Thirty years after Random House published the first edition of Selected Logic Papers, Harvard University Press has provided us with an enlarged edition. This is good. Not only does this help a new generation of philosophers to have easy access to some seminal papers in logic and to become better acquainted with the rigor of Quine’s work, but it also gives the philosophical community the opportunity to appreciate his more recent work and to assess changes in his thought.

This enlarged edition contains the original 23 papers (spanning the years 1934-1960) along with eight recent papers (1982-1994). The papers cover a variety of topics, including axiomatic set theory, truth functions, quantification theory, and history of logic. Several particularly influential papers appear: “Completeness of the Propositional Calculus,” “A Proof Procedure for Quantification Theory,” “On W-Inconsistency and a So-called Axiom of Infinity, and Variables Explained Away.” By his own admission, Quine’s most influential paper on mathematical logic, “New Foundations for Mathematical Logic,” is not in this collection because it is already reprinted in From A Logical Point of View. (Nevertheless, this present collection does contain a recent article on “The Inception of New Foundations.”) While these papers are technical, underlying them is a concern to address philosophical issues that might seem more obvious in Quine’s other, less technical papers. Those issues are: enunciating fruitful clarity in and through semantical analysis, combatting ontological confusions, and advocacy of pragmatic epistemic holism. So, essays such as “On W-Inconsistency” or “Quantification and the Empty Domain” are not only about legitimate interpretations of formulae, but are also about ontological commitments. Or, “Variables Explained Away” is not only about syntactical components of a quantificational system, but is also about the nature of predicates and singular terms. Nevertheless, these papers will be dauntingly technical to many readers. Several papers, though thick, are expository, e.g., historically-oriented essays on Whitehead, Peirce, Peano. “Logic, Symbolic,” which originally appeared in the 1957 edition of Encyclopedia Americana, is a masterful overview of its titled topic.

In his review of the first edition of Selected Logic Papers, Peter Caws quoted J.L. Austin as having written, “Everything done by Quine is just fine....” I have thought so, until the publication of From Stimulus to Science. My major complaint about this book is that there seems to be no reason for it to have been published, other than for Harvard Press to profit. There is very little here of substance that has not appeared before, especially in light Harvard’s publishing of Quine’s Pursuit of Truth just a few years ago. In eight chapters, From Stimulus to Science contains the jist of lectures given at the Universitat de Girona in 1990. The dust jacket proclaims that he begins the book with “a lightning tour of the history of philosophy.” Indeed he does, and, though he knows better, he provides us with this summary of medieval epistemology: “But darkness descended, and mists of myth and mysticism settled in for a thousand years. Ways of knowing dwindled to one: higher authority.” Shame! From this beginning historical overview, Quine moves to giving a non-technical account of naturalistic empiricism, and true to the book’s title, there is little on the nature of stimulus or the nature of science. Rather, we have his account of how it is that we move from, as he puts it, noticing “what goes on around us” to intersubjective epistemic checkpoints to “responsible theor[ies] of the external world.” As anyone familiar with Quine’s work over the past half-century could guess, that account centers on observation sentences.
and behavioral feedback, on our primitive attempts at theory (what he calls "observation
categoricals"), on intersubjective testing of those categoricals. Much of the book, however, is not
on explicating how we move from stimulus to science, but on philosophical commitments that
come by the by. The final three chapters (40 of the 105 pages of text) deal with denotation, truth,
semantic agreement, propositional attitudes, semantic ascent, etc.

Now, I happen to be very sympathetic with Quine's philosophical sentiments and projects,
but I don't see that From Stimulus to Science explicates or advances them. If the present book
truly offered "the many small refinements of detail and formulation" that the dust jacket promises,
it would be a helpful addition to Quine's corpus. Sadly, it does not. My own recommendation is
Pursuit of Truth as a fine recent summary statement of his thought; it covers much of the same
material as the present book and it doesn't contain the howlers like the one quoted above. Quine is
quite rightly considered by many (including myself) as THE American philosopher of our century
(ok, along with Dewey!). His works - canonical by now - are genuine troves. From Stimulus to
Science, though, is an unfortunate shank in his philosophical golf game.

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NATURE'S GRACE: ESSAYS ON H. N. WIEMAN'S FINITE THEISM, by Marvin C
Shaw. Peter Lang. 1995. xi plus 160 pp. $29.95

Wieman was an empirical religious naturalist who taught at the University of Chicago
from 1927-1947 and was one of the scholars called to start the graduate program in philosophy at
Southern Illinois University from 1956 to 1966. He was influential among a number of religious
thinkers and helped process theology develop. Morris Eames of SIU said that Wieman and Dewey
helped many to reconstruct and thus retain their religious heritage. His influence continues among
religious empiricists such as Nancy Frankenberry, William Dean, Emanuel Goldsmith, Charley
Hardwick, Karl Peters and myself, in the Society for Philosophy of Creativity, and among some
psychiatrists.

This first booklength study of Wieman is first rate. Shaw describes Wieman's naturalistic
theism as a modification of Dewey's interaction of human and non-human, so that what is creative
of the good is the interaction as a whole rather than the human factor primarily, as with Dewey.
Contrary to humanism's self-reliance, we are to cultivate openness to gifts of a non-human source
of transformation and yield our lives to be transformed in the process. Shaw helpfully sets Wieman
within the context of the Chicago naturalists E. S. Ames and Shailer Mathews, for whom the divine
is neither nature nor the human ideal, but nature insofar as it is supportive of human good. For this
theism, God, however conceived, is the proper object of devotion, not the source of all existence.
This involves a selective principle, focusing only on what is creative or transformative of human
good. This selectivity is a major point of contention among current religious naturalists. Wieman
differs from his colleagues in his effort to specify the pattern of creativity.

Part of the genius of Shaw's interpretation is that he sees the development of Wieman's
thought driven by these attempts to specify the generic concept of the divine. These attempts go
from "progressive integration" and "creative synthesis" through "creative event" to "creative
interchange." The controversial but valid part of Shaw's claim is that increasing specificity of the
concept of the divine leads to vulnerability to criticism and to reduction to the commonplace.

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