-- reconstruction of the problematic context in which intelligence finds itself. Dewey's conception of philosophy as wisdom (the proper use of knowledge in human affairs) is in keeping with the classical and Platonic aspiration for philosophy even while abandoning its methodological commitments.

Dewey's reconstruction of classical Greek logic as the theory of inquiry follows from the conception of knowledge as a species of action rather than a kind of seeing or vision. An adequate theory of inquiry must be able to account for error (which traditional empiricism fails to do) as well as the increase or growth of scientific knowledge (which traditional rationalism fails to do). Hook devotes four of his twelve chapters to Dewey's theories of meaning, truth, logic, and mind claiming that Dewey's "... basic doctrines and most fundamental contributions have been in the field of logic." (88) These early chapters are programmatic in Hook's exposition and also indicate Dewey's critical involvement with the Western philosophical tradition, guarding against the view that Dewey is a mere moralist. The first misunderstanding or undervaluing of Dewey is possible because his writings are not replete with citations even when historical positions and figures are being examined. The second undervaluing is possible due to the extent of Dewey's writings in morals and politics. These applications to morals, art, religion, and education presuppose Dewey's methodological contributions, which Hook recounts in his early chapters.

Regrettably, Hook died before this republication. How he may have reintroduced this study in 1995 is uncertain. What is certain, I believe, would be his opposition to Richard Rorty's claim in the Introduction that there is no conceptual linkage between pragmatism and democracy. (xvii) This claim, which Rorty presents here without argument, is at odds with Hook's text (152-154, 159-160, 174) and with Hook's calling Dewey "The Philosopher of American Democracy."

In conceiving philosophy as a method for articulating the movement and spirit of the age, projecting its possibilities, and evaluating their actualization, Dewey has left, as he once jokingly remarked, some work for the younger people to do, and also, as Hook recounts, something with which to work.

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For scholars of both Arendt and Heidegger this will prove to be a frustrating book, promising much more than it delivers. The nature of their relationship has long puzzled interpreters of Arendt, especially in the light of her determined but ineffective attempts at exoneration of Heidegger's now well-established enthusiasm for and cooperation with the Nazi regime. It has
generally been assumed that clues would lie in their correspondence, formerly believed to be sealed until into the next century (in contrast to the accessible wealth of their surviving material left by them both).

Now Ettinger has apparently been permitted by Arendt's Literary Trust to "use" letters from her to Heidegger and Heidegger's wife Elfride, but only to "peruse" those from Heidegger to her. The exact terms of these agreements are not spelled out, although the careful reader can establish their main lines (for example, no quotation at all from Heidegger). The result is an oddly unbalanced exposition in more than one way; for example, Ettinger often relies for corroboration of her main points by quoting at length correspondence between her two main protagonists and Karl Jaspers, the other point in a complex and consistent triangle, which has long been published and translated. Indeed the strongest feature of her analysis is the identification of the collusive way in which both Arendt and Jaspers strove to see the best in their former friend, and the latter's greater acceptance of the self-sacrifice he was making in doing so.

The main lines of the story are well known: Arendt's experience as both the student and lover of Heidegger at the University of Marburg; her completion of her studies at Freiburg with Husserl and Heidelberg with Jaspers (both of whom later suffered at Heidegger's hands during his notorious, if short, period as Rector of Heidelberg in 1933); their separation (rather than estrangement) between Arendt's flight from Germany in 1932, and their emotional reunion in 1950; their curious continuing desire for each other's intellectual and emotional approbation, frustrated by his second wife Elfride and understood and supported by her second husband Heinrich Bluecher; her development of a role not only as his advocate to the English-speaking world but also as his literary agent; and the closeness of their deaths in late 1975 and early 1976 respectively.

Sadly we learn little that is new about any of these episodes, nor about how Arendt (whose most enduring philosophical legacy is about the conditions of judging human behavior in the extreme conditions of the present century) could have made such astonishing mistakes in her evaluation of her mentor. Ettinger's thesis stresses consistently the personal dimension, in particular the "perfidy and sentimentality" with which he apparently maintained a hold upon her. It is, however, perfectly possible to accept the fairly despicable manipulativeness with which Heidegger managed most of his personal relationships, as well as the self-delusions he held about his brief period in the public spotlight, and to remain puzzled about Arendt's unique willingness to give him the benefit of the doubt. Some, like Alan Ryan (in the New York Review of Books, 11 January 1996) suspect that the answer lies in her continued need for his philosophical framework. I am more convinced that she had moved beyond this intellectual dependence (see David Watson, Arendt, Harper Collins 1992, pp. 122-25). Neither of us is assisted much by this hyped and superficial account.