alienation and nostalgia. Thoreau's growing absorption into detailed measurements is then seen as a fall from Reason into Understanding. But Walls sees Thoreau instead developing a different approach to nature. Thoreau finds that we need to forget what we know and see things anew. He was looking for creative interaction with the natural, an intimacy that did not destroy reciprocity. Rather than detached observation, he wanted to be the scribe of nature. Nature is not passive in the knowing process. This challenges a science which abets commodification of things.

As an empirical holist, his task was to join literature, philosophy and science into a whole emerging from particulars. This is less shocking when we realize facts (facta) are made and that literature is not the same as fiction. Critics, like Matthiessen, debate Thoreau's success in balancing fact and meaning. (Walls treats several critics in notes.) The literature/science split widened and criticism backed Thoreau into this split. Thoreau did cooperative natural history even as Agassiz demoted it to amateur status.

He finally studied the dispersion of seeds. What if matter organized itself without a divine or human mind? The world's end changed into continual succession. Seeds are transported through several networks, dispersing the center across multiple lines of connection. This was a genuine but neglected contribution to science and anticipated postmodernism. In his time insistence on naturalistic explanation was revolutionary. Darwin's Origin, read within a week of publication, give him context and focus. Yet Thoreau's was not a competitive deterministic world alienated from humanism.

Thoreau's project in the important address to the Middlesex Agricultural Society was to interface literature and science, just when they were unraveling. He used literary techniques to create what Steve Woolgar calls 'feedbacking' and 'inversion' which deny the transparency of the author and the object speaking for itself. The publisher deleted what he took as literary asides, thus stabilizing it as a scientific piece. 'Wild Apples' traces his growing respect for the wild in which growth and decay are mixed.

Cosmos emerges and re-emerge from self-organizing chaos. Eden includes the Fall. Yet nature is redemptive. We can learn from him because what he experienced, we feel as a culture.

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**Heaven's Champion: William James's Philosophy of Religion.** Ellen Kappy Suckiel.
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996. xvi plus 184 pp. $28.95

Ellen Suckiel's goal in this insightful volume is to "integrate James's numerous writings on the topic of religion, and to show how his religious views rely upon the broader principles of pragmatism" (pp. xi-xii). This project, however, must be taken with a grain of salt, for she argues again and again that James does different things in different texts. In the Varieties, for example, his aim is to marry science and religion, but in "The
Will to Believe,” his aim is to bracket the issue of science and to look at the positive aspects of the religious impulse on its own terms. It is, then, a mistake to look for a single coherent justification of religious belief. The justification seems, appropriately for a pragmatist, to be contextual in nature, i.e., fitted to the occasion and the audience at hand. James wanted to open up new ways of appreciating the issue of religion, which remained a constant theme in his philosophy, pervading many of his text.

"The Will to Believe" for Suckiel has two goals: "to establish the pragmatic justification for religious belief; and second . . . to demonstrate the impoverishment of the position of the scientific rationalist" (p. 37) -- the latter being defined as one who holds life to have no meaning, or to have merely a subjective one imposed from without. Thinkers of this type cut off options in advance by refusing to hold the religious option as a live one--refusing to "imagine foreign states of mind," as James would say. Religious feelings, Suckiel argues, not only "provide pragmatic justification for religious belief" (p. 75) -- "they [also] constitute evidence for religious claims" -- since, for James, feelings have cognitive value. Going further, one should not always vote for parsimony over richness, and "no hard and fast line can be drawn between the epistemic warrant for an explanation and the pragmatic justification for believing it"(p. 67).

Suckiel argues that "nowhere in James's philosophy of religion is he a realist in his conception of truth" (p. 94). However, she seems at least concerned that James at times comes close to such a position, since in the Varieties he does argue that religious beliefs must be empirical and, as such, must to some degree be confirmation by experience. James is on stronger grounds, she claims, when he argues either that, at bottom, both religion and science are equally partisan, or when he raises "the question of what the appropriate conception of science might be" (p. 131) -- i.e., when he suggests that "science" does not have meaning invariance. The issue here turns on how one decides to define realism: if "objective reference" is taken to connote an autonomous neutral entity, then James is not a realist. As Suckiel herself points out, James is no dualist; his religious metaphysics emphasizes communion, and sees the self as "an ever-changing series of experiences." The boundaries of the self are constantly changing and, within this perspective, God is seen as a wider series of experiences. But here one might want to argue, on pain of becoming too Hegelian in nature, that God remains, in some fundamentally important sense, an "other." It is here that James's "piecemeal supernaturalism" required that for the hypothesis of God to be true it must produce real effects, i.e., be operative in the universe. Suckiel concludes that, if this premise refers to the personal experience of prayer, widely conceived of as communion, then it is quite acceptable. But if it is taken as a mandate to produce a "science of religions" then it has gone to far, or, indeed, turned in the wrong direction. "To claim that there must be empirical confirmation of the propositions of religion, beyond experiences of religious communion, is not to strengthen religion, but rather to diminish the significance of this personal relationship in which religious individuals understand themselves to be participating" (pp. 12728). Here Suckiel relies on a less well-known article of James's, entitled "Reason and Faith," where he holds that sometimes religious experience can "call into question" other sorts of empirical facts. She uses this claim to argue, cleverly, that if personal experiences of religious communion can
be used to negate claims about the natural world, then happily there cannot be a science of religion -- and that this is what James should have said if, indeed, he did not do so clearly.

There is much in this book that is thoughtful and clearly argued. The tension between James's disjunctive claims for religion vs. science vis à vis his conjunctive claims for a science of religion is brought out clearly. One might quibble with specifics, e.g., whether one can exercise the will to believe, at times "forced, living, and momentous," in both science and religion. But the overall effect of the text is to present a reevaluation and, at many times, a new interpretation of an aspect of James's work that has been too often underestimated -- the religious dimension.


According to Alfonso Lopez Quintas, in his 1972 study (El pensamiento filosófico de Ortega y d'Ors, Madrid: Ediciones Guadarrama) on José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) and Eugenio d'Ors (1881-1954), these two philosophers are characteristic of Spanish thought in the first half of the twentieth century. Yet, in the English speaking world d'Ors is virtually unknown while Ortega has long enjoyed a high reputation (due mainly to his The Revolt of Masses). For example, d'Ors was not included in the valuable anthology, Spanish Philosophy (University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), with an introduction and translations by A. Robert Caponigri. (However, he was included in the study and anthology by the well-known French Hispanist, Alain Guy, Les philosophes espanols d'hier et d'aujourd'hui. [Toulouse: Privat, Editeur, 1956].)

The members of our society, at least, should be interested in this recent anthology of d'Ors' work, a non-sexist translation of whose title is The Philosophy of the Human Person Who Works and Who Plays. The reason: in 1907 d'Ors defined himself as a pragmatist, although later he considered his philosophy to have gone "beyond" pragmatism (and vitalism) while preserving the "truths" of that philosophy (14). How did this come about? The biographical context is presented in an excellent introductory essay (11-22), without which the excerpts in the anthology would be far less intelligible, by Professor Jaime Nubiola of the University of Navarra (Pamplona), whose interesting paper on Peirce and Spain was delivered at our Albuquerque conference. Having terminated his studies in literature and law in his native Barcelona (1903), d'Ors became intensely active in a career that combined journalism with cultural works in Catalonia. In 1906 his newspaper transferred him to Paris, a decisive step in the formation of his thought, where he discovered biology (upon which foundation he would later construct his logic) and experimental psychology (which he would later consider himself qualified to teach on the university level), as well as attended classes taught by Emile Boutroux and Henri Bergson. From those years date his Glosari (Glosses), many of whose pages form this anthology.