert Burch develops a Tarski style semantics for Peirce's beta-graphs, and gives sketches for a completeness and a consistency proof for this system; Jay Zeman argues that Peirce came very close to the idea of possible world semantics in his gamma graphs. Both papers experience some difficulty in explaining Peirce's graphical logic in largely non-graphical terms. Zeman's paper is very successful, however, in showing the great potential of the graphical capabilities of the personal computer for research in this type of logic. This is certainly an area in which much interesting work can still be done.

In the next set of papers several aspects of Peirce's philosophical orientation are discussed. In the first Sandra Rosenthal argues that Peirce derives his categories from the very start from experience, and not, as is argued by some, through a transcendental deduction. Next, Richard Robin reconstructs the proof of pragmatism Peirce intended to give in his 1905 Monist series, but never did. Based on a careful analysis of unfinished drafts, Robin shows that this proof must be found in the way pragmatism fits into Peirce's Architectonic system, where it is supported, so to speak, from above and below. Helmut Pape and Carl Hausman, in turn, each address the tension resulting from Peirce's
simultaneous alliance to realism and idealism. The first seeks to alleviate this tension through the assumption of an isomorphism between the logical structure of thought and the reality of things; the second, by examining Peirce's views of experience.

The three following papers deal with Peirce's theory of inquiry. Christopher Hookway examines Peirce's views on the role of sentiment and ethical dispositions in inquiry. Douglas Anderson looks at the social implications of Peirce's theory of inquiry, and the distinction between theoretical and practical matters. Susan Haack, finally, examines Peirce's first rule of reason (in order to learn one must desire to learn), after which she takes up arms against three classes of inquirers who are not guided by this principle, namely, those who inquire to confirm their already set beliefs (sham reasoners), those who inquire to promote their own reputation (whom she calls fake reasoners), and those who inquire merely to obtain profitable results.

The last two papers discuss Peirce's views on the self and self-consciousness. Vincent Colapietro argues that Peirce's view about the deliberative subject ties together his views on semiotics, pragmatism, and realism, so as to result in a fallibilistic account of critical appraisal that is at once historically embedded and formally critical. Thomas Short, in turn, defends Peirce's claim that knowledge of the self is derived abductively by hypostatic abstraction from knowledge of external facts. The book is concluded with an In Memoriam of David Savan.

With respect to the collection in general, it is to be regretted that only a few of the authors mention the year for the passages they cite. As there are important shifts in Peirce's thought with broad ramifications for his views, the date at which a particular passage is written is often significant. Providing such information is moreover helpful to the reader. It allows the reader to connect those passages—together with the arguments in the context of which they are cited—with other developments in Peirce's thought with which he may be familiar, and which may bear upon the issue at hand. For example, Sandra Rosenthal first notes that Peirce uses a phenomenological argument to dismiss Kant's claim that the categories are final (see page 124). To support this she refers to CP 1.374. Next, she argues that it is because of this that Peirce realizes "the uselessness of transcendentalism" (op.cit.). To show that Peirce does indeed draw this conclusion she refers this time to W 1.72-3. Why are the years important? In this case they will immediately reveal that Peirce's W 1.72f. belief that transcendentalism is useless cannot possibly result from his CP 1.374-dismissal of Kant. In fact, Peirce reaches this conclusion no less than 29 years before he makes the argument from which it is purportedly drawn. However, not only does the conclusion precede the evidence in this case, thereby suggesting that Peirce might have arrived at this conclusion on entirely different grounds, but in the three decennia that separate the two much has happened to Peirce's views as a whole.

I do not want to imply that this undermines Rosenthal's main argument, but only that where Peirce's work is concerned it is generally good practice to provide the dates.
Despite this minor detail, The Rule of Reason combines an excellent set of essays that should be read by anyone who is genuinely interested in the work of Peirce.

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In the epilogue to this text the author states that "this book is about how we are losing our minds." (p. 158) By this he means that, as humans, we need to experience things, others, etc. at the primary level, but that, more and more, we are engaged in secondary, i.e., processed, modified, and packaged experience. This imbalance is a pervasive one. Education, for example, has moved from a focus upon hands-on experience to an emphasis on users' manuals. Even physical intimacy now comes packaged in the form of phone sex. Most children spend more than half of their waking hours plugged into the processed information box of television.

Reed does not believe that we can simply return to a "golden" age. But he does believe that progress can be made by utilizing the resources of American philosophy, especially Dewey, and to a lesser extent James, Putnam, Rorty and others-- to illustrate just why primary experience is so important to us. He also employs James Gibson's "ecological psychology," which sees its foremost task as that of "explaining how people and animals encounter their surroundings." (p. 7)

The downgrading of personal experience as unimportant buttresses an oppressive social order. (p. 37) Echoing Dewey, Reed says that "philosophers--especially postmodern ones--need to spend more of their time thinking about the places within which people find themselves (schools, workplaces, in front of the television) and less time dealing with abstractions." (p. 46) In the twentieth century, "we are beginning to lose the ability to experience the world directly," as we succumb to the Cartesian fear of uncertainty. The latter "has become a major cultural force in our world.... Every field from medicine to money making--even mysticism--searches for foolproof techniques." (p. 59) As a result, the environment we are leaving to our children is both degraded and dangerous. "Our post-modern world is thus achieving the reverse of what Dewey called for. Instead of using our information technology to create workplaces within which human experience can grow and thrive we are using the technology to manufacture jobs that are often little more than glorified pigeonholes, with all opportunity for growth and reflection eliminated." (p. 64) A standard refrain in many work situations is: "the computer won't let us do that." Intelligence in general has been redefined so as to mean "reliability, rapidity, and repeatability," while at the very same time pretending to value wisdom and individual creativity. In such a routinized environment one can't grow because nothing varies. In short, "mechanized experience is limited and limiting." (p. 91)