and behavioral feedback, on our primitive attempts at theory (what he calls "observation
categoricals"), on intersubjective testing of those categoricals. Much of the book, however, is not
on explicating how we move from stimulus to science, but on philosophical commitments that
come by the by. The final three chapters (40 of the 105 pages of text) deal with denotation, truth,
semantic agreement, propositional attitudes, semantic ascent, etc.

Now, I happen to be very sympathetic with Quine’s philosophical sentiments and projects,
but I don’t see that From Stimulus to Science explicates or advances them. If the present book
truly offered “the many small refinements of detail and formulation” that the dust jacket promises,
it would be a helpful addition to Quine’s corpus. Sadly, it does not. My own recommendation is
Pursuit of Truth as a fine recent summary statement of his thought; it covers much of the same
material as the present book and it doesn’t contain the howlers like the one quoted above. Quine is
quite rightly considered by many (including myself) as THE American philosopher of our century
(ok, along with Dewey!). His works - canonical by now - are genuine troves. From Stimulus to
Science, though, is an unfortunate shank in his philosophical golf game.

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NATURE’S GRACE: ESSAYS ON H. N. WIEMAN’S FINITE THEISM, by Marvin C
Shaw. Peter Lang. 1995. xi plus 160 pp. $29.95

Wieman was an empirical religious naturalist who taught at the University of Chicago
from 1927-1947 and was one of the scholars called to start the graduate program in philosophy at
Southern Illinois University from 1956 to 1966. He was influential among a number of religious
thinkers and helped process theology develop. Morris Eames of SIU said that Wieman and Dewey
helped many to reconstruct and thus retain their religious heritage. His influence continues among
religious empiricists such as Nancy Frankenberry, William Dean, Emanuel Goldsmith, Charley
Hardwick, Karl Peters and myself, in the Society for Philosophy of Creativity, and among some
psychiatrists.

This first booklength study of Wieman is first rate. Shaw describes Wieman’s naturalistic
theism as a modification of Dewey’s interaction of human and non-human, so that what is creative
of the good is the interaction as a whole rather than the human factor primarily, as with Dewey.
Contrary to humanism’s self-reliance, we are to cultivate openness to gifts of a non-human source
of transformation and yield our lives to be transformed in the process. Shaw helpfully sets Wieman
within the context of the Chicago naturalists E. S. Ames and Shailer Mathews, for whom the divine
is neither nature nor the human ideal, but nature insofar as it is supportive of human good. For this
theism, God, however conceived, is the proper object of devotion, not the source of all existence.
This involves a selective principle, focusing only on what is creative or transformative of human
good. This selectivity is a major point of contention among current religious naturalists. Wieman
differs from his colleagues in his effort to specify the pattern of creativity.

Part of the genius of Shaw’s interpretation is that he sees the development of Wieman’s
thought driven by these attempts to specify the generic concept of the divine. These attempts go
from "progressive integration" and "creative synthesis" through "creative event" to "creative
interchange." The controversial but valid part of Shaw’s claim is that increasing specificity of the
concept of the divine leads to vulnerability to criticism and to reduction to the commonplace.
Shaw finds Wieman at his best in the second period, 1929 to 1938, in contrast to those who know Wieman mainly from *The Source of Human Good* or who, like John Broyer, draw mainly from the later Wieman.

Shaw is brilliant a) in pointing out that for Wieman the divine as progressive integration is an instrumental notion for the observed behavior of the universe, not a force, the movement toward integration, not the mover; and b) in analyzing Wieman’s distrust of all concepts about God or reality and suggests that this is a "post-modern" aspect to Wieman. However, both these points should be contextualized by noting that Wieman’s God is a distinctive structured event or process and is open to empirical inquiry using precise concepts. Shaw is helpful in pointing out that for Wieman the mark of the religious approach to life is readiness for transformation. This counteracts the language of auto-suggestion in the earlier books. Shaw’s treatments of the earliest period and of *The Source of Human Good* are clear and reliable, if brief. He is helpful in sorting out issues in Wieman’s growing rejection of metaphysics, on whether there is a unity in the divine, and whether the divine creativity is active on nonhuman levels. His treatment of the relationship to Dewey, including *The Christian Century* debate, and to Santayana is instructive. Additional gems are the exploration of the debate with William Bernhardt, continuity and change in his conception of mysticism, and his treatment of Jesus. Lacking in this otherwise fine study are other issues, including the use of the social sciences, implications for social ethics, and Bernard Meland’s critiques of Wieman.

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Joseph Conforti’s re-evaluation of Jonathan Edwards’s influence on the development of American culture depends on the thesis that significant figures in cultural history are created by their followers. Most of this book is devoted to an investigation of the generation and transformation of the New Divinity movement in New England. Conforti’s speculative thesis, that Edwards’s role in American religion is largely an invention of his New Divinity “disciples,” provides the real tension and interest in this book.

The historical scope of this book begins with the Second Great Awakening and its immediate progenitors, and concludes with a "sketch" of the twentieth century appropriation of Edwards. Conforti’s intention is much more than sketchy, however, in regard to the progressive/neo-orthodox debate over Edwards in our century. From this historical platform Conforti leans toward making an analogical argument. The development of the image of Edwards is an instance of cultural development writ large. Significant figures and events are dubious, especially when later thinkers have "cultural needs" to fill. The "filling" is a re-construction or a wholesale invention of the "past." Conforti’s most interesting work on this point is his tracking of the distribution and the various edited versions of Edwards’s writing, especially *The Life of David Brainerd*, during the Second Great Awakening and its waning. The absence of Edwards’s books before the Second Awakening inclines Conforti to believe that the First Great Awakening, and Jonathan Edwards himself, were not great or principally significant for New England, but only became significant in light of the purposes of the Second Great Awakening. This "invention" of Edwards and the Great Awakening, Conforti claims, continues to dominate Edwards scholarship.