be used to *negate* claims about the natural world, then happily there cannot be a science of religion -- and that this is what James *should* have said if, indeed, he did not do so clearly.

There is much in this book that is thoughtful and clearly argued. The tension between James's *disjunctive* claims for religion vs. science vis a vis his *conjunctive* claims for a science of religion is brought out clearly. One might quibble with specifics, e.g., whether one can exercise the will to believe, at times "forced, living, and momentous," in both science and religion. But the overall effect of the text is to present a reevaluation and, at many times, a new interpretation of an aspect of James's work that has been too often underestimated -- the religious dimension.

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**La Filosofía del Hombre Aque Trabaja Y que Jueng.** Eugenio d'Ors. Madrid: Libertaras/Prodhufi, 1995. 231 pp.

According to Alfonso Lopez Quintas, in his 1972 study (*El pensamiento filosófico de Ortega y d'Ors*, Madrid: Ediciones Guadarrama) on José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) and Eugenio d'Ors (1881-1954), these two philosophers are characteristic of Spanish thought in the first half of the twentieth century. Yet, in the English speaking world d'Ors is virtually unknown while Ortega has long enjoyed a high reputation (due mainly to his *The Revolt of Masses*). For example, d'Ors was not included in the valuable anthology, *Spanish Philosophy* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), with an introduction and translations by A. Robert Caponigri. (However, he was included in the study and anthology by the well-known French Hispanist, Alain Guy, *Les philosophes espagnols d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*. [Toulouse: Privat, Editeur, 1956].)

The members of our society, at least, should be interested in this recent anthology of d'Ors' work, a non-sexist translation of whose title is *The Philosophy of the Human Person Who Works and Who Plays*. The reason: in 1907 d'Ors defined himself as a pragmatist, although later he considered his philosophy to have gone "beyond" pragmatism (and vitalism) while preserving the "truths" of that philosophy (14). How did this come about? The biographical context is presented in an excellent introductory essay (11-22), without which the excerpts in the anthology would be far less intelligible, by Professor Jaime Nubiola of the University of Navarra (Pamplona), whose interesting paper on Peirce and Spain was delivered at our Albuquerque conference. Having terminated his studies in literature and law in his native Barcelona (1903), d'Ors became intensely active in a career that combined journalism with cultural works in Catalonia. In 1906 his newspaper transferred him to Paris, a decisive step in the formation of his thought, where he discovered biology (upon which foundation he would later construct his logic) and experimental psychology (which he would later consider himself qualified to teach on the university level), as well as attended classes taught by Emile Boutroux and Henri Bergson. From those years date his *Glosari* (Glosses), many of whose pages form this anthology.
As stated by one of his biographers, and reported by Nubiola, it was during these years that d'Ors "experiences the seduction (seducción) of the doctrines of the North American pragmatists Peirce and James, which doctrines were beginning to be diffused in Paris from the turn of the century (13-14)." It was in one of his glossas, entitled "Pragmatisme," that he declared himself a pragmatist, and for the same reason — according to d'Ors — that had Peirce and James: in an effort to recognize an esthetic dimension in human action that is not reducible to the merely utilitarian.

Also in the anthology is d'Ors' essay-review of Boutroux's study of James (116-121), a study d'Ors thought Boutroux was most capable of undertaking both because of Boutroux's being the "ideal" type of historian of philosophy (having been trained in the school of Zeller) but also because both philosophers were "gentlemen" (even if the temperament of James made him "laugh" while that of Boutroux only made his "smile"). The only "essential note" of James that escaped Boutroux's "luminous analysis," according to d'Ors' judgment, was James' "protestantism" concerning the individual, his "lutheranism" as manifested in his Varieties of Religious Experience.

For much the same reason as d'Ors was initially attracted to James' pragmatism, he was attracted to Bergson's vitalism. He was sympathetic to their objections to monism as well as to Cartesian dualism, to their emphasis on a pluralistic dualism, to their acknowledging that the philosophic problems of our time were the subconscious and the irrational dimension of reality. But, ultimately, he was to reject both as incapable of understanding human life because of their strain of romanticism. Instead, he attempted to formulate a "new" classicism based on "integral reason," on an intelligence he called, in his native Catalan, "Seny" (analogous to the French "Sagesse") (204) that was the cornerstone of his "newest" organon. His notion of reason was reducible neither to contemplation ("pure reason") nor to action ("practical reason") but incorporated both in harmony. For him some human actions have an end (as in work) while other actions do not (as in play, although he thought the English word "sport" said it best) — hence the title of this anthology (which originally appeared in 1914 through the editorship of two of his disciples: Ramón Rucabado and José Farran).

The renewed interest in pragmatism is beginning to reveal just how widespread in Europe, including Spain, has been the influence of James — as seen in the recent study by John Graham, the first of a projected three volume study, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Life in Ortega y Gasset (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1994), and in this anthology with its "Presentación" by Jaime Nubiola, a Spanish historian of pragmatism.

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