developed branch of Peirce's general semeiotic theory." Universal rhetoric or speculative rhetoric addresses the relationships between signs and interpretants, or (p. 79) it "can be thought of as the formal conditions for attainment of truth." While chapters on grammar and logic outline the details of sign, object, interpretant, deduction, induction, and abduction, and a plethora of other terms (including a couple of pages on existential graphs) as have appeared in other texts, Liszka's development is systematic and more clear than any other. Additionally, the final chapter develops the semeiotic concepts of "sense," "meaning," and "significance" (using Lady Welby's terms for Peirce's divisions) and tying them to the interpretant as "process, product, and effect." Briefly put, such a discussion unifies Peircean philosophy, culminating in Peirce's ideas of communication within a community of scientists, which seeks the ultimate logical interpretant.

The book's organization provides for a general sense of the evolution of signs, from simple intrasemeiotic dynamics in the second chapter, to intersemeiotic dynamic sign interaction within propositions and the development of logic, to the final chapter's articulation of Peirce's concepts of generals. Notions from vagueness to methods of inquiry are woven into the universal rhetoric showing how ethics, and aesthetics derive from the basic semeiotic. There is no speculation beyond the teleological conclusions of the ethics and aesthetics, but Liszka nicely unites Peirce's lofty goals into one complete (and short) systematic philosophy.

The only concerns with this monumental work, which Peirce was not able to produce within his life-time, are one minor point and one more far-reaching philosophical and scientific point. First, Liszka mentions Louis Agassiz as a geologist and while Agassiz contributed significantly to that field and to ichthyology, it seems that he should be more generally known as a naturalist.

The larger issue is one informed by Peirce's "Guess at the Riddle" among other writings, which address his general evolutionary perspective. Liszka explains Peirce's concepts of the "quasi-sign" and mechanics (p. 34), but seems to suggest that mechanics (and perhaps other forms of energy) operate at a pre-semeiotic or hyposemiotic level. The general nature of the semeiotic within the universe, coupled with Peirce's idea, "three elements are active in the world, first, chance; second, law; and third, habit-taking" (from "Guess") would yield a cosmic evolution which is semeiotic and would include a semeiotic dynamic within what physics and chemistry studies. Then, one could find all aspects of the grammar, logic, and rhetoric defining energy and matter, after all, "matter is effete mind" (from "The Architecture of Theories").

Cobb County Schools

George W. Stickel


30
This posthumous anthology of twenty-six years of Peircean publications is a credit to both Father Potter and Colapietro. While it is as comprehensive as its title suggests, it makes a unique contribution to Peirce studies and to philosophy and theology. It comprehensiveness is found both in the variety of topics and approaches, but more specifically in its thesis.

While the thesis is found in many forms throughout the book, in short, it is found in the corrective nature of Peirce’s pragmaticism. That pragmaticism is a triadic system—generals and the formation of generals—the formation of habits and rules for meaning and purpose within human experience. Given that thesis, one finds Potter returning to Peirce with question after question “convinced [according to Colapietro] that Peirce had gotten some things fundamentally right; so that, in getting Peirce right, we are led to think aright.” To get Peirce right Potter has several comparative essays and several essays of explication. Peirce is examined in light of British thinkers Duns Scotus, Alexander Bain, and William Whewell, compared extensively with William James, compared to Bernard Lonergan on “objective chance,” and briefly compared on continuity to Cantor and Kant.

Topics of explication include some of the traditional Peircean scholar debate topics, such as nominalism verses realism, the Peircean categories (which are woven throughout) and the essence of Peirce’s pragmaticism. There are other topics which need more visibility within the Peircean community, namely his theology and his normative sciences. Colapietro reminds us in the “Foreword”: “However unpalatable Peirce’s thesism is to some of his followers, it is—for good or ill—simply an integral part of his philosophical perspective.”

Potter succinctly threads Peirce’s normative science (logic, ethics, and aesthetics, and their development) throughout the essays, while focusing explicitly upon it within one essay. The corrective nature of the normative sciences is found within the very nature of logic, ethics, and aesthetics as they represent the categories of third, second, and first, respectively. Potter is clear that given this system of philosophy that the act is not the end of James’s pragmatism, but rather a component of Peirce’s pragmaticism. From a theological perspective, then, God cannot be said to exist, for that is mere secondness, which limits God. The reality of God, however, is beyond the action of secondness, although knowing God has implications for human conduct. The knowing of God, then, is not limited to acts within human experience, but includes the logic of arguments (thirds) and the sense of God derived from the heart as a sense organ.

So Potter moves the reader from a general overview of Peirce, through various aspects of his philosophy, to his “Neglected Argument for God.” While there is overlap, since several of the essays were published elsewhere and can stand alone, the book ties various aspects of Peirce’s philosophy into one unified whole.

The book is a good introduction to Peirce and an excellent resource on Peirce’s ethics and aesthetics within his architectonic (which needs expansion within the Peircean community). The greatest weaknesses of the book are two. First, there is no index, which
makes a text of this nature far less valuable than this academic book should be, which is all
the more astonishing in the age of technology and the quality of Fordham University Press.
The second weakness is the lack of sensitivity to the use of inclusive language. While
Potter may have been of an earlier generation, there has been enough research to move
editors and publishers to improve upon language and to make Potter’s contribution more
timeless. Nonetheless, this work is a must for any Peircean library and the casual and the
serious scholar.

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George W. Stickel

Seining New Worlds: Henry David Thoreau and Nineteenth-Century Science. Laura
Dassow Walls. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995. xii plus
300 pp. $42.00, $22.95 pb.

This excellent book looks at Thoreau’s philosophical and literary development against his scientific readings. Walls’ detailed study of the late writings, some forgotten or just published, forces a reinterpretation of material once dismissed as inferior. Major themes are his dialectic between intentional vision and “sauntering” with the eye, a relational epistemology of contact, the world as composed of patterns created by multiple material agents, the knower as one among these agents in interaction with them, and multiple views substituting for a God’s eye view. Walls seeks to overcome our scientific-literary split. Influenced by Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour, she is not just a postmodernist. It is not language all the way down. There is interaction with the world.

Thoreau’s context includes Emerson, Coleridge, Locke, Goethe, Carlyle, Lyell and especially Humboldt. Her point is that we have accepted the dichotomy between “Baconian” science and romanticism and tried to fit Thoreau into the scheme. Walls traces Thoreau’s journey from “rational holism” to “empirical holism.” Not an isolated hermit, Thoreau participated in this misunderstood alternative scientific tradition. Facts do not fit into, but generate the whole. Order is not the law of the same, but rather the product of multiple interactions. Mind and nature create each other. Science involves imagination. Since the parts combine to generate the whole, inconvenient parts cannot be discarded as accidents. Since nature is generated by the interaction of random differences, there is emergence but no teleology and facts are made by the interaction of mind and nature, a rejection of dualism. Emerson’s single law disintegrated into Thoreau’s multifariousness. Instead of universal truth there are viewpoints. Walls is excellent on Thoreau’s twin strategies of intentionality and spontaneity. The 19th century origin of these ideas, which anticipate ecology and James, challenges our periodization into modern and postmodern.

“Rational holism” had set a gulf between mind and nature, creating alienation from nature in the romanticists. This results in the standard interpretation of Thoreau, McIntosh’s influential Thoreau as Romantic Naturalist, which sees a dialectic of

32